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Regulation of the Use of Force in Military Organization and Coalition Forces

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Book cover Coping with Caveats in Coalition Warfare

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Abstract

The reasoning of a conception of caveats that are both recognizable to military professionals and discrete and nuanced enough to be useful in empirical research, requires the reviewing of the post-Cold War experience with caveats and the mechanism of rules of engagement (RoE) in the regulation of the use of force. RoE is not a recipe for the use of force in combat, but guidelines as to when, where against whom, and how military force be used, and who has the authority to make such decisions. Situational judgment needs to be applied in the interpretation of RoE and relies on both local and prior knowledge to make optimal trade-offs between military and political concerns. RoEs vary regarding how specific, delegative, and robust formulated. The coalition RoE is a key yardstick against which national reservations on the use of force (caveats) be measured.

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  1. Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

    Gunnar Fermann

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  1. Gunnar Fermann
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Correspondence to Gunnar Fermann .

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Fermann, G. (2019). Regulation of the Use of Force in Military Organization and Coalition Forces. In: Coping with Caveats in Coalition Warfare. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92519-6_3

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