The Case for Christian Theism

Lataster, Raphael

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-90793-2_4

Raphael Lataster⁵

Part of the book series: Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures ((SCPT,volume 26))

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Abstract

The focus of this part of the book will be on how Craig moves on from generic theism, or actually a generic supernaturalism, to demonstrate the truth of Christian theism. After sowing doubt about the historical sources, I then put forth a Bayesian-inspired argument for the implausibility of miraculous claims being truthful. This allows for a thorough critique of Craig’s climactic Christological argument, which relies on the truth of the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, whose very historical existence is becoming increasingly questioned. Finally, alternative – particularly Bayesian – Christological arguments shall be analysed, including one supplied by Richard Swinburne.

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Notes

1.
Craig (RF), pp. 24, 247, 287, 333. In later works, it is clarified further that Craig’s ultimate aim is to extend his “apologetic case beyond mere belief in God to belief in the biblical God revealed by Jesus”. See Craig (OG), pp. 182, 265.
2.
Craig (RF), pp. 207, 247, 333; Craig (OG), pp. 182, 265.
3.
A more concise and less technical form of this critique has since been published. See Raphael Lataster, “A Philosophical and Historical Analysis of William Lane Craig’s Resurrection of Jesus Argument,” Think 14, no. 39 (2015): 59–71.
4.
Craig has since clarified that his resurrection argument is indeed an argument from God’s existence, when notified about my Think article on his resurrection argument. Claiming that he did not read my article, Craig also acknowledged that his hypothesis may be more ad hoc than alternative explanations, due to the assumption of God’s existence, though he tries to minimalise this. The latter appears absurd, given the central theme of his work. See William Lane Craig. “Is my Argument for Jesus’ Resurrection Question-Begging?,” accessed 18/05/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-my-argument-for-jesus-resurrection-question-begging. Craig was later asked if he had any thoughts about my work, replying, “Nope” (in a semi-public communication with attorney James W. Cushing, via Facebook, August 3, 2016). Swinburne’s Christological argument also proceeds from God’s existence, as we shall later see. And as with Craig, Swinburne is aware of Philipse’s unrelenting God in the Age of Science?, but has not read all of it. See Raphael Lataster, “On Richard Swinburne and the Failings of Christian Theistic Evidentialism,” Literature & Aesthetics 26, no. 1 (2016): 37.
5.
Indeed, the fact that many people change their religions or doctrines – sometimes several times – should serve as a warning concerning exclusivist beliefs.
6.
Craig (RF), pp. 395–399; Craig (OG), pp. 219–264.
7.
William Lane Craig. “Is the Material World all there is? Arguments for the Existence of God,” accessed 06/12/2013, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/08/06/3819108.htm.
8.
I have earlier argued for the position of Historical Jesus agnosticism, that it is not certain that a historical Jesus existed, and also supported Richard Carrier’s defence of Jesus mythicism, the view that Jesus did not exist as a historical person. Much of this work will be referenced and summarised below. For far greater detail, see Raphael Lataster, “Jesus Scepticism: An Examination of the Arguments for Various ‘Jesus as a Myth’ Theories” (Master’s thesis, University of Sydney, 2013); Richard Carrier, On the Historicity of Jesus: Why We Might Have Reason For Doubt (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2014); Raphael Lataster, “The Fourth Quest: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Literature on Jesus’ (a)Historicity,” Literature & Aesthetics 24, no. 1 (2014): 1–28; Raphael Lataster, “It’s Official: We Can Now Doubt Jesus’ Historical Existence,” Think 15, no. 43 (2016): 65–79. The latter article was published by Cambridge University Press, and I have also presented a well received paper, by believers as well as non-believers, on this and related issues at Oxford University. See Raphael Lataster, “The (Overwhelming) Improbability of Classical Theism” (paper presented at the Oxford Symposium on Religious Studies, Oxford, 1st August 2016).
9.
Craig (RF), pp. 395–396.
10.
The uses of the criteria, and other issues concerning historical method, were covered in more detail in the Introduction.
11.
Hershel Shanks, “How the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Old Testament Differ: An Interview with David Noel Freedman – Part 1,” Bible Review 9, no. 6 (1993): 34.
12.
Stephen Law, “Evidence, Miracles and the Existence of Jesus,” Faith and Philosophy 28, no. 2 (2011): 129–151; Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne, eds., Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity (London: T&T Clark, 2012). I earlier discussed this and the criteria’s failings in greater detail. See Lataster (JS), pp. 21–27; Raphael Lataster, “Bayesian Reasoning: Criticising the ‘Criteria of Authenticity’ and Calling for a Review of Biblical Criticism,” Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 5, no. 2 (2013): 271–293.
13.
Ronald F. Hock, The Infancy Gospels of James and Thomas: With Introduction, Notes, and Original Text Featuring the New Scholars Version Translation (Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge Press, 1995), p. 109.
14.
Craig (OG), p. 195.
15.
The testimony of Jewish women seems to have been trusted after all. See Judith Romney Wegner, Chattel or Person?: The Status of Women in the Mishnah (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 119–127.
16.
Craig (RF), pp. 367–368. Note that Craig refers only to Josephus and the Talmud for this apparently incorrect claim about women, with no support from Christian writings, or even the Old Testament. He similarly thinks it unlikely that Jesus’ burial by Joseph of Arimathea would be fabricated. See Craig (OG), p. 224. Rather, this story could indicate that the new faith is so inclusive, that even ‘the worst’ of people (Joseph being a Jewish Sanhedrist) are permissible. Interestingly, Reginald Fuller sees this story as legendary, going so far as to consider if Joseph was “a pure invention”. See Reginald Horace Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2007), pp. 54–56. Consider also Paul’s apparent progressivism in Galatians 3:28.
17.
Mark 16:3. Perhaps a fabrication illustrating that God will eventually reward and provide for the uncertain-but-faithful, as seemingly indicated in earlier parables (Mark 4). The later Matthew 6:26–27, revealing that God even provides for the ‘birds of the air’, might better illustrate this point, however.
18.
See Mark 16, Matthew 28, Luke 24, and John 20.
19.
Little is known of her, though Luke 8:2 includes Mary Magdalene in a group of women suffering from “evil spirits and diseases”, specifying that she was possessed by multiple demons. Cf. Mark 16:9. This is exactly how superstitious and unsophisticated ancient peoples would have perceived mental illnesses. For links between claims of possession and schizophrenia, see Miriam Azaunce, “Is It Schizophrenia or Spirit Possession?,” Journal of Social Distress and the Homeless 4, no. 3 (1995): 255–263; S. N. Chiu, “Historical, Religious and Medical Perspectives of Possession Phenomenon,” Hong Kong Journal of Psychiatry 10, no. 1 (2000): 14–18. Even a conservative paper, which casually and absurdly refers to demons as actually existing, which clearly begs the question, admits to the similarities. See M. Kemal Irmak, “Schizophrenia or Possession?,” Journal of Religion and Health 53, no. 3 (2014): 773–777.
