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Proportionality in Law pp 3–24Cite as

Proportionality as a Universal Human Rights Principle

Abstract

Proportionality is the standard that guides the balancing of human or fundamental rights in law, requiring that the interference with rights must be justified by reasons that keep a reasonable relation with the intensity of the interference. One may well regard the principle of proportionality as a universal standard of rationality, which any legal system must recognise. Thus, when applied to human rights, proportionality presents a universal human rights principle. However, the thesis of the universal validity of the principle of proportionality faces various objections. I will refute these objections. First, I will distinguish diverse meanings of the universal character of principles and argue that the principle of proportionality is in a certain sense universally valid. In the second part, I will analyse the content of the principle of proportionality as part of a general framework of balancing and suggest a general scheme for examining the justification of the interference with a fundamental right according to the standard of proportionality.

Keywords

  • Proportionality
  • Universal principle
  • Human rights
  • Balancing
  • Interferences to fundamental rights

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Thus, elementary normative arguments are a compound of deontic operator (O), norm content (p), and ascription of validity (VAL).

  2. 2.

    Accordingly, “requirement for validity” should in general, if not indicated otherwise, be read as “requirement for definitive validity”.

  3. 3.

    Validity is understood here in a normative sense, that is, as the implication that a valid norm ought to be applied and followed.

  4. 4.

    Although one finds attempts to analyse normative conflicts by means of normative statements or propositions, for example, by means of optimising requirements, prima facie- or pro tanto-norms, or defeasible norms, these conceptions weaken the content or the character of validity of the respective norms in a way that makes them incapable of figuring as arguments in the situation of conflict. See Sieckmann (2011).

  5. 5.

    As to the notion of norms in a semantic sense see Sieckmann (1990).

  6. 6.

    On the principle of proportionality, Schlink (1976), Hirschberg (1981), Alexy (1985 [2002]), and Clérico (2001, 2009). For a formal analysis see Sartor (2013).

  7. 7.

    Concrete or particular case must not be understood as a single or individual case. Any description of a case must include general features and hence define a certain type of individual cases. Consequently, balancing is aimed at establishing general rules of priority.

  8. 8.

    Similarly Alexy (1985, p. 83); (2002, p. 54). However, his “law of collision” (Kollisionsgesetz) does not include a reference to the respective result of the balancing.

  9. 9.

    The idea of optimisation is ambiguous and contested. For a critique see for example Slote (1989). Nevertheless, it seems at least possible to integrate critiques, such as the suggestion that one should choose a second best solution, into a more complex model of optimisation. In addition, it is not clear whether the critiques against optimisation apply to the model of autonomous balancing proposed here.

  10. 10.

    This goes beyond the original meaning of this criterion and also of its use in economics and practical philosophy. However, the criterion explicates a central feature of rational decision-making when choices between incompatible options must be made. There is no need to restrict it to the positions, utilities or preferences of individuals.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Jan Sieckmann

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  1. Jan Sieckmann
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Correspondence to Jan Sieckmann .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Public Law Department, University of Lisbon School of Law, Lisbon, Portugal

    Prof. Dr. David Duarte

  2. Public Law Department, University of Lisbon School of Law, Lisbon, Portugal

    Jorge Silva Sampaio

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Sieckmann, J. (2018). Proportionality as a Universal Human Rights Principle. In: Duarte, D., Silva Sampaio, J. (eds) Proportionality in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89647-2_1

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