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Institutional Empowerment and Progressive Policy Reforms: The Impact of the Inter-American Human Rights System on Intra-state Conflicts

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The Inter-American Human Rights System

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Abstract

This chapter develops the concept of ‘institutional empowerment’ to highlight the ways in which state actors have redefined their strategies as a result of interactions with the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS). The empirical analysis in the chapter assesses the direct and indirect ways that IAHRS decisions have helped strengthen state agencies that are facing difficulties in driving forward human rights policies, particularly as a result of resistance from other sectors of the state itself. This strategic repositioning of state agencies contributes to broader efforts to ensure the greater enjoyment of rights by individuals and groups. Parra-Vera’s examination of a range of concrete cases demonstrates the diversity of the actions of state agencies in the Inter-American System.

In this chapter, I draw on several ideas originally outlined in Oscar Parra-Vera (2017).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In particular, I am referring here to Venezuela and the Dominican Republic’s agenda against the IAHRS, as well as to other notable periods of tension between states like Peru and Ecuador with the Inter-American Commission.

  2. 2.

    On the notion of the ‘disaggregated state’ in the context of ‘transnational judicial dialogue,’ see Slaughter (2004).

  3. 3.

    In addition to the extensive literature on ‘state capacity,’ see Oszlak (1981).

  4. 4.

    On the symbolic effects of judicial decisions, see García-Villegas (2014).

  5. 5.

    Distinctions between indirect, symbolic, unblocking and deliberative effects were originally made by Rodríguez Garavito and Rodríguez Franco (2010).

  6. 6.

    On the type of alliances that should emerge between high courts and the IACtHR, see Dulitzky (2015).

  7. 7.

    A complete list of the provisional measures granted to public officials is available in the reports of the Rapporteur for Human Rights Defenders of the Inter-American Commission.

  8. 8.

    The Commission granted precautionary measures to judges Cesar Julio Valencia, Yesid Ramírez, Sigifredo Espinosa, María del Rosario González and auxiliary judge Iván Velásquez. Redacción Judicial, “Corte Interamericana ordena protección a magistrado Espinoza,” El Espectador, 27 October 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/articulo-231745-corte-interamericana-ordena-proteccion-magistrado-espinoza. See also, Jaime Ospina, “Magistrados dicen que Gobierno no ha cumplido con medidas de protección” La w radio, 28 October 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/magistrados-dicen-que-gobierno-no-ha-cumplido-con-medidas-de-proteccion/20101028/nota/1378037.aspx

  9. 9.

    Provisional measures MC 119/09, MC 157/09, MC 243/210. Retrieved from: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/cautelares.asp

  10. 10.

    On the concept of ‘framing’ as a qualitative tool in media analysis, see Rodríguez Garavito and Rodríguez Franco (2010). In relation to this specific example, several media outlets reported the fact that it was a Supreme Court judge who was being protected by the Commission’s precautionary measures as being ‘historic.’ See Asdrubal Guerra, “CIDH concede medidas cautelares a magistrado de la Corte Suprema de Justica,” W Radio, 8 May 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/cidh-concede-medidas-cautelares-a-magistrado-de-la-corte-suprema-de-justicia/20090518/nota/813578.aspx

  11. 11.

    CEJIL, “Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos requiere al Estado de Guatemala que proteja a Jueces que juzgaron a Ríos Montt,” 2 July 2013. Retrieved from: http://cejil.org/comunicados/comision-interamericana-de-derechos-humanos-requiere-al-estado-de-guatemala-proteger-a-j. See also, Miller and Piccone (2013).

  12. 12.

    Government Agreement 370–2012 publicly declared that the Guatemalan government would not comply with IACtHR decisions regarding events after 1987. Though the decree was later overturned, the government has nevertheless informed the IACtHR that it intends to apply the country’s amnesty law in several of the cases being evaluated by the Court. Similarly, there have been some concerns that the Constitutional Court will grant amnesty to those charged with these types of offences. The government has maintained this non-cooperative and defiant attitude, as was reflected by the IACtHR report of 21 August 2014 regarding Guatemala’s failure to comply with its duty to investigate in 11 cases.