20.
Mark 15:40.
21.
Mark 15:47.
22.
According to the contentious Mark 16:9. Note also that Mary Magdalene’s omission in Paul’s writings on the resurrection is very curious, given her key role according to the Gospel accounts.
23.
Mark 16:10–11, Luke 24:9–10.
24.
Geraldine Pinch, Handbook of Egyptian Mythology (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2002), p. 79. Note that numerous scholars actually deny the veridicality of the empty tomb narrative. One reason is that there are many similarities with earlier Pagan myths, such as those concerning Romulus. See Richard C. Miller, “Mark’s Empty Tomb and Other Translation Fables in Classical Antiquity,” Journal of Biblical Literature 129, no. 4 (2010): 759–776.
25.
Craig (RF), p. 379.
26.
Mark 6:4.
27.
Of course, billions of Christians throughout history did not/do not find Jesus’ death embarrassing. On the foreshadowing of a suffering Messiah figure, see Isaiah 52–53. There is yet more in the oft-overlooked inter-testamental literature.
28.
2 Kings 19:35–36.
29.
For a theologian’s perspective, though he rightfully acknowledges this “fairy-tale”, see A. R. Millard, “Sennacherib’s Attack On Hezekiah,” Tyndale Bulletin 36, no. 1 (1985): 61–77. For a more sceptical approach, see Finkelstein and Silberman (BU), pp. 259–263.
30.
And yet, according to the Gospel account, it was scholarly consensus that condemned Jesus to death. See Mark 14:53–65.
31.
Crossan (HJ), p. xxviii.
32.
Lataster (JS), pp. 47–61. Craig agrees on the latter point, noting that “they don’t really tell us anything new”. See Craig (OG), p. 185, and also William Lane Craig, “Rediscovering the Historical Jesus: The Evidence for Jesus.,” Faith and Mission 15, no. 2 (1998): 17.
33.
Secular Historical Jesus researchers would certainly appreciate such a source, especially one whose authenticity and textual integrity could not be doubted. For example, Yeshua Bar-Yosef, My Rather Insignificant Life (Jerusalem: Sandy Temple Press, 29), p. 13.
34.
Ranke (HRG), p. xi; Gottschalk (UH), p. 165.
35.
See Matthew 4:23–25, 14:1, and Luke 5:15.
36.
Gary R. Habermas, “Resurrection Claims in Non-Christian Religions,” Religious Studies 25, no. 2 (1989): 170.
37.
Cf. Garraghan and Delanglez (GHM), p. 168.
38.
On the latter point, I am mostly referring to miraculous claims. This pertains more to Craig’s second premise, so for now, I shall attempt the even greater challenge of demonstrating the reasonableness of scepticism regarding the quite mundane Historical Jesus, as opposed to the more easily dismissed Christ of Faith or Biblical Jesus.
39.
Obvious sources such as the books of the Tanakh or Old Testament and the inter-testamental literature cannot, of course, confirm the historical events described in the later New Testament books.
40.
Ehrman (DJE), p. 42; Bart D. Ehrman and Michael Licona, Debate – Can Historians Prove Jesus Rose from the Dead? (Matthews, NC: Southern Evangelical Seminary, 2009), DVD.
41.
Avalos (EBS), pp. 68–69, 77, 91, 117.
42.
Hector Avalos and William Lane Craig, The Resurrection of Jesus: Fact or Fiction? (La Mirada, CA: Biola University, 2004), Audio CD. Similarly, Tucker asserts that biblical critics and historians are concerned with “the explanation of the evidence, not whether or not a literal interpretation of the evidence corresponds with what took place”. See Tucker (OKP), p. 99.
43.
Pieter F. Craffert, “Caretakers, Critics, and Comparativists: A Meta-Analysis of Historical Jesus Research,” Journal for the Study of Religion 25, no. 2 (2012): 111–135. Note that the likes of Carrier (whose defence of mythicism is discussed in the following subsection) and myself might just be performing such alternative analyses, by setting aside long-held assumptions, and entertaining various possibilities where the sources are not intended to portray genuine historical events.
44.
Robert M. Price, The Incredible Shrinking Son of Man: How Reliable is the Gospel Tradition? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), p. 351.
45.
Rudolf Bultmann (b. 1884) was an influential New Testament scholar, who downplayed the ‘facts’ concerning the historical Jesus and stressed the importance of faith.
46.
Cf. “I do indeed think that we can now know almost nothing concerning the life and personality of Jesus, since the early Christian sources show no interest in either, are moreover fragmentary and often legendary; and other sources about Jesus do not exist.” See Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the Word (New York: Scribner’s, 1935), p. 8. For more on this minimalist stance, see David Seeley, Deconstructing the New Testament (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p. 14; Darrell L. Bock, Studying the Historical Jesus: a Guide to Sources and Methods (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2002), pp. 144–145; Rudolf Bultmann, The New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic Writings, ed. Schubert M. Ogden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1989).
47.
For some discussion on Old Testament minimalism, see Thomas L. Thompson, “Is The Bible Historical? The Challenge of ‘Minimalism’ for Biblical Scholars and Historians,” Holy Land Studies 3, no. 1 (2004): 1–27; Megan Bishop Moore and Brad E. Kelle, Biblical History and Israel’s Past (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2011).
48.
Robert H. Stein, “Was the Tomb Really Empty?,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 20, no. 1 (1977): 24–25; Bart D. Ehrman, Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 230. Liberal Christian John Shelby Spong is also somewhat of a minimalist, and also disputes the veridicality of the resurrection claims. See John Shelby Spong, Resurrection – Myth or Reality?: A Bishop’s Search for the Origins of Christianity (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1994). Consider also Christian scholars who even deny a Historical Jesus, such as Thomas Brodie, a Catholic priest, and Edward van der Kaaij, a Protestant pastor. See Thomas Brodie, Beyond the Quest for the Historical Jesus: Memoir of a Discovery (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2012); Hanna Daych. “Jesus didn’t exist, but a “myth”, says banned pastor,” accessed 24/03/2015, http://www.nltimes.nl/2015/02/08/jesus-didnt-exist-myth-says-banned-pastor.
49.
See Lataster (JS), pp. 93–100.
50.
