Understanding Contemporary Military Coalitions and Coalition Defection

McInnis, Kathleen J.

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-78834-0_2

Understanding Contemporary Military Coalitions and Coalition Defection

Kathleen J. McInnis²

Chapter
First Online: 20 June 2019

205 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter employs both quantitative and qualitative methodologies to understand the “universe” of contemporary military coalitions. In so doing, it augments the extant literature by conceptualizing and explaining contemporary military coalitions themselves; identifying the many reasons why states join them, and what impact those reasons can have on state decision-making related to continued participation; identifying what constitutes defection versus a planned withdrawal, and how frequently defection occurs; identifying the myriad strategies states can choose from to defect from coalitions, often without appearing to do so at a strategic level; understanding whether coalitions can be hollowed out to the point of collapse at the operational level while appearing to remain coherent at the strategic level; and building a theoretical framework to understand how and why states defect from contemporary military coalitions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter: USD 29.95; Price excludes VAT (USA)

eBook: USD 79.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 99.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
General David Petraeus, “Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq,” Testimony before a joint session of the House Foreign Affairs and House Armed Services Committees, 1st Session, 110th Congress, September 10, 2007.
2.
Jonathon P. Riley, Napoleon and the World War of 1813: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2000); Paul W. Schroeder, “The Collapse of the Second Coalition,” The Journal of Modern History 59, no. 2 (1987); Edouard Driault, “The Coalition of Europe against Napoleon,” The American Historical Review 24, no. 4 (1919).
3.
Holger H. Herwig, “Disjointed Allies: Coalition Warfare in Berlin and Vienna, 1914,” The Journal of Military History 54, no. 3 (1990).
4.
Mark A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941–1943 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977).
5.
William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton University Press, 1997); Wayne Danzik, “Coalition Forces in the Korean War,” Naval War College Review, no. 47 (1994). Altstedter explores the differences between coalition partners during the Korean War, particularly as they formulated war cessation strategies. See also Norman Altstedter, “Problems of Coalition Diplomacy: The Korean Experience,” International Journal 8, no. 4 (1953).
6.
See Stanley R. Larsen and James L. Collins Jr., Allied Participation in Vietnam (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1985); Marilyn Young, Vietnam Wars 1945–1990 (Harper Collins, 1991); Lloyd C. Gardner, The Search for Peace in Vietnam, 1964–1968 (Texas A&M University Press, 2004); Maurice Vaisse, “De Gaulle and the Vietnam War,” Gardner and Gittinger, Search for Peace in Vietnam (1964).
7.
Joseph Lepgold, Danny Unger, and Andrew Bennett, Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War (St. Martin’s Press, 1997).
8.
See Wayne A. Silkett, “Alliance and Coalition Warfare,” Parameters 23, no. 2 (1993); James P. Thomas, The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions (Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies London, 2000).
9.
See, for example, John E. Peters, et al., “European Contributions to Operation Allied Force. Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001); Myron Hura, et al., “Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations,” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000).
10.
Senate Armed Services Committee, Lessons Learned from Operation and Relief Efforts in Kosovo, 1st Session, 106th Congress, October 21, 1999.
11.
Gale Mattox and Stephen Grenier, Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance (Stanford University Press, 2015).
12.
Nora Bensahel, “The Coalition Paradox: The Politics of Military Cooperation” (Stanford University, 1999).
13.
Ibid., p. 4.
14.
See “International Alliances and Military Effectiveness.”
15.
Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions Upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2012); David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton University Press, 2014).
16.
Sarah E. Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War (Oxford University Press on Demand, 2011).
17.
James W. Peterson, American Foreign Policy: Alliance Politics in a Century of War, 1914–2014 (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2014).
18.
McInnis, “Lessons in Coalition Warfare: Past, Present and Implications for the Future.”
19.
Scott Wolford and Emily Hencken Ritter, “National Leaders, Political Security, and the Formation of Military Coalitions,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2016), pp. 540–551.
20.
Atsushi Tago, “Determinants of Multilateralism in US Use of Force: State of Economy, Election Cycle, and Divided Government,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005).
21.
Nina M. Serafino, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense,” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016).
22.
