Abstract
In this chapter, a brief history of China’s nuclear programme is presented. It focuses on three topics: first, the role of Mao’s thought in China’s nuclear policy; second, the main steps in the development of China’s nuclear arsenal; and third, the elaboration of the “no-first-use” doctrine that for approximately three decades represented China’s only declared nuclear policy.
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Notes
- 1.
This logic is similar to the logic of institutional mimicking used by Martha Finnemore to analyse the worldwide diffusion of the Western model of an armed forces. Being that the Western state is regarded as a form of a “modern” political organization and enjoys broad legitimacy at the international level, all the other countries that aspire to obtain analogous recognition attempt to develop similar political structures. “Even the state defence apparatus, the component of the state that realism would expect to be most constrained by task demands imposed by a self-help world, exhibits this kind of isomorphism. First, virtually all states have defence ministries even when they face no external threat. Further, virtually all states have tripartite military structures, with an army, air force, and navy—even landlocked states. Finally, weapons acquisition patterns, particularly among developing states, is often driven by symbolic (and therefore cultural) considerations” (Finnemore 1996: 336–337). On the role of nationalism in the decision of going nuclear, see also Etel Solingen’s analysis of the inward-looking political coalition and their support for the development of nuclear weapons (Solingen 2009).
- 2.
On this point, see the next section.
- 3.
Mao was prepared to be Stalin’s number two, but he was in no way willing to be Khrushchev’s number two (Zagoria 1962). “[…] after Stalin death, Mao already felt that he should have a greater voice on questions concerning not only matters between Beijing and Moscow but also the fate of the entire international Communist movement” (Chen 2001: 68). On Chinese nationalism and its role in foreign policy, see Peter Hays Gries (2004).
- 4.
In November 1957, during the Moscow conference of Communist parties, Mao repeated his mantra on the secondary role of nuclear weapons, that they could not prevent the progress of the socialist system. Sending a shudder through his audience, he said that in the event of a nuclear war, “even if one-half of the population in the world died, another half would survive. Moreover, imperialism would be destroyed, and the entire world would be socialized. After some years, there would be 2.7 billion people again”.
- 5.
“Lin [Biao] was at least repeating what many in the populace and the army ranks were grumbling about: the great gamble of making war on a nuclear-armed nation. In the final analysis, as expected, Mao’s unwavering stand on the nuclear issue ended the argument. Within days, the time for decision arrived, and at the moment of truth in early October, no one raised the nuclear question” (Goncharov et al. 1993: 167).
- 6.
Talk by Mao Zedong at an Enlarged Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo (Excerpts), April 25, 1956 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114337).
- 7.
On nuclear cooperation between Beijing and Moscow, see Lewis and Xue (1988: 60–72).
- 8.
Address by Zhou Enlai at the Plenary Session of the Fourth Meeting of the State Council (Excerpt), January 31, 1955 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114333).
- 9.
Ibid.
- 10.
Request by the Chinese Leadership to the Soviet Leadership for Help in Establishing a Chinese Nuclear Program, January 15, 1956 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110398).
- 11.
Handwritten Letter from Nie Rongzhen to Zhou Enlai on the Development of the Atomic Energy Industry, July 11, 1957 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114340).
- 12.
Letter from Zhang Wentian to the Soviet Chargé Concerning the Development of the Atomic Energy Industry, August 12, 1957 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114341).
- 13.
At the outset, Mao was not completely against arms control measures. In February 1958, he stated: “In my opinion, the issues of arms reduction and atomic weapons sooner or later will have to be resolved, since it is inconceivable to think that anything can come out of fighting an atomic war”. Conversation of Mao Zedong with Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin (Excerpt), February 28, 1958 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114342).
- 14.
The launch of the Great Leap Forward affected in several ways the development of the nuclear programme. First, the euphoric mood aroused by the Great Leap affected the expectations about the possibility of building a Chinese atomic bomb. Second, the Great Leap started a nationwide campaign to discover uranium in Chinese soil. “In the spirit of the Great Leap Forward , the Second Ministry in mid-1958 issued the slogan ‘the whole people should engage in uranium mining’ (quanmin ban youkuang). The challenge was quickly taken up in Hunan, where the provincial Bureau of Metallurgy in July called for a Great Leap in the production of all types of non-ferrous metals. […] The use of local methods cost a great deal, wasted uranium, caused a major depletion of raw materials used in processing uranium, such as soda and acids, and produced serious pollution because of the near-absence of environmental protection equipment. But the Chinese recall the pluses as well as the drawbacks of the episode. […] The major advantage was that, in the quest for nuclear weapons, mass-based methods produced the first 150 tons of uranium concentrates. […] The timely acquisition of this uranium is credited with shortening the race for the bomb by one year. In this limited sense, the first Chinese bomb was a ‘people’s bomb’” (Lewis and Xue 1988: 87, 88).