Craig (RF), p. 362.
51.
Galatians 1:11–12.
52.
1 Corinthians 15:3–4.
53.
Cf. Gerd Lüdemann, “Paul as a Witness to the Historical Jesus,” in Sources of the Jesus Tradition: Separating History from Myth, ed. R. Joseph Hoffmann (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2010), p. 212. Paul also seems to be, by his own admission, a bit crafty, as in 2 Corinthians 12:16. Furthermore, while discussing some of his revelations, Paul claims that he was given a messenger of Satan to harass him, so that he could stay grounded. See 2 Corinthians 12:1–10.
54.
Lataster (JS), pp. 73–92. Mainstream critical scholars suppose that Jesus was a historical figure that became gradually mythicised. The likes of Paul-Louis Couchoud, Earl Doherty, and Richard Carrier theorise that Jesus was initially a ‘mythical’, celestial figure that became gradually historicised. For example, see Earl Doherty, Jesus: Neither God Nor Man (Ottawa: Age of Reason Publications, 2009).
55.
Cf. 2 Corinthians 12:2 and recall the claims about revelation.
56.
I have elsewhere gone into more detail, regarding all the ‘early’ sources about Jesus. See Raphael Lataster, “Questioning the Plausibility of Jesus Ahistoricity Theories – A Brief Pseudo-Bayesian Metacritique of the Sources,” Intermountain West Journal of Religious Studies 6, no. 1 (2015): 63–96.
57.
Craig (OG), p. 188–189.
58.
Lawrence A. Babb, “Sathya Sai Baba’s Magic,” Anthropological Quarterly 56, no. 3 (1983): 116–124. Note that the numerous contemporaneous accounts concerning Sai Baba’s miracles constitute vastly better evidence than that for Jesus’ miracles. It may also be worth considering that Josephus’ alleged mention of Jesus, with the most obvious interpolations removed, seems to portray a very different Jesus, though it too was supposedly written several decades after Jesus’ lifetime.
59.
For some examples, see 2 Corinthians 11 and Christopher W. Skinner and Kelly R. Iverson, eds., Unity and Diversity in the Gospels and Paul: Essays in Honor of Frank J. Matera (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012).
60.
A critically-acclaimed example would be Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Louise Maude and Aylmer Maude (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
61.
Even Christians argue against this notion. See Theodore J. Weeden, “Kenneth Bailey’s Theory of Oral Tradition: A Theory Contested by Its Evidence,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 7, no. 1 (2009): 3–43. See also Jacob Neusner, Rabbinic Literature and the New Testament: What We Cannot Show, We Do Not Know (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2004).
62.
For example, see Zeba A. Crook, “Collective Memory Distortion and the Quest for the Historical Jesus,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 11, no. 1 (2013): 53–76 and Zeba A. Crook, “Matthew, memory theory and the New No Quest,” Hervormde Teologiese Studies 70, no. 1 (2014): 1–11. For more on false memories concerning the anomalistic, see Christopher C. French and Krissy Wilson, “Incredible Memories – How Accurate are Reports of Anomalous Events?,” European Journal of Parapsychology 21, no. 2 (2006): 166–181.
63.
Such scholars include Hector Avalos, Carole Cusack, and Christopher Hartney. See Hector Avalos. “Raphael Lataster’s New Book on Jesus Mythicism,” accessed 22/06/2014, http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com.au/2013/09/raphael-latasters-new-book-on-mythicism.html; Carole M. Cusack, review of There Was No Jesus, There Is No God: A Scholarly Examination of the Scientific, Historical, and Philosophical Evidence & Arguments For Monotheism, by Raphael Lataster, Literature & Aesthetics 23, no. 2 (2013): 144–146; Christopher Hartney, review of There Was No Jesus, There Is No God: A Scholarly Examination of the Scientific, Historical, and Philosophical Evidence & Arguments For Monotheism, by Raphael Lataster, Alternative Spirituality and Religion Review 5, no. 1 (2014): 171–174.
64.
Much of this subsection could have ‘merely’ highlighted the uncertainty regarding the sources that Craig trusts so vehemently, and need not have mentioned the possibility of Jesus’ ahistoricity at all.
65.
For my detailed review of the recent (2012–2014) literature on the topic by Ehrman (historicity), Casey (historicity), myself (agnosticism), and Carrier (mythicism), see Raphael Lataster, “The Fourth Quest: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Literature on Jesus’ (a)Historicity,” Literature & Aesthetics 24, no. 1 (2014): 1–28.
66.
Ehrman (DJE), pp. 37–38.
67.
Ibid., p. 42 and throughout.
68.
Ibid., pp. 78–83.
69.
Ibid., pp. 83–86.
70.
Ibid., pp. 87–93.
71.
I have since presented a well-received paper on this troubling method, which is currently being adapted as an article. See Raphael Lataster, “The Gospel According to Bart: The Folly of Ehrman’s Hypothetical Sources” (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Australian Historical Association, Sydney, 7th July 2015). The only objector in the audience filled with secular and other historians was a Christian sociologist.
72.
In an intriguing twist, a later book has Ehrman himself raising many doubts about his hypothetical sources, and the memories, fictions, and eyewitness accounts that allegedly preceded them. See Ehrman (JBG).
73.
Maurice Casey, Jesus: Evidence and Argument or Mythicist Myths? (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 75, 103.
74.
Ibid., p. 86.
75.
Ibid., p. 94.
76.
Ibid., p. 66.
77.
Ibid., p. 82.
78.
Ibid., p. 44.
79.
Ibid., p. 49.
80.
Ibid., pp. 10–26.
81.
Ibid., p. 114.
82.
Ibid., p. 234.
83.
James G. Crossley, Jesus and the Chaos of History: Redirecting the Life of the Historical Jesus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 171.
84.
Such work is usually published by amateurs, or bona fide scholars from outside the relevant academic fields of History, Religious Studies, and Biblical Studies.
85.
Carrier’s Proving History provides an excellent explanation of Bayes’ Theorem and its historical uses, as does Aviezer Tucker’s earlier effort. See Tucker (OKP). For a simplified description, and a discussion of the uses of Bayesian approaches in judging the veridicality of certain religious claims, see Raphael Lataster, “Bayesian Reasoning: Criticising the ‘Criteria of Authenticity’ and Calling for a Review of Biblical Criticism,” Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 5, no. 2 (2013): 271–293.
86.
Carrier (OHJ), pp. 18–55.
87.
Carrier acknowledges that Doherty’s theorising led him to seriously consider Jesus’ non-existence. See ibid., p. xii. Doherty, in turn, seems to have been influenced by Couchoud. My own interest in this area was piqued by the oft-vilified Acharya S. It is worth noting that sometimes amateurs come up with good ideas, while qualified scholars can make very poor arguments.
