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Abstract

The evolution and trajectory of Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign were mainly shaped by a set of geopolitical and geocultural threats and opportunities in international, regional, and domestic areas. Pahlavi Iran’s strategic connections with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia were forged to contain Iran’s enemies. At the same time, specific opportunities facilitated the formation of Iran’s non-state foreign policy. Furthermore, a constellation of institutional arrangement within Pahlavi Iran was responsible for shaping the dynamics of Iran’s non-state foreign policy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Rastakhiz Party was established by the Shah in 1975. Kongereh-ye Bozorg-e Zanan-e Iran [The Grand Congress of Iranian Women] (Tehran: Women’s Organization of Iran, 2536 [1978]), 3–5.

  2. 2.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. II: 1349–1351/1971–1972 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995), p. 148.

  3. 3.

    Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap deWilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998). p. 36.

  4. 4.

    The Middle East oil was a strong motive for both superpowers’ policies. Iran was a golden gate for the unlimited Middle East oil sources that could play a decisive role in the event of a war with the Soviet Union . For the U.S. policy makers, losing Baghdad and Riyadh oil reservoirs would bring up an oil war with the Soviet Union and vice versa. Besides, regional disputes over the price of oil as well as a general fear of the hegemonic ambitions of Saddam Hussein prompted the Shah to contain the Iraqi threat by the support for Barzani’s Peshmerga.

  5. 5.

    These territories in the north of Aras River comprise modern-day Republic of Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Armenia, and Georgia.

  6. 6.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. I: 1347–1348/1968–1969 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1993). p. 71.

  7. 7.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. II: 1349–1351/1971–1972 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995), p. 270.

  8. 8.

    A secret U.S. State Department document, April 1974, Documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Volume 8, 1979, 65.

  9. 9.

    A secret U.S. State Department document, April 1974, Documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Volume 8, 1979, 65.

  10. 10.

    The Shah visited Moscow in June 1965. Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. IV: 1353/1974 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 2000). p. 253.

  11. 11.

    Memorandum of Conversation, May 15, 1975. (FRUS 1969–1974, XXVII, 377).

  12. 12.

    Southern Yemen gained its independence initially under the name of the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen on 30 November 1967 under the control of the National Liberation Front (NLF). Two years later, however, a radical Marxist wing of the NLF transformed the country into a communist one and reorganized it as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.

  13. 13.

    The Shah of Iran: An Interview with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, New Atlantic, 1 December 1973.

  14. 14.

    Pan-Arabism was first followed by Sharif Hussein ibn Ali, the Sharif of Mecca. Promised a support for the establishment of a unified Arab state, constituted of the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire , he sided with the British military against Turks in World War I. The idea of the unified Arab territories was then followed by his son, Abdullah I of Jordan, who dreamed of Greater Syria of Syria, Jordan, and Palestine.

  15. 15.

    The coup plotters initially appointed General Muhammad Naguib as Egypt’s first president. However, it was soon revealed that the real leader of the revolution was Nasser . Conflict with Naguib over strategies soon resulted in his removal in October 1954.

  16. 16.

    SAVAK Documents, No. f-b2b2/15607, 6 February 1960; SAVAK Documents, No. 7b4/8200, 13 December 1958; SAVAK Documents, No Number.

  17. 17.

    For more detailed discussions see Laclau, Ernesto. New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Laclau, Ernesto. The Making of Political Identities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: towards a Radical Democratic politics, Verso, 1985; Melucci, Alberto, Challenging Codes: Collective action in the information age, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Torfing, Jacob. Poststructuralist Discourse Theory: Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe, and Zizek, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

  18. 18.

    Barnett, Michael N. Dialogues in Arab Politics. (Columbia University Press, October 15, 1998). pp. 108–29.

  19. 19.

    Neda al-Watan, 22 March 1969.

  20. 20.

    Kuwait 3511 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 February 1975.

  21. 21.

    Beirut 3506 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 December 1971.

  22. 22.