Patricia A. Weitsman, “Wartime Alliances Versus Coalition Warfare: How Institutional Structure Matters in the Multilateral Prosecution of Wars,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 4, no. 2 (2010).
23.
Patricia Weitsman, Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 43.
24.
Kober, p. 2.
25.
Stéfanie Von Hlatky, American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
26.
Olivier Schmitt, “Allies That Count: Assessing the Utility of Junior Partners in Coalition Warfare” (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018).
27.
Duffield, p. 345. Bruno Tertrais, “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,” Washington Quarterly 27, no. 2 (2004).
28.
Edwin H. Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” International Studies Quarterly 12, no. 1 (1968), p. 80.
29.
Compounding the fuzziness, different scholars have sought to categorize these multilateral military constructs in different, often-overlapping ways. Russet captures this ambiguity well when he lays out how different scholars—Hans Morganthau and Kalevi J. Holsti—approach the topic of alliances. He explains Morganthau categorizes alliances according to whether they are (1) mutual or unilateral; (2) temporary or permanent; (3) operative or inoperative, depending on their ability to coordinate members’ policies; (4) general or limited in their distribution of benefits; and (5) complementary, identical, or ideological in their scope of interest. Kalevi J. Holsti, by contrast, organizes alliances along the following lines: (1) the situation in which commitments are to become operational, (2) the type of commitments undertaken, (3) the degree of military cooperation or integration, and (4) the geographic scope of the treaty. Bruce M. Russett, “An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 15, no. 2 (1971), p. 264.
30.
See Moorhead Wright, “Book Review: Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies by Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, John D. Sullivan,” International Affairs 50, no. 1 (1974). See also: Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (John Wiley & Sons, 1973).
31.
Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, “Friends Indeed? Coalition Burden Sharing and the War in Iraq” PhD. Diss (Georgetown University, 2008), p. 26.
32.
Brett Ashley Leeds, et al., “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815–1944” International Interactions 28 (2002), pp. 237–260.
33.
Sven Groennings, E.W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson, “The Study of Coalition Behavior,” New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston (1970).
34.
William A. Gamson, “A Theory of Coalition Formation,” American Sociological Review (1961), p. 374.
35.
Axelrod.
36.
William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (Yale University Press, 1962). It should be noted that while his work is widely recognized as a cornerstone of the literature on coalitions, it seems to have limited utility when applied to military coalitions. This is because his “minimum size” coalition theory appears to be at odds with the actual size and composition of contemporary military coalitions.
37.
Weitsman (2010), p. 113.
38.
Scott Wolford, The Politics of Military Coalitions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
39.
The term “coalition of the willing” is therefore redundant: coalitions are, by definition, comprised of the willing (if not always entirely able).
40.
A number of scholars have sought to distinguish between different types of institutions though which states coordinate their security policies (alliances, collective security arrangements, security communities, etc.), although, again, their definitions tend to overlap somewhat. It is beyond the scope of this book to parse the definitions between these different types of coalition framework; the point is simply that different frameworks are likely to have some bearing on the national objectives that states intend to achieve in participating in contemporary military coalitions. See: Wolford and Ritter; Walt; Tertrais.
41.
A point on semantics: rather than use the term “coalition of the willing,” this book uses the term “ad hoc” to describe a strategic-level framework that is temporary and transactional in nature through which states have minimal obligations to each other beyond the accomplishment of the security task at hand. The term “framework,” by contrast, is used to describe the strategic-level organizing construct through which the operation takes place—be it NATO, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and so on.
42.
Paul Gallis, Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1999), pp. 9–10.
43.
Jim Garamone, “Carter Convenes Counter-Isil Coalition Meeting at Andrews,” DOD News, July 20, 2016.
44.
Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization 55, no. 04 (2001).
45.
Interviews with Australian Defense and Foreign Affairs Officials, Canberra, Australia, September 10–12, 2013.
46.
Interviews with Japanese Defense and Foreign Affairs Officials, Tokyo, Japan, September 16–17, 2013.
47.
Kathleen J. McInnis, “Post-9/11 Coalition Participation Dataset,” as contained in Understanding Defection from Expeditionary Military Coalitions: The Cases of Canada and the Netherlands, PhD Diss. (King’s College London, 2017).
48.
