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Democracy and Corruption

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Rethinking the Value of Democracy

Part of the book series: The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy ((PSTCD))

Abstract

Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fighting against high levels of continuous corruption. Dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research confirm statistically significant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization and measurement. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption. Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but in particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country. In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power. In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats).

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Doorenspleet, R. (2019). Democracy and Corruption. In: Rethinking the Value of Democracy. The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91656-9_5

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