    Kuwait 9939–12352 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 February 1975.

  23. 23.

    Kuwait 3511 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 February 1975.

  24. 24.

    Neda al-Watan, 22 March 1969.

  25. 25.

    Rajaiee, Farhang, The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression. (University Press of Florida, April 20, 1993), p. 12.

  26. 26.

    Iraqi had also penetrated in the Arab-speaking community of Khuzestan. In the mid-1960s, Iranian Arab-speaking teachers, including Zariya Al-Mohiaddin, in Iraqi schools in Khorramshahr were in full connection with Iraqi Istikhbarat, aiming to urge anti-Iran sentiments among the Arab-speaking people. With Mossad’s direct intervention, SAVAK thwarted their plot. Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  27. 27.

    Abdulghani, Jasim, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, October 1, 1984). p. 52.

  28. 28.

    Panahian was Minister of War in the Soviet-fabricated republic of Azarbaijan (1945–46).

  29. 29.

    Zehtabi was the main ideologue of pan-Turkism in Iran. Doaie has been a reformist clergy and editor-in-chief of Ettelaat newspaper since 1994.

  30. 30.

    SAVAK Documents, No. A/316/23010, 1 September 1964, and SAVAK Documents, No. 2399, 10 September 1966.

  31. 31.

    There were some strong documents stating that the Shah did not want to execute Qazi. It was Lieutenant General Haj Ali Razmara, Iran’s military leader and then-prime minister, who ordered the execution of Qazi.

  32. 32.

    SAVAK Documents, 311/185-2-d, 6 May 1962; SAVAK Documents, 331/21715, 28 August 1963.

  33. 33.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 312/54991, 21 April 1961; SAVAK Documents, No. 2b/1729, 18 May 1961.

  34. 34.

    SAVAK Documents, No. a1/43476, No Date.

  35. 35.

    SAVAK Documents, 234/0245, 13 May 1963.

  36. 36.

    In 1967, several members of the KDPI , including Ismail Sharifzadeh, Qadir Sharif, and Sulaiman Moini, left Tawfiq’s KDPI . They stressed on military struggles against Tehran. They have connections with the Tudeh Party. See also SAVAK Documents, No. 232/49824, 2 August 1967.

  37. 37.

    In the late months of World War II, Stalin planned to annex several provinces in northern Iran. His territorial aspirations included Iranian provinces of Azarbaijan , Kurdistan, Gilan, Mazandaran, and Khorasan. See “Secret Soviet Instructions on Measures to Carry out Special Assignments throughout Southern Azerbaijan and the Northern Provinces of Iran in an attempt to set a separatist movement in Northern Iran,” Dated 07/14/1945, Available through Cold War International History Project:

    www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Collection&item=1945%2D46%20Iranian%20Crisis; Nosratollah Jahanshahloo, former Deputy Premier and Health Minister of the Pishevari government of Iranian Azarbaijan Democratic Republic, explained the Soviet’s humiliating behavior with Pishevari and said, “Mr. Gholiev [the Soviet Consul in Tabriz] met us in a small room.” Angered by the Russian behavior, he raggedly protested Col. Gholiev and said, “You [Russians] brought us to this place. Now, you left us since it [supporting the Azarbaijan Republic in Iran] would not be in your favor anymore … Tell me now who is responsible for this disturbance?” Shocked and angered by Pishevari’s bold protest, Col. Gholiev told him, “He who brought you here, now tells you to go.” Jahanshahloo, Nosratollah, We and the Foreign: Political Memoirs of Dr Nosratollah Jahanshahloo, Samarghand Publicatio, 1385, p. 190; For more discussion, see Joseph V. Stalin to Ja’far Pishevari, Leader of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, 8 May 1946. AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 34, d. 544, II. 8–9 Available: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117827); Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, АВПРФ، ф. 094، оп. 38، п. 364 A، д. 49، л. 1–7 Федерации Архив внешней политики Российской; Archive of Political Parties and Social Movements of the Azerbaijan Republic, AR SPIHMDA، f. 1، s. 89، i. 114، v. 218–2.

