Abstract
The conclusion provides a summary of the main research findings. The explanations of the Chinese nuclear doctrine, which analyse separately international factors, strategic culture, and leaders’ belief systems have several shortcomings. The model used in this work, based on neoclassical realism, consents to solve the puzzles inherent to the studies presented. It combines both international variables and unit-level variables to explain the way a country reacts to international threats/opportunities.
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Notes
- 1.
The Korean War , the Indochina War, and the crisis in the Taiwan Strait presented the possibility of a nuclear attack against mainland China (Lewis and Xue 1988).
- 2.
Neorealists’ approaches disregard completely the role of cultural variables. Conversely, neoclassical realism considers strategic culture one of the most important intervening variables to explain leader perception and decision making/implementation processes (Ripsman et al. 2016: 66–70). For a neoclassical explanation of the role of ideas in grand strategy formation, see Kitchen (2010: 13): “Actors within states may hold competing operational ideas about which means are most appropriate to address particular threats. For example, within militaries, the different forces tend to hold competing ideas about the effectiveness of their respective methods. Elsewhere within the state, some actors may consider that particular goals require the use of economic sanctions and military ‘sticks’, whereas other actors prefer to rely on the ‘carrots’ of trade and softer elements of power. Not only do actors hold different ideas about which means will work, there exists a competition of ideas concerning which means are ethically acceptable. Correspondingly, actors will have different ideas about which means are appropriate, which may reflect both long-standing cultural factors and prevailing domestic political attitudes”.
- 3.
“The distinction between permissive and restrictive strategic environments relates to the imminence and the magnitude of threats and opportunities that states face. All things being equal, the more imminent the threat (or the more enticing the opportunity) the more restrictive the state’s strategic environment is. Conversely, the more remote the threat or opportunity and the less intense the threat and or opportunity, the more permissive the strategic environment is” (Ripsman et al. 2016: 52).
- 4.
“In sum, the balance of power (and changes to it) and the systemic pressures generated by an anarchic political order more generally, inform the environment in which all states act. In that context, however, all states, and especially great powers, enjoy considerable discretion with regard to how they pursue their goals and what sacrifices they make in the face of constraints. It is thus impossible to understand and anticipate the behaviour of states by looking solely at structural variables and constraints. To explain world politics, it is necessary to appeal to a host of other factors, including domestic politics, history, ideology, and perceptions of legitimacy” (Kirshner 2015: 162).
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Rosa, P. (2018). Conclusions. In: Neoclassical Realism and the Underdevelopment of China’s Nuclear Doctrine . Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78640-7_6
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