Demarcating Simulation

  • Nico FormanekEmail author
Part of the Philosophy of Engineering and Technology book series (POET, volume 31)


Philosophy of computer simulation has for long tried to answer the question: What makes computer simulation special? Answers normally proceed by giving a demarcation criterion, a property which only holds for computer simulation. The definition by demarcation has also been attempted in different fields, maybe most famously by Popper for science. So it might not come as a surprise that philosophy of mathematics has tried to demarcate computer aided proof. What is remarkable is that the demarcation criteria for computer simulation and computer aided proof are rather similar. As the debate in philosophy of mathematics is more advanced, I will show how its arguments can be translated for the philosophy of computer simulation. I argue that even in the light of computer methods human justificatory capabilities still remain central. In closing I point out, that the focus on justificatory methods like verification/validation in software engineering challenges the traditional philosophical account of engineering.


Philosophy of computer simulation Epistemology of computer simulation Philosophy of software engineering 


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© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.HöchstleistungsrechenzentrumStuttgartGermany

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