Nuclear Doctrine as a Continuation of Factional Politics by Other Means, 1964–1971

  • Paolo Rosa


This chapter analyses the period from 1964 to 1971, which followed the first nuclear test. This period was characterised by a very dangerous international environment (the Indochina War, the clash with the USSR on the Ussuri River, and paranoia about a possible Soviet decapitation nuclear attack), a complicated domestic situation (Cultural Revolution and the fall of Lin Biao) marked by hard factionalism, and a strategic debate captured by domestic struggle so that the development of the nuclear doctrine was a sort of continuation of “factionalism by other means”.


Factionalism Cultural Revolution Strategic debate 


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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of TrentoTrentoItaly

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