  13. 13.

    See CEJIL, “CEJIL deplora la inminente destitución de la Fiscal General de Guatemala,” Ciudad de Guatemala y San José, 6 February 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.cejil.org/es/cejil-deplora-inminente-destitucion-fiscal-general-guatemala-0

  14. 14.

    One example provided by Mersky and Roth-Arriaza (2007, pp. 30–31), relates to a video of the Dos Erres massacre, which was broadcast on television as part of the friendly settlement negotiated by the victims and COPREDEH. After airing the video, in which victims accused the military of responsibility for the massacre, the leadership team of COPREDEH was allegedly asked to resign. Guatemala’s Congress, ‘under the control of those linked’ to one of those accused of carrying out the massacre, also ‘denounced the video and called for COPREDEH to be dissolved.’

  15. 15.

    IACtHR, Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, 27 January 2009.

  16. 16.

    IACtHR, Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, 18 November 2010.

  17. 17.

    “Interview with César Barrientos, President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Guatemala,” ICTJ, 5 January 2012. Retrieved from: http://ictj.org/es/multimedia/audio/guatemala-jueces-y-fiscales-con-voluntad. See also Barrientos (2012).

  18. 18.

    IACtHR, Gelman v. Uruguay. 24 February 2011.

  19. 19.

    For a critique of the Gelman ruling, see Gargarella (2014).

  20. 20.

    Law 18,831, “Punitive Claims against the State: Reestablishment for crimes committed in the context of state terrorism prior to 1 March 1985,” approved on 27 October 2011.

  21. 21.

    For a video of the ceremony, see Estado uruguayo reconoció responsabilidad en la desaparición de María Claudia García de Gelman, 12 March 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9osFrV2cVk&feature=related

  22. 22.

    See IACHR, reports 29/92, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374 and 10.375, Uruguay, October 2, 1992; IACHR, merits report No. 32 – Gelman case – of July 18, 2008, and Human Rights Committee, Hugo Rodríguez v. Uruguay, Final Observations on Uruguay in 1993 and 1998.

  23. 23.

    IACtHR. Gelman v. Uruguay. 20 March 2013.

  24. 24.

    IACtHR. Mendoza Prisons regarding Argentina. 1 July 2011; IACtHR, Persons imprisoned in the “Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira” Penitentiary in Araraquara, São Paulo regarding Brazil. 25 November 2008.

  25. 25.

    Representatives from both the federal and provincial levels appeared at a public hearing in 2006 regarding the extremely serious and urgent situation of inmates of Mendoza’s prisons. During the hearing, there was a dispute between the various members of the state delegation and authorities from Mendoza used this public platform to complain about how the federal authorities had decided to deal with the situation. In 2010, in another hearing before the IACtHR, there was a more harmonious relationship between the national and provincial (and in particular the province’s human rights director) authorities.

  26. 26.

    The friendly settlement stated that: “The Government of the Province of Mendoza undertakes to draw up, in conjunction with the National State and the petitioners, within a maximum period of 90 days, a Plan of Action on Penitentiary Policy to aid in setting short, medium and long-term public policies with an appropriate budget to make implementation possible.” See IACHR No. 84/11, 12.532, Friendly Settlement, Argentina, Inmates of the Penitentiary of Mendoza, 21 July 2011.

  27. 27.

    IACHR, No. 21/07, 161–02, Friendly Settlement, Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto, Mexico, 9 March 2007.

  28. 28.

    IACtHR, González et al. (‘Cotton Field’) v Mexico, 16 November 2009. Congresswoman Teresa Inchaústegui also proposed creating a database of genetic information and new protocols and manuals regarding forensic investigations into gender issues, as well as other reforms relating to reparations outlined in the IACtHR judgement. See Redacción Terra, “Pugna PRD por tipificar como delito feminicidio,” 29 January 2011. Retrieved from: http://noticias.terra.com.mx/mexico/seguridad/pugna-prd-por-tipificar-como-delito-feminicidio,a1481d47603df310VgnCLD200000bbcceb0aRCRD.html. Moreover, in December 2010, deputies from the Special Commission on Femicide demanded that heads of the federal, Chihuahua and Ciudad Juárez governments immediately commit to and carry out “verifiable and decisive action” to ensure compliance with the IACtHR ruling in the ‘Cotton Field’ case. Congresswomen also agreed to try and persuade the governments of Mexico’s 32 federal entities to adopt the IACtHR resolutions. See Redacción CIMAC, “La voluntad política no es suficiente para cumplir sentencia de CoIDH,” Cimacnoticias, 16 December 2010. Retrieved from: http://cimacnoticias.com.mx/node/59669

  29. 29.

