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A Lattice Attack on Homomorphic NTRU with Non-invertible Public Keys

  • Soyoung Ahn
  • Hyang-Sook Lee
  • Seongan Lim
  • Ikkwon Yie
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10631)

Abstract

In 2011, Stehlé and Steinfeld modified the original NTRU to get a provably IND-CPA secure NTRU under the hardness assumption of standard worst-case problems over ideal lattices. In 2012, López-Alt et al. proposed the first multikey fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on the IND-CPA secure NTRU. Interestingly, this homomorphic NTRU and subsequent homomorphic variants of NTRU removed the condition ‘invertible public key’ of the underlying IND-CPA secure NTRU. In this paper, we investigate the security influence of using non-invertible public key in the homomorphic NTRU. As a result, we present how to mount a lattice attack to message recovery for the homomorphic NTRU when the public key is non-invertible. Our result suggests that using invertible public keys in the homomorphic NTRU is necessary for its security.

Keywords

NTRU Homomorphic NTRU IND-CPA security Lattices LLL algorithm 

Notes

Acknowledgement

Hyang-Sook Lee and Seongan Lim were supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (Grant Number: 2015R1A2A1A15054564). Seongan Lim was also supported by Basic Science Research Program through the NRF funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (Grant Number: 2016R1D1A1B01008562). Ikkwon Yie was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the NRF funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (Grant Number: 2017R1D1A1B03034721).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsEwha Womans UniversitySeoulKorea
  2. 2.Institute of Mathematical SciencesEwha Womans UniversitySeoulKorea
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsInha UniversityIncheonKorea

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