Advertisement

A PUF and Software Collaborative Key Protection Scheme

  • Changting Li
  • Zongbin Liu
  • Lingchen Zhang
  • Cunqing Ma
  • Liang Zheng
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10631)

Abstract

PUF-based key generation provides an alternative to address key storage problems. However, PUFs seem helpless in preventing the generated key from being stolen by malicious code and PUF itself is under threat of probing by adversaries. In this paper, we propose a cost-effective key protection scheme which protects against software leakage of the generated key through all stages of chip’s development. In the proposed scheme, PUF primitives and device’s firmware are bound together to generate the private key, therefore, the successful recovery of the key proves not only the legality of the hardware device but also the integrity of the bound firmware, which secures the operating environment of the generated key. Besides, a hash module in our scheme controls the PUF’s input and output which restricts the access to PUF instance thereby further boosts the system’s security.

Keywords

Key protection Physically Unclonable Function Controlled PUF 

References

  1. 1.
    Rührmair, U., Holcomb, D. E.: PUFs at a glance. In: Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition (DATE), pp. 1–6 (2014)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Gassend, B.: Physical random functions. In: Computer Security Conference, p. 928 (2003)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Pappu, R., Recht, B., Taylor, J., Gershenfeld, N.: Physical one-way functions. Science 297(5589), 2026–2030 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Daniel, E.H., Wayne, P.B., Kevin, F.: Power-up SRAM state as an identifying fingerprint and source of true random numbers. IEEE Trans. Comput. 58(9), 1198–1210 (2009)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Kota, F., Mitsuru, S., Akitaka, F., Takahiko, M., Takeshi, F.: The arbiter-PUF with high uniqueness utilizing novel arbiter circuit with delay-time measurement. In: ISCAS, pp. 2325–2328 (2011)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Gassend, B.: Physical random functions. M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), MA, USA, p. 36, 52, 209 (2003)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Gassend, B., Clarke, D., van Dijk, M., Devadas, S.: Silicon physical random functions. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security – CCS, pp. 148–160. ACM (2002)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Guajardo, J., Kumar, S.S., Schrijen, G.-J., Tuyls, P.: FPGA intrinsic pufs and their use for IP protection. In: Paillier, P., Verbauwhede, I. (eds.) CHES 2007. LNCS, vol. 4727, pp. 63–80. Springer, Heidelberg (2007).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Kota, F., Mitsuru, S., Akitaka, F., Takahiko, M., Takeshi, F.: The arbiter-PUF with high uniqueness utilizing novel arbiter circuit with delay-time measurement. In: ISCAS, pp. 2325–2328 (2011)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Lee, J.W., Lim, D., Gassend, B., Suh, G.E.: A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits for identification and authentication applications. In: 2004 Symposium on VLSI Circuits, Digest of Technical Papers, vol. 42, pp. 176–179. IEEE (2004)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Hospodar, G., Maes, R., and Verbauwhede, I.: Machine learning attacks on 65 nm Arbiter PUFs: accurate modeling poses strict bounds on usability. In: IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 2, pp. 37–42. IEEE (2012)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Ganji, F., Tajik, S., Fäßler, F., Seifert, J.P.: Strong machine learning attack against PUFs with no mathematical model. In: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2016. Springer, Heidelberg (2016).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_19Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Ruhrmair, U., Solter, J.: PUF modeling attacks: an introduction and overview. In: Conference on Design, Automation & Test in Europe, European Design and Automation Association, vol. 13, p. 348 (2014)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Gassend, B., Clarke, D., Dijk, M.V., Devadas, S.: Controlled physical random functions. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 10(4), 1–22 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Gassend, B., Clarke, D., Dijk, M.V., Devadas, S.: Controlled physical random functions. In: Computer Security Applications Conference, 2002, Proceedings, vol. 10, pp. 149–160. IEEE (2007)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Roel, M.: Physically Unclonable Functions: Constructions, Properties and Applications. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium (2012)zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Dodis, Y., Reyzin, L., Smith, A.: Fuzzy extractors: how to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 523–540. Springer, Heidelberg (2004).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3_31CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Maes, R., Van Herrewege, A., Verbauwhede, I.: PUFKY: a fully functional PUF-based cryptographic key generator. In: Prouff, E., Schaumont, P. (eds.) CHES 2012. LNCS, vol. 7428, pp. 302–319. Springer, Heidelberg (2012).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_18CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 19.
    Delvaux, J., Gu, D., Schellekens, D., Verbauwhede, I.: Helper data algorithms for PUF-based key generation: overview and analysis. IEEE Trans. Comput.-Aided Des. Integr. Circ. Syst. 34(6), 889–902 (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Zhang, Q., Liu, Z., Ma, C., Li, C., Zhang, L.: FROPUF: how to extract more entropy from two ring oscillators in FPGA-based PUFs. In: Deng, R., Weng, J., Ren, K., Yegneswaran, V. (eds.) International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Systems, pp. 675–693. Springer, Cham (2016).  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59608-2_37CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Changting Li
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Zongbin Liu
    • 2
    • 3
  • Lingchen Zhang
    • 2
    • 3
  • Cunqing Ma
    • 2
    • 3
  • Liang Zheng
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.School of Cyber SecurityUniversity of Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  2. 2.Data Assurance and Communication Security Research CenterBeijingChina
  3. 3.State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information EngineeringCASBeijingChina

Personalised recommendations