Ibid. Please note that data for OEF is incomplete. There are several reasons for this. First, country-by-country participation data—or annual force-level data—is classified due to the sensitive nature of the operations in question. Second, states contributed ground, air, and naval assets to OEF making it difficult to parse unclassified statements in the public domain about coalition participation. Finally, OEF was a global mission, with individual operations in the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan, making it further difficult to isolate which country’s contribution was applied to which theatre. OEF is therefore represented in the data as a combat mission, but no further details are applied.
49.
Interview with Former NATO Official, December 12, 2012, London, UK.
50.
See Appendix B.
51.
Monty G. Marshall, “Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946–2012,” Center for Systemic Peace (2012).
52.
Ibid.
53.
With the exception of the United Nations, data from the 1990s should be treated as illustrative due to the lack of available data sources on coalition participation prior to 1999.
54.
See Appendix A for a detailed description of mission coding.
55.
Zero participation tends to indicate a coalition that withdrew its troops prior to official mission conclusion.
56.
Haas, 1983, p. 191.
57.
These theories will be considered in more detail later in this chapter; question nine reviews the literature to identify possible explanations for coalition defection.
58.
Ibid.
59.
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 1
60.
Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Neoclassical Realism and Identity,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); “Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 1 (2000).
61.
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 02 (1992).
62.
Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006).
63.
Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” International Studies Review 4, no. 3 (2002).
64.
Ibid., p. 111.
65.
Ibid., p. 112.
66.
Helene Cooper, “Defense Secretary Mattis Tells NATO Allies to Spend More on Defense, Or Else,” New York Times, February 15, 2017.
67.
Gregory Johnson, “Examining the SFOR Experience,” NATO Review (Winter 2004). https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue4/english/art4.html; “Chiefs of Defence provide direction and guidance on key NATO priorities,” NATO News, September 16, 2017 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_146938.htm.
68.
William Wallace, “Issue Linkage among Atlantic Governments,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–) 52, no. 2 (1976), p. 164.
69.
Arthur A. Stein, “The Politics of Linkage,” World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations (1980), p. 62.
70.
Ibid., p. 81.
71.
Wallace, p. 163.
72.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), p. 253.
73.
Ibid., p. 30. See also Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32, no. 03 (1980).
74.
Michael D. McGinnis, “Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no. 1 (1986), p. 142.
75.
“Bulletin: Angola/Namibia Accords,” United States Department of State (1989).
76.
The Angolan civil war restarted after the accords were reached and was only concluded in 2002.
77.
Chas Freeman, “The Angola/Namibia Accords,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 4 (1988).
78.
Geoffrey R. Berridge, “Diplomacy and the Angola/Namibia Accords,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–) 65, no. 3 (1989), p. 465.
79.
Freeman, pp. 130–131.
80.
These professed interests included ending apartheid in South Africa, Namibian independence, and rolling back of Soviet/Cuban influence in Africa. See Freeman, p. 129.
81.
Freeman, p. 130.
82.
“Bulletin: Angola/Namibia Accords,” p. 10.
83.
Stein, p. 81.
84.
Linda B. Miller, “America in World Politics: Linkage or Leverage?,” The World Today 30, no. 7 (1974), p. 271.
85.
Stueck, pp. 73–74.
86.
Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, Coalition Politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of Choice (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner/FirstForumPress, 2010), p. 39.
87.
Ibid., p. i.
88.
Ibid., p. i.
89.
Peter Viggo Jakobsen, et al., “Prestige-seeking small states: Danish and Norwegian Military Contributions to US-led Operations,” European Journal of International Security 3, no. 2 (2018), pp. 256–277.
90.
Ibid., p. 11.
91.
Ibid., p. 14.
92.
In my experience in the Pentagon, larger, and more risky, troop contributions absolutely led to greater access to senior US government officials, where any number of issues—some unrelated to the coalition operation in question—were discussed.
93.
Miroslav Nincic, “Getting What You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations,” International Security 35, no. 1 (2010).
94.
Randall Newnham, “Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?” US Economic Linkage and the Iraq War Coalition,” International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 2 (2008).
95.
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 97.
96.
Riley, p. 13. For scoping purposes, this research does not explore the dynamics of coalition defection during the Napoleonic Wars. That said, this is an interesting area for further research.
97.
Marina E. Henke, “Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building,” International Security 43, no. 4 (Spring 2019).