  38. 38.

    Tafreshian , Aboulhasan, Qiam-e Afsaran-e Khorasan (The Revolt of Khorasan Officers). (Atlas, Tehran, 1988). p. 112–5.

  39. 39.

    Research Study RNAS-10 prepared by the Department of State, May 31, 1972, FRUS 1969–1976, E4, 310; Memcon, April 12, 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, XVII, 243; Gallman to Department of the State, 14 Oct. 1958, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vol. XII (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 344–46; Barzani’s alleged ties to the KGB are discussed in Pavel Sudolatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold. L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, Special Tasks: The Memories of an Unknown Witness—A Soviet Spymaster (Boston: Little, and Co., 1994), pp. 259–64.

  40. 40.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 311/185, 6 May 1962.

  41. 41.

    O’balance, Edgar. The Kurdish Revolt, 19611970 (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1973). pp. 63–64.

  42. 42.

    During 1961–79, the Soviets took ambivalent strategies toward the Kurds. On the one hand, Moscow’s historical support for the Third World liberation movements, Barzani’s long-term connection with Russian KGB and pro-socialism Kurd leaders, like Talabani and Ahmad, solidified the Russian-Kurdish connections. On the other hand, apart from ebbs and flows within the central government, all Iraqi leaders had enjoyed good relations with Moscow. This paradoxical situation recalled the Horn of Africa crisis in the 1960s and 1970s for the Soviets . As Khaled Bakdash, the officer of Syria Baath Party, once aptly argued, “The problem of the Kurds is that they are too close to Russian borders, and Russia does not intend to make Iran, Turkey, and Syria upset. However, had Kurds been in Africa, Russians would have established a state for them. The Russian policy toward Kurds always has the policy of Expedient.”

  43. 43.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 13808, 12 February 1961.

  44. 44.

    Qaneifard, Erfan, Pas az Shast Sal: Zendegi va Khaterat-e Jalal Talabani (After Sixty Years: The Life and Memories of Jalal Talabani). (Elm Publication, Tehran, October 2012). p. 677; Qaneifard, Tonbad-e Havades: Goftogooi ba Isa Pejman (Hurricane of Events: A Dialogue with Isa Pejman), (Elm Publication, Tehran, October 2012). p. 139.

  45. 45.

    Baghdad 150 to State; September 20, 1962 (NARA/RG59/R2/787.00/9-2062), pp. 1–2.

  46. 46.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 231/45008, 12 February 1965, and SAVAK Documents, No. 2/13998, 3 October 1965.

  47. 47.

    SAVAK Documents, No. 6218, 11 January 1968.

  48. 48.

    SAVAK Documents, No. j5/18801, 13 June 1961; SAVAK Documents, No. 5541, 5 January 1961.

  49. 49.

    SAVAK Documents, No. p. 348, 16 March 1966.

  50. 50.

    Kuwait 1904 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 July 1963.

  51. 51.

    Qaneifard, Erfan, Pas az Shast Sal: Zendegi va Khaterat-e Jalal Talabani (After Sixty Years: The Life and Memories of Jalal Talabani), (Elm Publication, Tehran, 2009). p. 787.

  52. 52.

    Sayyid, Bobby S. A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism. (Zed Books; Revised edition, February 7, 2004).

  53. 53.

    Ruhani, Hamid, Nehzat-e Imam-e Khomeini [Imam Khomeini’s Movement], 2 vols (Tehran, 1979), 1, p. 25.

  54. 54.

    UN Special Committee on Palestine, Recommendations to the General Assembly, September 3, 1947.

  55. 55.

    The formation of two independent states in Palestine was finally adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947.

  56. 56.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  57. 57.

    Ramazani, Rouhollah, Iran’s Foreign Policy 1941–1973 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975). p. 404.

  58. 58.

    Baghdad 2243 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 September 1969.

  59. 59.

