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Verifiable and Forward Secure Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Storage Efficiency

  • Kazuki Yoneyama
  • Shogo Kimura
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10631)

Abstract

Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) provides private searching over an encrypted database against an untrusted server. Though various SSE schemes have been studied, recently, it is shown that most of existing schemes are vulnerable to file injection attacks. At ACM CCS 2016, Bost proposed a forward secure SSE scheme to resist such attacks, called \({\varSigma }{o}{\phi }{o}{\varsigma }\). Besides the basic scheme (\({\varSigma }{o}{\phi }{o}{\varsigma }\)) secure against semi-honest servers, a verifiable scheme ( Open image in new window ) secure against malicious servers is also introduced. In Open image in new window , each client keeps hash values of indexes of documents corresponding to each keyword. Thus, the client storage cost is higher than for \({\varSigma }{o}{\phi }{o}{\varsigma }\), and the hash table must be reconstructed when a new document is added. Also, since any security definition and proof of security against malicious servers are not provided, what Open image in new window guarantees against malicious server is unclear. In this paper, we propose a new verifiable and forward secure SSE scheme against malicious servers. An advantage of our scheme to Open image in new window is the client storage cost; that is, our scheme only needs the same storage cost as \({\varSigma }{o}{\phi }{o}{\varsigma }\). Our key idea is to bind each index and keyword with a tag generated by an algebraic pseudo-random function, and to store the tag to the server as well as the encrypted index on an update phase. The client can efficiently check validity of answers to search queries by verifying the combined tag thanks to closed form efficiency of the algebraic pseudo-random function; and thus, the client does not need to keep the hash table. Also, we formally prove security against malicious servers. Specifically, we show that our scheme satisfies the strong reliability definition.

Keywords

Searchable symmetric encryption Forward security Algebraic pseudo-random function Strong reliability 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ibaraki UniversityHitachi-shiJapan

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