98.
Jonathan Colman and J.J. Widen, “The Coalition of the Semi-Willing: American Diplomacy and the Recruitment of Allies in Vietnam, 1964–68,” European Studies Research Institute Center for Contemporary History & Politics (Manchester, UK, 2008), p. 5.
99.
Ibid., p. 5.
100.
Newnham, p. 184. See also: Andrew G. Long, “Defense Pacts and International Trade,” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 5 (2003).
101.
US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “FY 2008 Supplemental Request,” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), p. 68.
102.
The end of the Cold War led several prominent observers to conclude that the NATO alliance should also end. The search for a post-Cold War rationale for the alliance, especially alongside the nascent European Security and Defence Identity/Policy, led many to conclude that exporting security to the Balkans was a worthwhile mission for NATO that proved its enduring relevance. Ronald D. Asmus, “Reinventing NATO (Yet Again) Politically,” NATO Review, Summer 2005.
103.
Interview with New Zealand Ministry of Defense Official, September 7, 2013, Wellington, NZ.
104.
Ministry of Defense of Japan, The Basis of Defense Policy: National Defense Paper 2013, Ministry of Defense of Japan (2013).
105.
Ibid., p. 1.
106.
Christopher W. Hughes, “Why Japan Could Revise Its Constitution and What It Would Mean for Japanese Security Policy,” Orbis 50, no. 4 (2006).
107.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive case study. Rather, what follows is an account of Japanese participation in OIF as described by Japanese interlocutors.
108.
All interlocutors mentioned this “trauma” without any prompting.
109.
This phraseology was used by interlocutors in Tokyo as a way to describe the difference between the Afghan theatre (which was seen as “combat against another state”) and Iraq, which was a non-permissive environment but not combat against another state.
110.
Interview, Ministry of Defense of Japan Official, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, October 4, 2013.
111.
Yukiko Miyagi, Japan’s Middle East Security Policy: Theory and Cases (Routledge, 2013), p. 102. Miyagi also suggests that another reason for Japanese participation was Koizumi’s desire to begin “normalizing” Japan’s military. This particular aspect of Japanese rationale for participation was not reflected in my discussions with Japanese officials in Tokyo; it was instead a motivation attributed to Mr Koizumi’s eventual successor, Shinzo Abe.
112.
Interview, Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official, Tokyo, Japan, October 5, 2013.
113.
Interview, Ministry of Defence of Japan Official, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, October 4, 2013.
114.
“55% Want Sdf to Withdraw from Iraq by March, Shows Kyodo Poll,” Japan Economic Newswire, January 23, 2005.
115.
Daniel Baltrusaitis breaks down the variables affecting nations’ decisions to contribute to coalitions with more granularity in his work, Determinants of Coalition Participation, and includes (among other things) historical learning, alliance dependence and perceptions of free riding, and so on. These variables are organized into the three categories seen here.
116.
This sentiment was underscored by every Japanese interlocutor interviewed for this project in Tokyo.
117.
These “asks” are generated by coalition leaders or framework organizations. In the case of NATO, the list of coalition requirements is called the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR); after receiving the list, nations look to NATO allies and partners to fill the CJSOR. This is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
118.
Sarah Kreps, “When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan,” Security Studies 17, no. 3 (2008), p. 532.
119.
Interview, Ministry of Defence of Japan Official, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan, October 4, 2013.
120.
“55% Want Sdf to Withdraw from Iraq by March, Shows Kyodo Poll.”
121.
Interview, Ministry of Defence of Japan Official, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo Japan, October 4, 2013.
122.
“Spanish Government Admits Defeat,” BBC News Online 2004.
123.
Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 295.
124.
“France and Libya: Sarkozy’s Libyan Surprise,” The Economist, March 14, 2011.
125.
Sarah Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-Led Operations in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 3 (2010).
126.
Brian C. Rathbun, Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans (Cornell University Press, 2004).
127.
This is not to say that military interventions cannot have a decisive impact on domestic politics. Both the Dutch and the Spanish governments collapsed over their participation in ISAF and OIF, respectively. However, both governments also found different, less risky ways to remain engaged in US-led coalition operations, as is detailed later in this book.
128.
