The Validity and Influence of Clausewitz’s Trinity on the Development of Naval Power

  • Carlos Guzmán
  • Óscar Barrionuevo
  • Teresa Guarda
Conference paper
Part of the Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies book series (SIST, volume 94)

Abstract

General Carl Von Clausewitz, based his work “On War” on the lessons obtained from the Napoleonic Wars; defining in this work the denominated “Trinity of Clausewitz”: Town, Government and Armed Forces. The purpose of this paper is to analyze if this theory is still valid and to demonstrate whether the conceptual applicability in the process of planning and development of the naval power of a State. The problem is approached from the context of the Grand Strategy and the Maritime Strategy, based on the Trinitarian theory of Clausewitz. The aim is to visualize the relationship that exists between this conception and the theories that sustain the development of naval power and the design of forces. The argumentation of this research was developed through the analytical-deductive method, describing Clausewitz’s theory about war, and then interpreting what concerns the development or planning of forces, thus having the elements to correlate to determine the validity and incidence of “The Trinity of Clausewitz” in the development of Naval Power.

Keywords

Naval power Trinity of Clausewitz Design of forces Maritime Strategy 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carlos Guzmán
    • 1
  • Óscar Barrionuevo
    • 1
  • Teresa Guarda
    • 2
    • 3
    • 4
  1. 1.Armada del EcuadorGuayquilEcuador
  2. 2.Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas-ESPESangolquiEcuador
  3. 3.Universidad Estatal Península de Santa Elena – UPSELa LibertadEcuador
  4. 4.Algoritmi CentreMinho UniversityGuimarãesPortugal

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