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Tool-Supported Safety-Relevant Component Reuse: From Specification to Argumentation

  • Irfan Sljivo
  • Barbara Gallina
  • Jan Carlson
  • Hans Hansson
  • Stefano Puri
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10873)

Abstract

Contracts are envisaged to support compositional verification of a system as well as reuse and independent development of their implementations. But reuse of safety-relevant components in safety-critical systems needs to cover more than just the implementations. As many safety-relevant artefacts related to the component as possible should be reused together with the implementation to assist the integrator in assuring that the system they are developing is acceptably safe. Furthermore, the reused assurance information related to the contracts should be structured clearly to communicate the confidence in the component. In this work we present a tool-supported methodology for contract-driven assurance and reuse. We define the variability on the contract level in the scope of a trace-based approach to contract-based design. With awareness of the hierarchical nature of systems subject to compositional verification, we propose assurance patterns for arguing confidence in satisfaction of requirements and contracts. We present an implementation extending the AMASS platform to support automated instantiation of the proposed patterns, and evaluate its adequacy for assurance and reuse in a real-world case study.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work is supported by the EU and VINNOVA via the ECSEL Joint Undertaking projects AMASS (No 692474) and SafeCop (No 692529), as well as the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research (SSF) via the FiC project.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Irfan Sljivo
    • 1
  • Barbara Gallina
    • 1
  • Jan Carlson
    • 1
  • Hans Hansson
    • 1
  • Stefano Puri
    • 2
  1. 1.Mälardalen UniversityVästeråsSweden
  2. 2.Intecs, SpAPisaItaly

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