    See also Redacción Justicia, “Procuraduría, ante OEA por presunto hostigamiento en casos de aborto,” El Tiempo, 14 March 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-12687023.html

  30. 30.

    In its 2006 ruling, the Constitutional Court ordered that the Attorney General modify a press release “in order to explain that it had erroneously referred to the campaigns ordered in ruling T-388 of 2009 as ‘massive promotion campaigns of abortion as a right’ as, in reality, these sought to help Colombian women to improve their understanding of their sexual and reproductive rights, including the right to voluntary and legal abortion.”

  31. 31.

    The Court ordered the Attorney General’s Office to modify one of its policy documents in order to accept the obligation of the National Superintendency for Health to remove any obstructions to access to voluntary abortions. It also ordered the removal of any reference to the right of institutions to object to this on grounds of conscience or to the collective exercise of rights to terminate pregnancies. Finally, it stated that the Attorney General’s Office must refrain from undue interference in procedures to include Misoprostol in the Compulsory Health Plan.

  32. 32.

    I am grateful to Ariadna Tovar, senior lawyer at Women’s Link Worldwide, (interviewed 25 May 2015) for this point.

  33. 33.

    See also Colombian Constitutional Court Ruling T-653 of 2012.

  34. 34.

    The High Court in Colombia ordered that the Presidential Agency for Social Action “inform the population affected by the Ituango massacres—via local and national radio, TV and press coverage, including community radio, at least once a month in all media for a period of six months, at times and platforms with large audiences—of the reparation measures ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights so that the individuals specified in that ruling are then able to access these measures.”

  35. 35.

    Another interesting example has not been analysed here due to space constraints. This is the impact of IAHRS decisions on the reconfiguration/change of majorities/votes within high courts which lead to guarantees-based jurisprudence. Many judicial decisions on controversial human rights matters in the region have been decided by very narrow margins. Changes in the composition of votes in some courts are accordingly associated with changes in jurisprudential direction in various areas. In some cases, the influence of IAHRS decisions may be seen in changes in the opinion of some judges or in the consolidation of the judicial narrative of high court judges who are then able to overturn majorities aligned against a more progressive judicial trend. In this chapter, this analytical variable is relevant in situations where there are clear divisions between judicial blocks whose votes are often decided by an extremely small margin. The change in the vote of Minister Petracchi of Argentina’sSupreme Court is an interesting example of this. In an interview in 2013, he stated that “the influence of [IACtHR] decisions is enormous. In my case, they made me change my vote regarding the amnesty for military officials. When the first case came to us (‘Camps’) I said, yes, this is effectively a case of amnesty – even though President Alfonsín didn’t even want to hear the word ‘amnesty’. Later, it became clear that [an amnesty] was not admissible. Some reproached me for changing vote, but I’m a judge and I abide by the rules. The ‘Barrios Altos’ case (on which the IACtHR ruled) was, for that reason, a decisive factor in my change of vote” (emphasis added). “Entrevista al ministro Enrique Santiago Petracchi,” Revista Argentina de Teoría Jurídica, 14 (2013). Retrieved from: http://www.utdt.edu/ver_contenido.php?id_contenido=9173&id_item_menu=5858

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Special Jurisdiction for Peace, Bogota, Colombia

    Oscar Parra-Vera

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  1. Institute of the Americas, University College London, London, UK

    Par Engstrom

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Parra-Vera, O. (2019). Institutional Empowerment and Progressive Policy Reforms: The Impact of the Inter-American Human Rights System on Intra-state Conflicts. In: Engstrom, P. (eds) The Inter-American Human Rights System. Studies of the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89459-1_6

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