- 15.
Zhou Enlai ’s Discussion with a Kenyan African National Federation Delegation (Excerpt), September 5, 1963 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114355).
- 16.
In the second half of the 1960s, with the development of a robust national arsenal and the risks of the proliferation of nuclear weapons by countries hostile to China, like India, Beijing’s interests began to move towards a policy of opposition to nuclear proliferation. While not adhering to the NPT , Beijing declared its willingness to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, its commitment not to help other countries in developing such weapons, and its support of the creation of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. In other words, in this period, China, while refusing to join the NPT, which it considered a symbol of American imperialism and Soviet revisionism, agreed to follow a line of conduct compatible with the obligations of the Treaty. In 1973, China signed—the first among the five declared nuclear weapons states—the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Latin America. In 1984, after years of foot-dragging, Beijing adhered to the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), responsible for ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the same year, Chinese policymakers drew up the “doctrine of the three noes”: no support, encouragement or assistance to other states in developing nuclear weapons. In 1990, a Chinese delegation attended the conference on the revision of the NPT in Geneva, claiming, for the first time, that the NPT had played a positive role in combating nuclear proliferation and preserving the peace. Finally, in 1992, Beijing officially adhered to the NPT. See Zhu Mingquan (1997), and Medeiros (2007).
- 17.
Mao Zedong ’s Talk at the Beidaihe Central Committee Work Conference (Excerpt), July 18, 1960 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114351).
- 18.
Report by Nie Rongzhen to Mao Zedong Regarding Science and Technology (Abridged), July 3, 1960 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114348). Zhou Enlai responded to Nie: “Base ourselves on independence, self-reliance and autarky […] Regardless of what we acquire, what we study, and what we purchase, or how much [is involved], we must principally rely on our own intensive study. If we don’t engage in intensive study, not only will we not be able to create our own unique inventions, but, furthermore, we also will not be able to make practical use and develop what we have acquired, studied and purchased”. Some Remarks by Zhou Enlai on a Report by Nie Rongzhen , July 11, 1960 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114349).
- 19.
“In order to stand on our own feet, make a breakthrough in atomic energy technology, and speed up the development of our country’s atomic energy industry, the Central Committee believes it is essential to further narrow the scope of activity, concentrate our strength, and increase support in various related areas for the development of the atomic energy industry”. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Decision with respect to Several Issues Concerning Strengthening Atomic Energy Industrial Infrastructure, July 16, 1961 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114353).
- 20.
The Third Machine-Building Ministry oversaw the aviation industry.
- 21.
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Decision with respect to Several Issues Concerning Strengthening Atomic Energy Industrial Infrastructure, July 16, 1961 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114353).
- 22.
Ibid.
- 23.
Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong on the Nuclear Explosion, September 21, 1964 (WC/DAIHD: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114356).
- 24.
https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/16-october-1964-first-chinese-nuclear-test/. On June 17, 1967, just three years after the first atomic test, China detonated its first hydrogen bomb.
- 25.
The text of Zhang Aiping’s call is fully reported in Lewis and Xue (1988: 188).
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
On this point, see Lewis and Xue (1988: 194).
- 29.
US Central Intelligence Agency, excerpt from draft report on Chinese military strategy, circa 1970–71 (NSA: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB26/docs/doc04.pdf).
- 30.
Statement reported in Defense Intelligence Agency, “Soviet and Peoples Republic of China Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and Strategy,” March 1972 (excerpt) (NSA: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB26/docs/doc14.pdf).
- 31.
- 32.
This fact, of course, is true also for American declaratory policy, as David Rosemberg has shown in his analysis of the US Nuclear SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Rosenberg 1983).
- 33.
J. Acton, “Is China changing its position on nuclear weapons?”, New York Times, April 18, 2013 (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/opinion/is-china-changing-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons.html?_r=0).
- 34.
On the importance of language in China’s foreign policy, see the classical study by Harry Solomon (1995) on Chinese negotiating behaviour.
- 35.
New York Times, April 18, 2013 (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/opinion/is-china-changing-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons.html?_r=0).
- 36.
G. Kulacki, “China Still Committed to No First Use of Nuclear Weapons”, April 23, 2013 (http://allthingsnuclear.org/china-still-committed-to-no-first-use-of-nuclearweapons/).
- 37.
Pang Sen, quoted in Kulacki.
- 38.
Fravel, “China Has Not (Yet) Changed Its Position on Nuclear Weapons”, April 22, 2013 (http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/china-has-not-yet-changed-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons/?all=true).
- 39.
Ibid.
- 40.
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Rosa, P. (2018). China’s Nuclear Programme: Origins and Progress. In: Neoclassical Realism and the Underdevelopment of China’s Nuclear Doctrine . Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78640-7_3
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