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Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable Hedonic Games and Fractional Hedonic Games

  • Michele Flammini
  • Gianpiero MonacoEmail author
  • Qiang Zhang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10787)

Abstract

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. These are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the existence and structure of stable outcomes (i.e., partitions in coalitions), assuming that preferences are given. However, there is little discussion on this assumption. In fact, agents receive different utilities if they belong to different partitions, and thus it is natural for them to declare their preferences strategically in order to maximize their benefit. In this paper we consider strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games, that is, partitioning methods without payments such that utility maximizing agents have no incentive to lie about their true preferences. We focus on social welfare maximization and provide several lower and upper bounds on the performance achievable by strategyproof mechanisms for general and specific additive functions. In most of the cases we provide tight or asymptotically tight results. All our mechanisms are simple and can be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, all the lower bounds are unconditional, that is, they do not rely on any computational or complexity assumptions.

Keywords

Noncooperative games: computation Strategyproof mechanisms Coalitions formation Additively separable hedonic games Fractional hedonic games 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michele Flammini
    • 1
  • Gianpiero Monaco
    • 2
    Email author
  • Qiang Zhang
    • 3
  1. 1.GSSI InstituteUniversity of L’AquilaL’AquilaItaly
  2. 2.University of L’AquilaL’AquilaItaly
  3. 3.Sapienza University of RomeRomeItaly

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