    Ramazani, Rouhollah, Iran’s Foreign Policy 1941–1973 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975). p. 427.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Afkhami, Ghoma Reza, The Life and Times of the Shah (Berkeley, CA, 2009). pp. 302–03.

  62. 62.

    Conversation among President Nixon , MacArthur, and Haig, Washington, April 8, 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 122.

  63. 63.

    National Security Council 5820/1 in Keefer, E.C. and G.W. LaFantasie ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula (Washington 1992), p. 191.

  64. 64.

    McKesson to Baundy, August 6, 1963, (FRUS 1961–1963, XVIII, 307).

  65. 65.

    Editorial Note, (FRUS 1969–1976, I, 29); Richard Nixon, “Asia after Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (1967): 113–25.

  66. 66.

    Memorandum from President Nixon to Haldeman, Ehrlichmann, and Kissinger , March 2, 1970, (FRUS 1969–1976, I, 61).

  67. 67.

    Alvandi, Roham, (2012) “Nixon , Kissinger , and the Shah: the origins of Iranian primacy in the Persian Gulf,” Diplomatic History, 36(2). pp. 337–372; whether the Shah’s advice to Nixon was a determining factor in the decisions he later made as president is debatable. The idea of “regional influentials” was well established in Washington’s foreign policy circles at the time. See Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. (Yale University Press, 2007). p. 36.

  68. 68.

    U.S. State Department document, April 1974, Documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Volume 8, 1979, 65.

  69. 69.

    White House, Memorandum of Conversation, May 30, 1972—5:35 to 6:35 p.m. (FRUS/1964–68/XXI/doc.200), pp. 1–2; and Memorandum of Conversation, May 31, 1972—10:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. (FRUS/1964–68/XXI/doc.201), pp. 1–3.

  70. 70.

    Memorandum of Conversation, Tehran, May 30, 1972, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 200).

  71. 71.

    Conversation among President Nixon , MacArthur, and Haig, Washington, April 8, 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 122.

  72. 72.

    Letter from President Nixon to the Shah of Iran, February 23, 1970, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 48).

  73. 73.

    Pahlavi, Mohammad-Reza Shah, The Shah’s Story, Published by Michael Joseph. (London, September 29, 1980). p. 144.

  74. 74.

    Letter from Laird to Rogers, October 27, 1970, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 93); National Security Decision Memorandum 92, November 7, 1970, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 97).

  75. 75.

    Memorandum from Saunders and Kennedy to Kissinger, June 3, 1970, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 70).

  76. 76.

    Memorandum from Kissinger to President Nixon , October 22, 1970, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 91).

  77. 77.

    Harold Saunders in an interview with William Burr, February 24, 1987, Washington, DC, tape 2B, FISOHC.

  78. 78.

    Memorandum from Saunders and Kennedy to Kissinger, June 3, 1970, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 70).

  79. 79.

    Memorandum from Kissinger for the President’s File, undated, (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 28).

  80. 80.

    Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 22, 1969, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 33).

  81. 81.

    Although Pentagon strongly objected to this move—since giving Iran unlimited credit for military sales would spark a regional arms race and deepen the Persian-Arab enmity—Kissinger backed the Shah and wrote a memo: “In general, decisions on the acquisition of military equipment should be left primarily to the government of Iran. If the Government of Iran has decided to buy certain equipment, the purchase of U.S. equipment should be encouraged tactfully where appropriate, and technical advice on the capabilities of the equipment in question should be provided.” Available at the National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB21/03-01.htm.

  82. 82.

    Tehran 10954 to U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy on Iraqi/Iranian Conflict,” December 30, 1974 (NARA/AAD/RG59/CFPF/ET/1974), pp. 1–2.

  83. 83.

    Hahn, Peter, Missions Accomplished? The United States and Iraq Since World War I (Oxford University Press, 2011). pp. 51–53.

  84. 84.

    Memconn, July 23, 1973, (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 24).

  85. 85.

    U.S . Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA: The Pike Report. (Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1977). p. 198.

  86. 86.