Carl Friere, Japan to Withdraw Iraq Deployment, Associated Press Online, May 2, 2006; “Japan to pull ground troops out of Iraq by end of May,” Japan Economic Newswire, January 30, 2006.
129.
Saideman and Auerswald, 2012.
130.
Interview, Australian General Officer (Retired), Canberra, Australia, September 19, 2013.
131.
See: Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 03 (1988).
132.
For a survey of different war exit strategies and their implications, see, Jorg Noll, et al., Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2015: The Dilemma of Leaving: Political and Military Exit Strategies NL ARMS, Vol. VIII (2016). Still, that survey does not account for those withdrawals that are planned versus those that are unplanned, and therefore makes it somewhat difficult to determine whether and when a state is defecting versus routinely withdrawing.
133.
See, for example, Stephen Van Evera, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914,” World Politics 38, no. 01 (1985); Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations (1985); Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World Politics 38, no. 01 (1985).
134.
Recently, Daniel Morey noted how difficult it is to define and operationalize concepts of coalition defection and instead argues that a good definition of coalition defection requires understanding what states agree to commit to a coalition in the first place. This book agrees and uses the concept of “operational profile” integral to the theoretical framework to determine coalition contributions and how they change over time. See: Daniel Morey, “Defining Coalition Defection,” International Studies Quarterly Symposium (2017).
135.
Alex Weisiger, “Exiting the Coalition: When Do States Abandon Coalition Partners during War?” International Studies Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 4, 1 December 2016, pp. 753–765.
136.
Axelrod and Keohane; Axelrod (1984), p. 9.
137.
Hugo Grotius, as quoted in: Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger, International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 329; Brett Ashley Leeds, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel, “Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments,” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 2 (2009). Atsushi Tago (2009) makes steps towards understanding the politics of coalition defection when looking at national withdrawal from OIF. Tago argues the biggest factor leading to coalition withdrawal by democracies is national election cycles. In other words, states were more likely to withdraw from coalition operations when faced with an election; incumbents seek to shed themselves of risky operations that reduce their voter approval ratings. Challengers, by contrast, often take advantage of unpopular troop deployments in their bids to oust the sitting leadership. Yet Tago’s work, while a useful start, is inherently limited due to the fact that only states that fully withdrew their forces from OIF were considered in his survey.
138.
Morey (2017). The approach Morey posits is consistent with the methodology of this study, which involves tracing the evolution of a state’s operational profile over time to determine whether a defection occurred.
139.
Paul Ames, “NATO seek extension of Dutch mission in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, September 1, 2007.
140.
“Risk” will be defined and grounded in the literature later in this chapter.
141.
Kathleen J. McInnis, “Varieties of Defection Strategies from Multinational Military Coalitions: Insights from Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Contemporary Security Policy 40, no. 1 (2019), pp. 116–133.
142.
While quartiles are a fairly blunt analytic tool, in this instance it was useful because it resulted in a more sophisticated sample than a histogram analysis provided. The latter indicated that most withdrawals are below ~200 per annum, which in itself is not that useful. The quartile methodology helped identify which of those withdrawals might be significant for the purposes of identifying coalition defections.
143.
While an attempt was made to determine whether all withdrawals were planned or unplanned regardless of quartile, it was extremely difficult to make such determinations with respect to withdrawals that fell in the lower quartiles (by either percentage or actual withdrawals).
144.
Sources include Nexis.com, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations troop participation data, the European Union, United Nations reports to the Secretary General, and BBC Country Timelines. See Appendices for further explanations.
145.
William J. Kole, “Already Overstretched in Balkans, West Wary of Long-Term Afghan Commitment,” Associated Press Worldstream, January 31, 2002.
146.
Interview with DOD Official, Arlington, VA, December 12, 2012.
147.
The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” (2009).
148.
A complete list of the coalitions that experienced significant defections can be found at Appendix B.
149.
“Risk” is explored in more detail later in this chapter in the context of prospect theory.
150.
