What Is Legal Personhood?

Part of the SpringerBriefs in Law book series (BRIEFSLAW)


At the level of basic textbook knowledge, the concept of personhood in law does not seem to stir any major doubts or controversies. It is commonly identified with the capability of holding rights and duties, sometimes also connected with the ability to bear responsibility. Thus, a person in law is an entity that can be ascribed certain rights and duties; being merely an object of rights or duties ascribed to others does not qualify an entity as such. This means that the status of person in law is granted to beings designated by the law as right-holders, even though on other occasions they can also be objects of rights or obligations held by other persons in law (as in case of, e.g. a corporation being a property of others or a child that the contract between its parents and a groove may relate to). In other words, being a person in law consists in the ability to enter a legal relation as a party and not only in being an object of a legal relation created by others (regardless of controversies concerning the very idea of a legal relation or its object).


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Legal Theory and Philosophy of LawUniversity of Silesia in KatowiceKatowicePoland

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