Abstract
The chapter completes the delimitation of the concept of caveats. Caveats are politically motivated, national conditions for the use of force in a coalition force, where military contingents are subordinated to a unified chain of command and relate to some common regulation of the use of force. Particular national conditions for the use of force can be either of a restrictive, or a permissive kind, and may be formally recognized as such, or be informal, undeclared, and even unadmitted by the force-contributing state, only to be observed in actual force-deviating behavior not related to lack of capacity or coordination. The empirical footprint of caveats are observable as national deviations from the coalition RoE in terms of when use of force is permitted and how; in national interference in the coalition’s chain of command on matters of task-assignment; and in national inflexibility in the extent to which coalition is delegated authority to make full use of the operational capacity of the contingent as to where, when, and how the national contingent may be deployed and used in theater of war.
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Fermann, G. (2019). Preparing the Concept of Caveats for Empirical Research. In: Coping with Caveats in Coalition Warfare. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92519-6_4
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