When surveying coalition literature—especially over the past decade—the subject of caveats is a recurring theme. Caveats are restrictions placed by nations on the employment of their military forces and occur in a wide variety of forms: from prohibiting crowd control to prohibiting night operations. It is important to note that caveats do not in themselves constitute coalition defection. Caveats (to the extent that they are made publicly available) help us understand the degree of risk nations are willing to accept at the outset. This, in turn, can help us understand the point at which risks—operational or otherwise—begin to outweigh rewards associated with coalition participation. But logically speaking, the placement of caveats does not equal defection unless it occurs while the mission is taking place. As such, caveats only become a symptom of coalition defection when they are revised to further minimize risk to troops during (versus prior to) a mission—a phenomenon that Kober would likely describe as defection by “evasion,” (explored below). Regardless, this particular type of coalition defection can only be loosely explored in this book due to the fact that the caveats themselves are classified. For further detail on caveats, see Saideman and Auerswald (2012).
151.
For a detailed narrative of the controversy, see Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004).
152.
Of the eight initial mission objectives for OIF, only one implied any degree of state building or post-conflict reconstruction: “Help Iraq achieve representative self-government and insure its territorial integrity.” Baker Spring, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Objectives Met,” The Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/04/operation-iraqi-freecom-military-objectives-met.
153.
Because several nations sought to hide their participation in or support of OIF, the actual number of coalition participants is classified. The figure is derived from public reporting.
154.
“Foreign Troops Could Quit Iraq Early 2007: Report,” Agence France Presse, March 5, 2006.
155.
Ibid.
156.
“Spain PM Firm on Iraq Withdrawal,” BBC World News, March 17, 2004.
157.
“Spain PM Orders Iraq Troops Home,” BBC World News, April 18, 2004.
158.
“Last Spanish Troops Leave Iraq,” BBC World Service, May 21, 2004.
159.
Balbina Y. Hwang, “South Korean Troops to Iraq: A Boost for U.S.-RoK Relations,” The Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/02/south-korean-troops-to-iraq-a-boost-for-us-rok-relations.
160.
“South Korea’s Defence Ministry to Assess Impact of Troop Withdrawal from Iraq,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific—Political, October 28, 2005.
161.
Ibid.
162.
“South Korea among Countries Ending Iraq Deployment,” FoxNews.com , November 30, 2008.
163.
“South Korea’s Defence Ministry to Assess Impact of Troop Withdrawal from Iraq.”
164.
“South Korea Drawing up Plan to Withdraw Troops from Iraq, Defense Ministry Says,” The Associated Press, April 13, 2007.
165.
“South Korea to Begin Cutting Troop Presence in Iraq from Next Month,” Associated Press, March 5, 2006.
166.
Ibid.
167.
“South Korea to Withdraw All Troops from Iraq by End of 2007,” Associated Press Worldstream, November 30, 2006.
168.
Jae-Soon Chang, “South Korea Delays Decision on Troop Withdrawal from Iraq,” ibid., June 28, 2007.
169.
“US Welcomes South Korean Troop Extension in Iraq,” Agence France Presse, October 23, 2007.
170.
“US Thanks South Korea for Troops’ Contribution in Iraq,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific—Political November 11, 2008.
171.
“US Bears Responsibility for Agent’s Death but Italy Will Stay in Iraq: Berlusconi,” Agence France Presse—English, May 5, 2005.
172.
Clive Myrie, “Anti-War Camp Rallies for Bush Arrival,” BBC World News, June 3, 2004.
173.
“Italy to Begin Pulling Troops out of Iraq in September: Berlusconi,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2005.
174.
“Italy Says Tie for Talks on Pulling Troops out of Iraq,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2005.
175.
“Italy to Begin Pulling Troops out of Iraq in September: Berlusconi.”
176.
“Berlusconi under Fire at Home after Iraq Withdrawal Climbdown,” Agence France Presse, March 17, 2005.
177.
“Italy to Withdraw Troops from Iraq by End of Year: Minister,” Agence France Presse, January 19, 2006.
178.
Amb. David H. Thorne, “Prt Dhi Qar: Italian Expertise, Generosity and Cooperation with the United States,” Il Tempo, June 8, 2011.
179.
Stephen A. Carney, Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Center for Military History, United States Army, 2011), p. 32.
180.
Theo Farrell, “Somalia,” (Research Note, 2008), p. 2–3.
181.
Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: U.S. Military Operations in Somalia, 2nd Session, 103rd Congress, May 12, 1994.
182.
Ibid., p. 2.
183.
Ibid., p. 2.
184.
Ibid., p. 2.
185.