    Memcon, July 23, 1973, (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 24).

  87. 87.

    Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, July 20, 1973, (FRUS 1969–1976, XXVII, 23).

  88. 88.

    National Security Council Report, Statement of US Policy to Iran, 6 July 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, 12, pp. 680–8.

  89. 89.

    Military Attaché Report 196-45 from captain Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr. (Baghdad), “Tribal Revolt in Kurdistan,” August 16, 1945.

  90. 90.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. I: 1347–1348/1968–1969 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1993). p. 196.

  91. 91.

    The Tehran-Israel alliance was also coupled with strategic cooperation in other domains, including the construction of the Eilat-Eshkalon oil pipeline from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean that facilitated Israel to import Iran’s oil and enabled Iran to export oil to Europe while bypassing the Suez Canal. The Iraqis were also “nervous” about Iran-Israel economic relations and the Eilat-Haifa pipeline. See Baghdad 293 to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 1961.

  92. 92.

    Additionally, the Israel-Kurdish alliance was intensified by Israeli demographic policy. The small population of the Jewish state pushed the Israeli leaders to encourage remote Jewish communities in Diaspora, especially in the Middle East, to immigrate to “the Promised Land.” With the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in 1948–49, the Jewish minority in Iraq, about 120,000, began leaving the country. Through SAVAK’s direct intervention, Iraqi Jews were smuggled through Iraqi Kurdistan to the northern Iranian city of Urumia and then turned over to Jewish organizations to repatriate Iraqi Jews in Israel. Sobhani, Sohrab, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948–1988 (New York: Praeger, 1989). p. 86.

  93. 93.

    For details see Ostrovsky V. By Way of Deception: The Making of a Mossad Officer. (Toronto: Staddart, 1990).

  94. 94.

    In the meeting with British Foreign Secretary George Brown, Secretary Dean Rusk underlined the significance of the UK presence in the Middle East and warned the possible threat of Russian infiltration in the region to fill the power vacuum created by the British departure. Rusk even begged the British officials: “[F]or God’s sake, act like Britain!” See Memorandum, Battle to Rusk , “British Plans to Accelerate Withdrawal of Military Presence from the Persian Gulf: Your Meeting with Foreign Secretary Brown, January 11,” January 9, 1968 (FRUS/1964–68/XXI/doc.122).

  95. 95.

    Commonly used to describe the U.S . Persian Gulf policy before the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the term Twin Pillars was never mentioned in the U.S . documentary records.

  96. 96.

    The United Arab Emirates (UAE) consisted of the emirates of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Bahrain, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Umm al-Quwain.

  97. 97.

    The Johnson administration’s excuse was that “large military expenditures that would adversely affect Iran’s economic development” and, more substantially, “Iran’s armaments should not be so augmented as to frighten other riparian states and thus endanger prospects for Arab-Iranian cooperation.” Memorandum from McClelland to Handley, August 28, 1968, (FRUS 1964–1968, XXI, 155).

  98. 98.

    Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 22, 1969, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 33–35).

  99. 99.

    Telegram 1019 from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, March 19, 1970, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 55).

  100. 100.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. I: 1347–1348/1968–1969 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1993). p. 160.

  101. 101.

    Ibid. p. 159.

  102. 102.

    Letter from Laird to Rogers, October 27, 1970, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 93); National Security Decision Memorandum 92, November 7, 1970, (FRUS 1969–1976, E-4, 97).

  103. 103.

    Kissinger , Henry, The White House Years. (Little Brown & Co, Boston, Massachusetts, 1979). 1264.

  104. 104.

    Memorandum of Conversation, May 15, 1975, (FRUS 1969–1974, XXVII, 371).

  105. 105.

    Qaneifard, Tondbad-e Havades: Goftogooi ba Isa Pejman (Hurricane of Events: A Dialogue with Isa Pejman). (Elm Publication, Tehran, 2012). p. 45.

  106. 106.

    Naraghi’s interview with Khabar-Online, 2 May 2011. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8711240772.