88.
Ibid., pp. 235–253.
89.
Ibid., pp. 229–230.
90.
Ibid., p. 243.
91.
Ibid., pp. 281–358.
92.
Ibid., pp. 359–509.
93.
Ibid., p. 564.
94.
Samuel Brandon makes clear that Paul attributes the Crucifixion to demonic powers rather than to Pilate and the Jewish leaders, further indicating that Paul portrays the Crucifixion as a non-historical event. See Samuel George Frederick Brandon, History, Time and Deity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1965), pp. 168–190. Ellingworth and Hatton claim that, “A majority of scholars think that supernatural powers are intended here”. See Paul Ellingworth and Howard Hatton, A Translator’s Handbook on Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians (New York: United Bible Societies, 1985), p. 46. See also Paula Fredriksen, From Jesus to Christ: The Origins of the New Testament Images of Jesus, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 56; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 233–236.
95.
Cf. Doherty (JNGNM), p. 105. Doherty further links this passage to Ephesians 3:9–10, which also seems to refer to ignorant spiritual powers, and Ephesians 6:12, wherein Paul explicitly states that their struggle is not against ‘flesh and blood’ but against evil spirits in the heavens.
96.
Even Bart Ehrman, a vocal critic of mythicism, admits to this. See Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee (New York: HarperOne, 2014).
97.
Carrier (OHJ), p. 565.
98.
1 Corinthians 15.
99.
Such visionary or revelatory appearances are found throughout the Epistles, and even the appearances mentioned in 1 Corinthians 15 provide no Earthly context, and are ‘tainted’ by the Greek word opthe, which often refers to supernatural visions. Paul may well refer to a purely celestial Jesus.
100.
Craig is aware that Paul does not mention the empty tomb, and tries to overcome this fact by reading into the text things that are not there; seemingly a common approach in biblical scholarship, and formerly known as eisegesis. See Craig (RF), p. 365. Craig is not the first to assume that post-mortem appearances entail an empty tomb. This approach seems especially egregious when Paul seems to declare that resurrection bodies await believers in Heaven. See 2 Corinthians 5:1–5.
101.
See 1 Corinthians 15:12–19. All this indicates that the apologetic tactic of claiming Paul’s audience to be familiar with the Gospel accounts is erroneous.
102.
Carrier (OHJ), pp. 596–600.
103.
Raphael Lataster, review of On the Historicity of Jesus: Why We Might Have Reason for Doubt, by Richard Carrier, Journal of Religious History 38, no. 4 (2014): 614–616. I have since written a book (forthcoming) that goes into much more detail on these issues, and argues that not only is it irrelevant that scholars questioning Jesus’ historicity tend to come from outside the field of New Testament studies, but that it is ideal and even necessary.
104.
See William Lane Craig and Brian Edwards. “Easter Debate: Craig vs. Edwards,” accessed 01/03/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/craig-vs-edwards. In my opinion, Edwards had the upper hand in this, and their next debate. He fared better than any other atheistic debate opponent of Craig’s. Craig also responded to a question about his specific god with, “it’s not my god, I’m his”, which seems unnecessarily evasive. Interestingly, Edwards has noted that many New Zealand churchgoers do not believe in the supernatural. This coheres some with the phenomenon of religious leaders who no longer believe literally in what they teach. See Daniel C. Dennett and Linda LaScola, “Preachers Who Are Not Believers,” Evolutionary Psychology 8, no. 1 (2010): 122–150. There are also ministers who are open about their atheism. For example, see Gretta Vosper, With or Without God: Why the Way We Live is More Important than What We Believe (Toronto: Harper, 2008).
105.
Ehrman refers to the Son of Man of 1 Enoch as the “cosmic judge of the earth”, and acknowledges that some considered him to be the Messiah, and worshipped him. See Ehrman (HJBG), pp. 66–68. In the same chapter, Ehrman also argues that since there are Jewish texts that outlaw angel worship, there must have been Jews worshipping ‘non-God’ divine beings. Sounding very much like those who deny the Historical Jesus, Ehrman explains that there were Jews who called angels ‘gods’, who believed in angels that warred and brought peace in Heaven, and who perceived Enoch as an angelic being. He also gives a nod to ‘Wisdom’ and ‘Logos’, and admits that Philo of Alexandria describes his Logos as divine, as God’s first born. Ehrman even realises that the Tanakh made it very easy for Jews to incorporate similar ideas from the Ancient Greeks, such as the Wisdom figure appearing in Proverbs 8, and Genesis 1’s ‘creative Logos’.
106.
For example, see Richard C. Miller, Resurrection and Reception in Early Christianity (New York: Routledge, 2015). Without needing to doubt Jesus’ historicity, Miller argues that the Gospels make clear that the resurrection narratives therein are purely legendary, so that trying to determine the probability of the resurrection’s truth is utterly futile.
107.
Interestingly, Craig seemed somewhat favourable of a Bayesian approach regarding miracles, but (again) dismissed it regarding Jesus’ resurrection due to apparently inscrutable priors. See Craig (RF), pp. 271–276. This is not a problem with the Bayesian method, but with his goal of showing Jesus’ resurrection to be probable. An inscrutable prior probability means an inscrutable posterior probability. Perhaps it is this eschewing of a transparent probabilistic approach that allows the apologist to proclaim their beliefs as reasonable.
108.
Ibid., p. 234.
109.
Ibid., pp. 238–239.
110.
In other words, there is no reason to suppose that the laws of nature were different several thousand years ago, than they are today. We thus assume uniformity. Cf. Ernst Troeltsch, Religion in History, trans. James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1991), p. 13.
111.
Almost everything Elijah does serves to make the eventual miracle seem more unlikely, hence making it more reasonable to believe that the eventual happening was caused by God rather than naturalistic processes. The authors knew that miracles were supposed to be improbable. See 1 Kings 18. In the Jesus myth, perhaps the tomb being sealed with a large stone is also stressed in order to further point to its removal and the tomb’s being empty as support for the miraculous resurrection. See Mark 15–16.
112.
Zeba A. Crook, “On the Treatment of Miracles in New Testament Scholarship,” Studies in Religion 40, no. 4 (2011): 461–478.
113.
Ibid.: 470.
114.
Ibid.: 474.
115.
Ehrman also agrees that as historians cannot know or prove what actually happened in the past, they are concerned with establishing what probably happened in the past. See Ehrman (JAPNM), pp. 96, 195–196, 227.
116.