Lucia Mouat, “UN to Break New Ground in Plan for Peacekeepers in Somalia,” Christian Science Monitor, March 16, 1993.
186.
Chester A. Crocker, “The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995), p. 4.
187.
Senate Armed Services Committee (1994).
188.
Theo Farrell, 2008, p. 4.
189.
Walter Clark and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (1996).
190.
Ibid., p. 76.
191.
“Security Council Expresses ‘Grave Concern’ over Iaea Assessment That Rapid Discharge Operations Will Render Agency Unable to Verify Dprk Safeguards Compliance,” Federal News Service, May 31, 1994.
192.
“U.S. Prepares for Troop Pull-Out,” Agence France Presse, December 15, 1993.
193.
Ibid.
194.
“Italy to Withdraw Troops from Somalia and Mozambique,” Agence France Presse, October 13, 1993.
195.
Jim Cusack, “Irish UN Convoy Arrives Safely at Mogadishu Port,” The Irish Times, March 29, 1994.
196.
Farrell, 2008, p. 3.
197.
“U.S. Prepares for Troop Pull-Out.”
198.
Emphasis added.
199.
Senate Armed Services Committee (1994).
200.
Ibid.
201.
Farrell, 2008, p. 3.
202.
“U.N Votes to Remove Peace Force; Other Developments,” Facts on File World News Digest, November 10, 1994.
203.
Wolford and Ritter.
204.
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Cornell University Press, 2007).
205.
Bennett (2014).
206.
Patrick A. Mello, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Change: Analyzing Withdrawal from Coalition Operations in Iraq,” (2016); Ulrich Pilster, Tobias Böhmelt, and Atsushi Tago, “Political Leadership Changes and the Withdrawal from Military Coalition Operations, 1946–2001,” International Studies Perspectives 16, no. 4 (2015); Weisiger, 2016; Justin Massie, “Why Democratic Allies Defect Prematurely: Canadian and Dutch Unilateral Pullouts from the War in Afghanistan,” Democracy and Security 12, no. 2 (2016).
207.
Tago, 2009.
208.
Weisiger.
209.
Ibid.
210.
Walt, 1997.
211.
Ibid., p. 170.
212.
D. Scott Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816–1984,” American Journal of Political Science (1997).
213.
Ibid., p. 870. See also Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, “Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances,” ibid., 1994.
214.
Bennett’s (1997) dataset was also limited to the time period between 1816 and 1984, while this study is primarily concerned with post-Cold War coalitions.
215.
See, for example, Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (Columbia University Press, 1959); Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 20–21; Walt, 1977; Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, “Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment,” Review of International Studies 15, no. 2 (1989), p. 183; G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization 44, no. 3 (1990), p. 285; James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science (1991); Wendt, 1999; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 1992; Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” International Studies Review (2002), p. 52.
216.
See, for example: Immanuel Kant, On Perpetual Peace (Broadview Press, 1917); Kreps, 2010, pp. 191–215; David P. Auerswald, “Inward Bound: Domestic Institutions and Military Conflicts,” International Organization 53, no. 03 (1999), pp. 469–504; Saideman and Auerswald, 2012; Rathbun, 2004; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 25; Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 01 (1999), pp. 479–502; David G. Haglund, “What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept,” International Journal 59, no. 3 (2004); Christoph Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union (Springer, 2006), p. 3; Leeds, 2003; Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 5 (2000). While Leeds et al.’s insights are useful, their dataset does not explore post-Cold War coalitions which, as noted above, differ quite considerably from earlier alliances.
217.
Baltrusaitis, 2008.
218.
Kober, p. xi.
219.
Ibid.
220.
Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 01 (1998), pp. 144–172.
221.
Lorenzo Cladi and Mark Webber, “Italian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: A Neoclassical Realist Approach,” European Security 20, no. 2 (2011).
222.
Rose. See also Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004).
223.
Alexander Reichwein, “The Tradition of Neoclassical Realism,” Neoclassical Realism in European Politics. Bringing Power Back In (2012), p. 31.
224.
Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
225.
Nathan Alexander Sears, “The Neoclassical Realist Research Program: Between Progressive Promise and Degenerative Dangers,” International Politics Reviews 5, no. 1 (2017), pp. 21–31.
226.
Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (Oxford University Press, 2016).
227.
Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 03 (1988).
228.