  107. 107.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. III: 1352/1973 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995), p. 62.

  108. 108.

    Department of State, Scope Paper, August 15, 1967. Available at the National Security Archive.

  109. 109.

    Airgram from the U.S . Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, January 1973.

  110. 110.

    Fardoust was the Shah’s childhood friend. He served as deputy of SAVAK (he was, in fact, a real head of SAVAK) for ten years and headed the Special Intelligence Bureau of Iran—described as “SAVAK within SAVAK”—and the Imperial Inspectorate. He was the Shah’s ear.

  111. 111.

    Fardoust , Hossein, Khaterat-e Arteshbod-e Baznesheshteh Hossein Fardoust: Zohour va Soqout-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi (The Memoirs of Retired General Hossein Fardoust: The Rise and Fall of Pahlavi Dynasty). (Moasese-e Etelaat va Pajouhesh-ha-ye Siasi, Third Edition, 1991). p. 382.

  112. 112.

    Ibid. p. 382.

  113. 113.

    The first Directorate monitored the Tudeh Party and other communist groups. The second one controlled the National Front and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the Worker and the Women. It also controlled the parliamentary candidates. The third and fourth directorates monitored separatist parties in Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and Azarbaijan as well as tribes. The fifth directorate traced new parties and anti-Shah activities. The sixth directorate kept information on anti-regime figures.

  114. 114.

    With rising anti-Shah violent guerrilla activities in Iran and then an internal competition among institutions in curbing guerrillas, Komite-e Moshtarak Zed-e Kharabkari [the Anti-Sabotage Common Committee] was established in late January 1972. Headed by Major General Jafar-Gholi Sadri and then-Brigadier General Zandipour, it consisted of security elements of SAVAK, Gendarmerie, Shahrbani, and the Army.

  115. 115.

    The rest of SAVAK Offices focused on different issues. The Fourth Office controlled intellectuals and artistic and literary activities and imposed heavy censorship. The Fifth Office and the Sixth Office controlled budget and recruitment. The Ninth Office controlled visa process. The Tenth Office was later established to control the public health of SAVAK employees.

  116. 116.

    According to Ehsan Naraghi, Farah Pahlavi’s adviser, Qadar had appointed an agent in his office to listen to all the news related to Iran and especially the Shah. For instance, Your Majesty had asked the officials why they did not use the gasoline in bakeries as a fuel in his travel to Zanjan. Immediately, Qadar reported to the Shah that “according to my investigation about other countries they all use gasoline as a fuel” to express his belief in the Shah’s comprehensive knowledge. Besides, Qadar shared a secret tie with Lebanon’s ambassador to Tehran. All members of this family, both the father and the son, were corrupt. The Lebanese ambassador had two pretty sisters. He sent his sisters to Assadollah Alam regularly. Alam was a tasteful, women-lover guy. These women had seduced Alam, providing a fertile ground for Qadar-Alam’s friendship and therefore Qadar’s ability in attracting the Shah’s attention. See Fars News Agency, Interview with Ehsan Naraghi. Available: http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8711240772.

  117. 117.

    Fars News Agency, Interview with Ehsan Naraghi, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8711240772.

  118. 118.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

  119. 119.

    Ibid.

  120. 120.

    The vz. 24 rifles were designed and produced in Czechoslovakia from 1924 to 1942.

  121. 121.

    Qaneifard, Tondbad-e Havades: Goftogooi ba Isa Pejman (Hurricane of Events: A Dialogue with Isa Pejman). (Elm Publication, Tehran, 2012). p. 129.

  122. 122.

    Alam, Assadollah. Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. III: 1352/1973 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995). p. 274.

  123. 123.

    Ibid. p. 367.

  124. 124.

    Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. (Yale University Press, 2007). p. 62.

  125. 125.

    Interview with Major General Mansour Qadar, Oral History, Foundations for Iranian History.

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    Reisinezhad, A. (2019). Driving Forces. In: The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia. Middle East Today. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89947-3_2

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