While I would like to avoid the apparently Humean notion that a miraculous claim could not be proven in principle, my approach is Bayesian, and appears Humean, and his approach to miracles has been judged – via similar Bayesian analyses – by others as being generally sound. See Philip Dawid and Donald Gillies, “A Bayesian Analysis of Hume’s Argument Concerning Miracles,” Philosophical Quarterly 39, no. 154 (1989): 57–65. Furthermore, it does seem that Hume was aware of Bayes’ Theorem. See David Raynor, “Hume’s Knowledge of Bayes’s Theorem,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 38, no. 1 (1980): 105–106. While he may not have used it, or formalised his argument mathematically, his argument essentially encapsulates the principles of Bayes’ Theorem. There are those who think that Hume was too strong in arguing against miracles, such as that he rules them out a priori, but others believe that Hume is being misunderstood. See Robert J. Fogelin, A Defense of Hume on Miracles (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). In any case, I do not argue that miracles are impossible or that they are impossible to prove. They are ‘merely’ extraordinarily improbable.
117.
This could also be narrowed to resurrection claims. Note also that I need only refer to such claims being unconfirmed, rather than being disproved.
118.
Craig (RF), p. 239.
119.
For example, see Josephus, The Life of Flavius Josephus 75.
120.
Indeed, that many miracles may not originate with God should further justify even believers being sceptical regarding claims of miracles wrought by God. For some examples and warnings of such diabolical miracles in the Bible, see Exodus 7, 2 Thessalonians 2:9, Matthew 24:24, 1 John 4:1, and Revelation 16:14.
121.
Barnabas Lindars, “Jesus Risen: Bodily Resurrection But No Empty Tomb,” Theology 89, no. 728 (1986): 91.
122.
Cf. 1 Corinthians 15:6. I am not claiming this tale to be true. I merely illustrate the ease of fabricating such a claim, and that further claiming x witnesses, does not mean there were x witnesses. Note also the thousands of Catholics in contemporary times, who have experiences of Mary. Somehow Craig, a non-Catholic, finds this less reliable than his evidence. Note that while Paul’s claim about the more than 500 witnesses can be rejected out of hand, a group hallucination is possible. Consider Zeba Crook’s thoughts on the work of Peter Craffert: “At the 2010 meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, in a session on social-scientific and cognitive science approaches to Jesus’ resurrection (all of which were etic), Peter Craffert took a comparative anthropological approach. Craffert argues that putative differences between vision (which is objective) and visions (which are subjective) do not hold up from a neuroanthropological perspective. The brain cannot tell the difference; it only receives information, but it cannot distinguish objective from subjective. To the human brain, it is all equally “real.” Recorded out-of-body experiences and electrode stimulation of the brain both illustrate that the mind can “see” things, and experience them as real, without external stimulus (e.g., seeing something material). In short, “vision and visions rely on very similar processes, and for that reason visions can be more real than ordinary vision – to such an extent that the subjects themselves cannot determine what is really out there and what is not”” (2010: 9). Craffert refers to the ethnographic work of American anthropologist Bruce Grindal, who lived among the Sisala clan of Ghana for over 2 years. One night, Grindal participated in a death divination ceremony, during which the corpse rose, spun, danced, and played drums. Grindal saw it, as did others in the room (but interestingly, not all present saw it). Of course, Grindal was under no illusion that this event happened in any material sense. He was able to “see” it because he had by then become sufficiently inducted into Sisala culture. Grindal, though a scientifically thinking westerner, had entered into the “consensus reality” of the group. Consensus reality becomes a way of overcoming the problematic distinction between objective and subjective vision. One can see things that are real but not material when one lives in a consensus reality in which these things happen.” See Zeba A. Crook, “On the Treatment of Miracles in New Testament Scholarship,” Studies in Religion 40, no. 4 (2011): 475.
123.
See Matthew 1.
124.
There are many claims about ‘virgin pregnancies’ in contemporary times, which prompt researchers to recognise that they “may still face challenges in the collection and analysis of self reported data on potentially sensitive topics”. See Amy H. Herring et al., “Like a virgin (mother): analysis of data from a longitudinal, US population representative sample survey,” The BMJ 347, no. 7938 (2013): doi:https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.f7102. Incidentally, the Zoroastrian messiah is supposed to be born from a virgin bathing in a lake containing Zoroaster’s semen.
125.
Cf. John Earman, Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 53–59.
126.
John 20:24–29.
127.
Craig (RF), p. 239.
128.
This seems unlikely, given the polytheistic origins of Yahweh, as earlier discussed. Also keep in mind that “Satan himself masquerades as an angel of light”. See 2 Corinthians 11:14.
129.
It seems plausible that Jesus did indeed teach things that were, from a Jewish perspective, ‘wrong’. Jesus’ contradictions with various books of the Tanakh and his conflicts with mainstream Jews of his time are well known. For example, see the chapter entitled “The Anti-Biblical Jesus” in Avalos (BJ). Also helpful, though more confessional, is Steve Moyise, Jesus and Scripture: Studying the New Testament Use of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010).
130.
Regarding the latter, recall the comments about the sect of Marcion and certain Gnostics in §3.6.
131.
That this god approves of Jesus, sent Jesus, and so forth. Of course, this is what the resurrection argument was supposed to establish.
132.
Craig (RF), p. 359.
133.
William Lane Craig. “Doctrine of Christ (part 23),” accessed 21/06/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/defenders-2-podcast/transcript/s6-23.
134.
Craig (RF), pp. 271–276, 359–360.
135.
In both of these sources, Craig refers to the ad hocness of an explanation. But that does affect the prior probability. He fails to see his inconsistency in dismissing ad hoc naturalistic explanations, whilst – since God is not proven – crafting a very ad hoc explanation of his own. It seems that Craig is open to utilising prior probabilities after all, but only when it suits him.
136.
Similarly, the supporters of a brutal dictator could suppose that she had good but hidden reasons for perpetrating her many atrocities, and also good but hidden reasons for keeping those reasons hidden. This does not stop critics from declaring, based on current evidence, that the dictator was evil and guilty of crimes against humanity.
137.
Craig (RF), p. 240.
138.
Ibid., p. 241.
139.
Ibid., p. 242.
140.
Ibid., p. 287.
141.
Ibid., p. 258.
142.
Ibid., pp. 259–263. Note that failing to assume dualism leads me to the regularity theory of natural law, that whatever happens is part of reality and need not be deemed ‘supernatural’.
143.
Ibid., p. 263.
144.
Ibid., p. 268.
145.
Ibid., p. 269.
146.