Related, according to Type III NCR as formulated by Ripsman et al., “grand strategic choices can affect relative power and international outcomes, and at times reshape the structure of the international system” (Ibid., p. 82). This book, however, maintains that these kinds of iterative interactions between international- and domestic-level variables shape important state foreign policy decisions below the grand strategic level.
229.
Ibid., p. 89.
230.
For a detailed treatment of prospect theory as it relates to IR, see Rose McDermott’s excellent work on the subject: McDermott. As for this book, this section is designed to illustrate a point that is perhaps more salient for policymakers than others: all things being equal, if prospect theory has any explanatory power when applied to coalition participation decisions, sustaining coalition participation in high-risk coalitions is only likely to get harder over time.
231.
Ibid.
232.
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Macmillan, 2011), p. 281.
233.
Ibid., p. 265.
234.
Rose McDermott, “Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses from the First Decade,” Political Psychology 25, no. 2 (2004), p. 291.
235.
Ibid., p. 298.
236.
Ibid., p. 294.
237.
Von Hlatky.
238.
Snyder, p. 166.
239.
Robert O. Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy, no. 2 (1971); Robert Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy 2 (Spring 1971): 161–182.
240.
Ibid., p. 168.
241.
Victor Cha demonstrates how anxieties shift from entrapment to abandonment (and back again) in the trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. See Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000).
242.
Interview, Former Ministry of Defense of Japan Official, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan 16 September, 2013.
243.
Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 04 (1984), p. 466.
244.
Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000), p. 266.
245.
Snyder, 2007, p. 19.
246.
My use of the term “tethering” differs somewhat from Patricia Weitsman’s definition as put forward in Dangerous Alliances; she uses “tethering” to describe the act of bringing an adversary into an alliance relationship. By contrast, I use “tethering” to mean constraints on a coalition partner that make it difficult to defect through total abrogation coalition participation.
247.
Interview, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Official, Mons, Belgium, November 11, 2012.
248.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO ISAF History,” http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO and Afghanistan Placemat Archive, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/107995.htm.
249.
Ibid. The “comprehensive approach” is a concept developed by nations—many of whom were involved in southern Afghanistan—describing effective delivery of stabilization effects through better coordination between civilian agencies and military counterparts at the tactical level. It tended to stress primacy of civilian instruments, local reconstruction teams were often led by civilian representatives. Counterinsurgency, by contrast, was slightly more agnostic about who delivered aid at the local level (e.g., US military commanders led PRTs and administered quick-impact projects through the Commander’s Emergency Response Programme, or “CERP”). This was somewhat controversial within NATO itself because NATO is a “military-only” alliance; attempts to push NATO forces to become better trained on delivering “civilian” effects (like that of CERP) were met with stiff resistance. For further discussion of the differences between the two approaches, see Michael Williams, The Good War: NATO and the Liberal Conscience in Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 106–109.
250.
Ann Scott Tyson, “Gates Backs Buildup of U.S. Troops in Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, November 22, 2008.
251.
This coordination was maintained at least through 2010 when RC-Southwest was established.
252.
McInnis, 2017.
253.
Ibid.
254.
President Barack Obama, “The New Way Forward—The President’s Address at West Point” (Washington, DC, 2009).
255.
As Canada’s Globe and Mail reported: “While NATO announced at a January summit that it had added 5000 troops to match the U.S. surge, most of these were temporary commitments made almost a year earlier by countries such as Britain. And that is still far short of the 10,000 NATO soldiers demanded by Afghan coalition commander General Stanley McChrystal to match the U.S. contribution.” Doug Sanders, “Dutch Government Folds over Afghan Mission; Parliament Dissolved after Coalition Parties Fail to Reach Consensus on Withdrawal of Troops from War-Torn Country,” Globe and Mail, February 21, 2010.
256.
Karen DeYoung and Scott Wilson, “Obama to Send 34,000 Troops to Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, December 1, 2009.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, USA
Kathleen J. McInnis

Authors

Kathleen J. McInnis
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

McInnis, K.J. (2020). Understanding Contemporary Military Coalitions and Coalition Defection. In: How and Why States Defect from Contemporary Military Coalitions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78834-0_2

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78834-0_2
Published: 20 June 2019
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-78833-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-78834-0
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics