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A New Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol to Secure Real Time Tracking of Radioactive Sources

  • Mouza Ahmed Bani Shemaili
  • Chan Yeob YeunEmail author
  • Mohamed Jamal Zemerly
  • Khalid Mubarak
  • Hyun Ku Yeun
  • Yoon Seok Chang
  • Basim Zafar
  • Mohammed Simsim
  • Yasir Salih
  • Gaemyoung Lee
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 235)

Abstract

Radioactive applications are employed in many aspects of our life, such as industry, medicine and agriculture. One of the most important issues that need to be addressed is the security of the movement of radioactive sources. There are many threats that may occur during the transportation of the radioactive sources from one place to another. This paper investigates the security issues in the transportation of the radioactive sources. Thus, it is an attempt to build a secure, real time freight tracking system in which the radioactive source can be under inspection and control at all times during transportation from the shipment provider to the end user. Thus, we proposed a novel lightweight mutual authentication protocol to be used for securing the transportation of radioactive materials. Also, the security requirements for the proposed protocol were verified using the Scyther tool.

Keywords

Radioactive sources Cyber security, mutual authentication Scyther tool Real-time tracking 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to acknowledge Information and Communication Technology Fund (ICT Fund) for the continued support for the educational development and research.

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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mouza Ahmed Bani Shemaili
    • 1
  • Chan Yeob Yeun
    • 2
    Email author
  • Mohamed Jamal Zemerly
    • 2
  • Khalid Mubarak
    • 1
  • Hyun Ku Yeun
    • 1
  • Yoon Seok Chang
    • 3
  • Basim Zafar
    • 4
  • Mohammed Simsim
    • 6
  • Yasir Salih
    • 4
  • Gaemyoung Lee
    • 5
  1. 1.Computer Information and Science DivisionHCTAbu DhabiUAE
  2. 2.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringKhalifa UniversityAbu DhabiUAE
  3. 3.School of Air Transportation and LogisticsKorea Aerospace UniversityGoyangKorea
  4. 4.Department of Electrical EngineeringUmm Al-Qura University, KSUMeccaSaudi Arabia
  5. 5.College of EngineeringJeju National UniversityJejuKorea
  6. 6.Ministry of Hajj, KSUMeccaSaudi Arabia

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