Ibid., pp. 269–273. On p. 274, he further exposes his ignorance regarding Bayes’ Theorem and its uses, by objecting to Hume’s alleged use of frequencies. That is often how probabilistic and even Bayesian reasoning works. Hopefully, over time, more data will result in these admittedly limited frequencies better reflecting whatever ‘objectively true’ values might exist. Bayesian reasoning cannot incorporate the information we do not yet have, and the information we will never have. It only tells us, based on the information we do have, what is the most reasonable hypothesis to believe. On p. 280, he seems to indicate that Hume was unaware of Bayes’ Theorem, which is refuted above.
147.
Ibid., p. 273.
148.
Ibid., p. 294.
149.
Adrian Nicholas Sherwin-White, Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).
150.
In fact, many of the political machinations of the novels echo events from the Wars of the Roses and the Hundred Years’ War. See James Lowder, ed. Beyond the Wall: Exploring George R. R. Martin’s A Song of Ice and Fire, From A Game of Thrones to A Dance with Dragons (Dallas, TX: BenBella Books, 2012), pp. 39, 124–125.
151.
Craig (RF), p. 297.
152.
Ibid., pp. 311–312. See also Craig (OG), p. 191.
153.
See Philostratus, The Life of Apollonius of Tyana: Books 1–4, trans. C. P. Jones (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 1.2–3.
154.
Craig (RF), p. 312.
155.
Ibid., p. 327.
156.
Ibid., pp. 333–349.
157.
Ibid., p. 350.
158.
Critics can speculate as to whether it is simply coincidental that Craig’s explanation of the facts is identical to what the sources outright claim, and that it happens to align with his personal religious views.
159.
Stephen Law, “Evidence, Miracles and the Existence of Jesus,” Faith and Philosophy 28, no. 2 (2011): 129–151.
160.
Craig (RF), pp. 359–360.
161.
Ibid., pp. 361, 377, 387. This is made all the more surprising when he admits on p. 365 that, “no one actually saw Jesus rise from the dead”.
162.
See James G. Crossley, “Against the Historical Plausibility of the Empty Tomb Story and the Bodily Resurrection of Jesus: A Response to N.T. Wright,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 3, no. 2 (2005): 171–186. See also Ehrman (HJBG), p. 7, as well as the fourth and fifth chapters. One of the reasons for Ehrman’s shift in position here is that the Romans generally allowed crucifixion victims’ bodies to be desecrated rather than buried, and he thinks it very implausible that the tyrannical Pilate would have made an exception for Jesus. Another seems to be that the earliest Christian author, Paul, does not ever mention the empty tomb. Ehrman also recognises that it was not the empty tomb that led people to believe in Jesus’ resurrection, but the post-resurrection appearances. Indeed, the Gospels explain that the empty tomb led to confusion, while Jesus’ appearances were more convincing. For example, see Luke 24 and John 20. Craig is also aware that the Jesus Seminar concluded that Jesus’ “corpse was probably thrown into a shallow dirt grave where it rotted away or was eaten by wild dogs”. See William Lane Craig, “Rediscovering the Historical Jesus: Presuppositions and Pretensions of the Jesus Seminar,” Faith and Mission 15, no. 2 (1998): 3–4.
163.
The late New Testament scholar and Anglican priest Barnabas Lindars argued that “there are equally good grounds for maintaining that the empty tomb is a late element in the history of the Gospel traditions”. See Barnabas Lindars, “Jesus Risen: Bodily Resurrection But No Empty Tomb,” Theology 89, no. 728 (1986): 90. Interestingly, while Craig argues from the empty tomb to the resurrection, on page 95 Lindars claims that, “the story of the empty tomb arose as a consequence of the gospel of the resurrection”.
164.
Craig (RF), pp. 361–371. There is an unsavoury comment, on p. 368, concerning “a hypothesis which has blown up in Crossan’s face”. Note also that the empty tomb is not mentioned in Paul’s epistles, though Craig attempts to argue that Paul knew of it, which – since Paul’s writings are older – puts the cart before the horse. Furthermore, Mark 16:8 has the women remaining silent about the empty tomb, despite the earlier angelic command to spread the word in v. 7. Perhaps the latter verse is a fabrication attempting to explain why the earlier, i.e., Pauline, traditions lack the empty tomb narrative. Cf. Philipse (GAS), p. 174.
165.
Craig (RF), p. 369.
166.
Ibid., p. 370.
167.
Ibid., p. 370, ft. 53.
168.
Ibid., pp. 371–377.
169.
As mused earlier, this same sort of creative denial may have prompted the evolution of God from merely the god of the Israelites to the god of all, after the catastrophe of the exile in Babylon. See Armstrong (HOG), pp. 24, 52–97. This also partly addresses Craig’s claim that Jesus’ disciples would not “die for a lie that they themselves had made up”. See Craig (RF), p. 213. This situation can be likened to the mass suicides perpetrated by religious groups, such as Heaven’s Gate. Consider also Plato’s concept of the ‘noble lie’, in his Republic, 3.414e-415c. Perhaps Jesus’ followers felt, like Paul in Nikos Kazantzakis’ The Last Temptation of Christ, that lying about Jesus would benefit humanity. Interestingly, Plato, writing centuries before Jesus’ lifetime, also discusses the ‘just man’ who would be tortured and killed, arguably even crucified, in Republic, 2.361c–362a.
170.
Craig (RF), pp. 377–395.
171.
Ibid., pp. 384–387.
172.
Ibid., pp. 378–379.
173.
See John Dominic Crossan, Who Killed Jesus?: Exposing the Roots of Anti-Semitism in the Gospel Story of the Death of Jesus (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), p. 209. Crossan also thinks that the empty tomb story “was most likely created by Mark himself” (pp. 184–185, 209).
174.
Matthew 17:9.
175.
Luke 24:23. Visions are also found throughout Acts and the Epistles.
176.
Craig (RF), pp. 390–391.
177.
Greenspahn notes that “it would be very surprising” if syncretism did not occur in ancient Israel, “especially in a culture that existed in close proximity with others”, before discussing some examples of Israelite and Pagan syncretism. See Frederick E. Greenspahn, “Syncretism and Idolatry in the Bible,” Vetus Testamentum 54, no. 4 (2004): 492–493. Gnosticism, widely believed to have been influenced by Hellenistic culture, may have influenced early Christianity. See Luther H. Martin, “Why Cecropian Minerva?: Hellenistic Religious Syncretism as System,” Numen 30, no. 2 (1983): 140 and Charles W. Hedrick and Robert Hodgson, eds., Nag Hammadi, Gnosticism, and Early Christianity (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2005).
178.
For example, see Justin Martyr, First Apology 5, 21, 54; Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 69; Tertullian, Prescription Against Heretics 40; Charles H. Talbert, What Is a Gospel?: The Genre of the Canonical Gospels (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985), pp. 27–28.
179.
On the diversity of Jewish religions, see John Kenneth Riches, The World of Jesus: First-Century Judaism in Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Matthew 16:1. On the diversity of early Christianity, see Ehrman (LC). The New Testament makes clear that greatly differing interpretations of Jesus were already in existence. See 2 Corinthians 11:3–4 and 2 John 1:7.
180.
See 1 John. Such views involve a very different Jesus, such as one that was not fleshly, but only appeared to be so. If such views were upheld, belief in a non-earthly ‘Celestial Jesus’ does not seem so implausible, particularly when there were some pre-Christian Jews that already believed in a celestial Messiah.
181.
See, for example, Ehrman (LC), p. 109.
182.
Craig (RF), p. 395.
183.
Craig seems to struggle with this concept, as his discussion of the “Principle of Sufficient Cause”, focussed on Alexander the Great, makes clear. See William Lane Craig. “Stephen Law on the Non-existence of Jesus of Nazareth,” accessed 25/02/2016, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/stephen-law-on-the-non-existence-of-jesus-of-nazareth.
184.
For but one example, see Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs (London: Pluto, 2005).
185.
I mention this to contrast earlier discussion about religion being caused by civilisation. See Norenzayan (BG).
186.
Mark 6:14–16, Matthew 14:1–2, Luke 9:7–8.
187.
For biblical and other references, see the subsection on the criteria, above. For a far more fantastic hypothesis, see Dan Brown, The Da Vinci Code (London: Bantam, 2003).
188.
On Mary and Jesus’ close relationship, see the Gospel of Mary and the Gospel of Philip. On Mary’s possible mental instability, consider her fervent devotion to a cult leader accused of blasphemy and sedition, and her allegedly being ‘possessed’. See Mark 2:6–7, 15:16–20, 16:9, Luke 8:2.
189.
There are numerous possible explanations for Mary’s believing that she had seen Jesus, many of which were touched on in §2.7. Of particular interest is that altered states of consciousness and optical illusions can explain why what is visually perceived sometimes differs from objective reality.
190.
Mark 16:9–11 and Luke 24:9–11 have some of Jesus’ other followers doubting Mary’s claims. They may have thought that she was simply mistaken, or even lying. Perhaps she was. Though taking the confessional position, Matthew 27:64 and 28:13 leave open the possibility that various stakeholders were being deceptive.
191.
Cf. Philipse (GAS), pp. 178–182.
192.
Eisenberg discusses such a scenario and, while admitting that it is improbable, agrees that it is still more probable than the supernaturalistic explanation. See Leonard Irwin Eisenberg, “A New Natural Interpretation of the Empty Tomb,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80, no. 2 (2016): 133–143. Note that other religious believers, such as certain Muslims and Gnostics, also believed that Jesus did not die on the cross that day. See Quran 4:157, and Second Treatise of the Great Seth, which seemingly has Jesus laughing as the innocent Simon of Cyrene suffers in his place.
193.
Craig (RF), pp. 397–399.
194.
Christopher Behan McCullagh, “The Resurrection of Jesus: Explanation or Interpretation?,” Southeastern Theological Review 3, no. 1 (2012): 41–53.
195.
Craig judges Ehrman’s example “that the make-believe god Zulu sent Jesus into the twelfth dimension” as being ad hoc. See Craig (RF), p. 398. Interestingly, Craig attributes far more goodness, knowledge, and power to his god than what is necessary to raise Jesus from the dead, so that the ‘Zulu’ explanation may indeed be less ad hoc than Craig’s.
196.
Except by sceptics who might – rightly – wish to see a far lower prior probability assigned to the hypothesis of Jesus’ resurrection. 1% is far too generous.
197.
Note that 0.67 and 0.33 could be substituted for 1 and 0.5, respectively, which would make no difference to the calculations.
198.
Interestingly, church father Origen inadvertently admitted that the evidence for Jesus’ miracles is very poor, with only the Gospels as sources. See Origen, Contra Celsum 2.33.
199.
Craig (RF), pp. 277–278; Craig (OG), pp. 282–283.
200.
Being naturalistic in nature, it is arguable that even – absurdly – supposing that the ‘chariot of fire’ that took Elijah to ‘Heaven’ in 2 Kings 2 was really referring to a flying saucer is preferable to the sort of supernaturalistic reasoning Craig opts for. For some examples of such theorising, see Erich von Däniken, Chariots of the Gods (New York: Berkley Books, 1984), p. 58; Zecharia Sitchin, The Earth Chronicles Expeditions (Rochester, VT: Bear & Company, 2007), pp. 108–109. Also recall author Arthur C. Clarke’s third law, that any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.
201.
Craig (RF), pp. 24, 268, 275.
202.
Swinburne effectively concurs with this approach, though does admit that what seems naturally impossible could be naturally possible after all. See Swinburne (EG), pp. 277–279.
203.
Iona Opie and Peter Opie, The Classic Fairy Tales (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 215, 218.
204.
Such as T’Klaar, a gifted medic in the Noumenalian Space Fleet. Indeed, some believe that historical claims of gods actually refer to such ‘ancient astronauts’, and yet others believe that highly advanced people lived in humanity’s distant past. See Michael Carroll, “Of Atlantis and Ancient Astronauts: A Structural Study of Two Modern Myths,” The Journal of Popular Culture 11, no. 3 (1977): 541–550.
205.
Such a gene might even disappear and then reappear at opportune times in history (to benefit the Buddha, for example), such as the IRGM gene. See the appropriately named article, Cemalettin Bekpen et al., “Death and Resurrection of the Human IRGM Gene,” PLOS Genetics 5, no. 3 (2009): 1–8.
206.
Mark 15:39, Matthew 27:54.
207.
We could also consider various forms of liberal Christianity. It is even possible that the earliest Christians did not take the resurrection accounts literally. See Miller (RREC). This view suits proponents of the Celestial Jesus theory, who often consider Mark as an allegorisation of Paul’s writings.
208.
Luke 17:20–21.
209.
Colossians 3:11.
210.
Acts 14. These believers also thought that Paul and Barnabas were these gods, in human form.
211.
According to Judeo-Christian tradition, even the false gods and/or heretical sorcerers could perform miracles. See Exodus 7:8–13.
212.
Craig (RF), p. 399.
213.
Exodus 7:10–11. See also Matthew 24:24 and 2 Thessalonians 2:9.
214.
Also, it does not follow that if Jesus was raised, that every claim made by or about Jesus is true.
215.
For example, see the warnings about ‘false prophets’ in Mark 13:6, 22, Galatians 1:6–10, 2 Peter 2, and 1 John 4:1. In an ‘inversion’ of Mark 13, perhaps Jesus was himself a false prophet, who drew attention away from ‘the true Messiah’.
216.
Craig (RF), p. 349; Craig (OG), p. 219.
217.
For more on Lapide’s unique view, which predictably relies on the assumption of the Gospels’ general reliability, see Pinchas Lapide, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Jewish Perspective (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1983).
218.
Gary R. Habermas, “Resurrection Claims in Non-Christian Religions,” Religious Studies 25, no. 2 (1989): 170. He goes on to downplay the evidence for similar non-Christian claims, despite the fact that all such claims are implausible and some of these claims are better supported, such as that of Sri Yukteswar. Yukteswar’s disciple Paramhansa Yogananda was an eyewitness, and published on Yukteswar’s post-death appearances only a few years after Yukteswar’s death. Also, Philostratus shows criticism with named sources regarding Apollonius, which is something totally unfamiliar to Paul and the Gospel authors. On non-Christian resurrection claims, Habermas inconsistently – as a conservative Christian – concludes that, “Simply to report a miracle is not sufficient to establish it, especially if that miracle is then going to be used to support a religious system” (177).
219.
After all, we do know that there were many doctrinal battles as mainstream Christianity took form. For example, see Ehrman (OCS, 2nd edn).
220.
This also alludes to a contradiction. While New Testament passages such as Romans 4:25, 1 Corinthians 15:3, 1 Peter 3:18, and 1 John 2:2 proclaim that Jesus died for our sins, earlier passages from the Tanakh, like Deuteronomy 24:16, Psalm 49:7, Jeremiah 31:30, Ezekiel 18, affectively assert that no one should suffer for the sins of another. The contradictions continue, with other Jewish verses asserting Yahweh’s penchant for generational curses. See, for example, Exodus 20:5, Numbers 14:18, and Deuteronomy 5:9.
221.
For a useful list of parallels between the books of the Tanakh and various Pagan – and older – sources such as the Epic of Gilgamesh, the Enûma Eliš, the Great Hymn to the Aten, the Code of Hammurabi, the Baal Cycle, the Epic of Aqhat, and the Instruction of Amenemope, see Jaco Gericke, “Does Yahweh exist? A philosophical-critical reconstruction of the case against realism in Old Testament Theology” (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pretoria, 2003), pp. 203–225.
222.
Dale C. Allison, Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest Christian Tradition and its Interpreters (London: T & T Clark, 2005).
223.
Michael Licona and Dale B. Martin, Did Jesus Rise Physically From the Dead? (Arva, ON: The Navigators, 2012), Video recording.
224.
Dale B. Martin, Pedagogy of the Bible: An Analysis and Proposal, 1st ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), p. 44.
225.
Raphael Lataster et al., Does the Bible Present the Real Jesus? (Sydney: Resolved Church Sydney, 2012), Audio recording.
226.
John Dickson, personal communication, October 17, 2013.
227.
John Dickson, personal communication, July 4, 2014. Dickson has made similar comments in his lectures on the Historical Jesus at The University of Sydney, some of which I attended, as an auditing student.
228.
Ernst Troeltsch, The Christian Faith, trans. Garrett E. Paul (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1991), p. 96.
229.
Gary R. Habermas and Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2004), pp. 206–214.
230.
Michael Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010), pp. 610–618.
231.
Nicholas Thomas Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2003), pp. 716–717.
232.
Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. Craig and Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 595.
233.
Ibid., p. 630.
234.
Swinburne (RGI), p. 2. That this is assumed to be the God of theism is made more evident on p. 201.
235.
Ibid., p. 2.
236.
Ibid., p. 76.
237.
Ibid., p. 82.
238.
For the few alternative theories he does consider, see ibid., pp. 174–186.
239.
Ibid., pp. 202–203.
240.
Lord Xenu is not just an alleged alien, but is also a very important figure in a rival religion. See Mikael Rothstein, “‘His name was Xenu. He used renegades...’: Aspects of Scientology’s Founding Myth,” in Scientology, ed. James R. Lewis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 365–388.
241.
Appealing to such seemingly unreasonable alternatives, even if naturalistic, seems problematic and unfair, though, admittedly, such a figure could well be worshiped and feared as a god. While a time-travelling wizard from the future, or some such outlandish figure, may be more plausible than a maximally great god, it is certainly preferable to note the possibility of vastly more probable naturalistic explanations, such as mere exaggeration. With this in mind, this argument against ‘miraculous’ or ‘supernatural’ or ‘religious’ claims, is really just an argument against outlandish claims. Also note that seemingly improbable events happen quite frequently, with no need to resort to supernatural explanations. For example, many people are born with rare congenital defects, and low-seeded and unseeded tennis players (like Boris Becker, Goran Ivanišević, and Roger Federer) beat high-seeded ones and even win tournaments (like Wimbledon and the Australian Open). Consider also the cases of ‘Brexit’, Donald Trump’s winning the US presidency, and perennial relegation candidate Leicester City’s coasting to the 2015–16 English Premier League title.
242.
For some examples, see Acts 8, 9:36–42, 20:9–12, and especially 1 Kings 17:17–24 and 2 Kings 4.
243.
Swinburne (RGI), p. 211.
244.
The gods number is described in §3.3.
245.
Swinburne (RGI), pp. 211–214.
246.
Swinburne also argues, quite cleverly, that there is a priori justification for God becoming incarnate through a figure very much like Jesus. I critique this aspect of his case, and many others, in Raphael Lataster, “On Richard Swinburne and the Failings of Christian Theistic Evidentialism,” Literature & Aesthetics 26, no. 1 (2016): 23–40.
247.
The results also suggest that theists are more likely to view the arguments for God more favourably, and also revealed that theists generally viewed the atheistic argument from evil as reasonably compelling. See Helen De Cruz. “Results of my survey on natural theological arguments,” accessed 02/03/2016, http://www.academia.edu/1438058/Results_of_my_survey_on_natural_theological_arguments. Notably, these responses did not account for the many alternative god-concepts that could obtain, nor the variety of possible revelations, so that my efforts in this project further establish the unconvincing nature of the arguments for theism. See also Helen De Cruz, “Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological Concepts,” Topoi 33, no. 2 (2014): 487–497.

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Raphael Lataster

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Lataster, R. (2018). The Case for Christian Theism. In: The Case Against Theism. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 26. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90793-2_4

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