Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Crisis and Change in Post-Cold War Global Politics pp 97–128Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Corruption, Crisis, and Change: Use and Misuse of an Empty Signifier

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

Abstract

Applying the post-structuralist approach to corruption, the aim of this chapter is twofold: First, this chapter explores, how the Presidents of Ukraine—Viktor Yushchenko in 2005–2010 and Viktor Yanukovych in 2010–2014—use an empty signifier of corruption, and second, what role the term “corruption” plays for both, political crisis and political change in Ukraine. Accordingly, the main question is: What meaning do the Presidents of Ukraine assign to corruption as an empty signifier and to what extent this temporarily fixed meaning unfolds potential to create social identities? The main challenge the Presidents face with this respect is creating a dominant public discourse and framing corruption in a way that represents themselves as “non-corrupt Self” and their competitors as “corrupt Others”.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   119.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   159.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   159.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    “Empty signifiers enable both the articulation of dissent as well as the production of consensus in society. Hence, they play a constitutive role for the possibility of society as such; they are a necessary condition for the (re)organization of political order. Oscillating within this tension between plural and potentially antagonistic views on the one hand, and the potential of socially acknowledged, universalized representations on the other hand, empty signifiers are always reversible” (Koechlin 2013: 23–24).

  2. 2.

    This chapter is a part of my Ph.D. research, where I also elaborate the case of Kuchma’s presidency.

  3. 3.

    According to the sociological polls, conducted by the Razumkov Centre 30 September 2010–05 October 2010, in the answer to the question “How strong do following institutions influence decision-making in Ukraine ?” 44.2% indicated that the President of Ukraine is the most influential institution http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=579.

  4. 4.

    The code system includes analysis of the following code groups with regard to corruption : “types”, “causes”, “consequences”, “description of the problem”, “Corrupt spheres and institutions”, “Role of the West”, “Responsibility for Anti-Corruption ”, “Anti-corruption Activities”, “Accusations in Corruption ” and “Reaction to Accusation”.

  5. 5.

    “ Hegemony is understood as an articulatory practice evolving out of the interplay of the logics of equivalence and difference and based on the temporal filling of a dislocated social structure by means of empty signifiers” (Nabers 2015: 146).

  6. 6.

    The term “power ” is extremely problematic, because both its meaning and its latitude differ between public office power , decision-making power in private sector, discursive power , etc. The relationship between public and private is also very ambiguous, since not many societies have a clear, formal line separating public and private. The word “misuse” can indicate either violation of the formal rules (illegal behaviour) or violation of public trust (illegitimate behaviour) and can differ according to different nations/cultures. Finally, both dimensions—legality and legitimacy—depend highly on local and temporal context (Debiel and Pech 2010: 54).

  7. 7.

    Rothstein and Tannenberg argue: “Within the development community , combating corruption has become one of the key pillars of good governance policy” (2015: 45). The authors list many negative effects of corruption , some of them are: increasing inequality (Gupta et al. 2002); undermining the legitimacy of the state (Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014); reducing education attainment (Kaufmann 2006); decreasing social trust and social capital (Rothstein 2005, 2011).

  8. 8.

    On analysis of the corruption framing strategies (see Wickberg 2016).

  9. 9.

    During his campaign Yushchenko said: “One of the main problems of the current Ukraine is corruption . Corruption is like erosion, corroding the state, creates a threat to the national security . Because of the high level of corruption , people do not trust the government. Almost 90% of Ukrainians consider current government corrupt and indifferent to the interests of ordinary people. Such situation has to be changed, government has to work for people, it has to be accountable to and controlled by the society.” In “Posle izbraniia prezidentom Ukrainy Yushchenko podpishet ukraz o sozdanii komiteta narodnoho kontrolia s otdeleniiami v oblastiakh,” UNIAN, 14 October 2004.

  10. 10.

    “Yushchenko, who appears to hold a slight lead in the polls, has promised to steer Ukraine toward a more open and democratic society, ending what he calls the cronyism and corruption of Kuchma’s 10 years in power ” (Myers 2004).

  11. 11.

    According to the Razumkov Centre sociological polls, in February 2005, 46.7% of respondents indicated that they “fully support” the actions of the president, while in October 2005 this number decreased to 18.1%. Available online: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=67.

  12. 12.

    With aim to resolve presidential election crisis during the Orange Revolution in 2004 and to agree on the elections rerun, the constitutional reform was a necessary compromise. Kuchma and his presidential candidate Yanukovych demanded to change Ukraine from presidential-parliamentary republic into parliamentary-presidential one, weakening the power of president and strengthening power of the parliament.

  13. 13.

    Available online: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=519.

  14. 14.

    Available online: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=520.

  15. 15.

    The poll was held on 20–28 July 2009. 2006 respondents aged above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine . The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%. Available online: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=516.

  16. 16.

    Similarly, Yanukovych addressed corruption in the second year of his Presidency at the National Anti-Corruption Committee meeting in June 2011, as a problem that is closely attached to the bureaucratic apparatus: “We all are very well aware that corruption in Ukraine became a medium for existence of bureaucratic apparatus and the reason for the widespread shadow economy, it bears a threat to the security of our country. Stealing from the strategic assets and resources in Ukraine , of the land and natural resources, became a permanent news in our state”. See “Vsledstvii korruptsii obshestvo iezhegodno teriaiet 20 mlrd. Hrn—Yanukovich”, UNIAN, 8 June 2011.

  17. 17.

    In-depth analysis of the law “On the Principles of Prevention and Countering of Corruption ” Nr 3206-VI is from 15 March 2011 (Khavroniuk 2011a).

  18. 18.

    Available online: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=67.

  19. 19.

    Some examples are published here: “Yanukovich’s Assets,” http://yanukovich.info.

  20. 20.

    Video “Presskonferentsiia V. Yanukovicha,” 21 December 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZxCGr-kLc4.

  21. 21.

    Video “Mustafa vs. Yanukovich: Mezhigorie,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJyGzfxZO1I, 4:35–4:50.

  22. 22.

    The poll was held on 30 September–8 October 2013. 2010 respondents aged above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine . The sample theoretical error does not exceed 2.3%. Available online: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=516.

  23. 23.

    According to the 4–9 November 2016 survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre, 65.5% of respondents trust volunteer organizations, 58.8% trust church, 51.8% trust NGOs. The Parliament (13.1%), political parties (12.5%) and courts (10.5%) enjoy the lowest levels of trust. See Andrii Bychenko “Assessment of the situation in the country by the citizens of Ukraine , their attitudes towards social institutions, electoral orientations,” Razumkov Centre, 22 November 2016. http://www.razumkov.org.ua/napryamki/sotsiolohichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-hromadianamy-sytuatsii-v-kraini-stavlennia-do-suspilnykh-instytutiv-elektoralni-oriientatsii.

References

  • Birch, S. 1998. “Electoral Systems, Campaign Strategies, and Vote Choice in the Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994.” Political Studies 46 (1): 96–114.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blomfield, A. 2005. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution Loses Its Lustre,” September 6. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/1497849/Ukraines-Orange-Revolution-loses-its-lustre.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Dahlberg, S., and S. Holmberg. 2014. “Democracy and Bureaucracy: How Their Quality Matters for Popular Satisfaction.” West European Politics 37 (3): 515–37.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darden, K. 2008. “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution.” Politics & Society 36 (1): 35–59.

    Google Scholar 

  • Debiel, T., and B. Pech. 2010. “Mit Korruptionsbekämpfung Zum Take off Bei Den MDGs? Zu Möglichkeiten Und Grenzen Einer Entwicklungspolitischen Strategie.” In “Simplizistische Lösungen Verbeiten Sich” - Zur Internationalen Zusammenarbeit Im 21. Jahrhundert, edited by Eckhard Deutschner and Hartmut Ihne. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Entman, R. M. 1993. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” Journal of Communication 43 (4): 51–58.

    Google Scholar 

  • Franziskus, U. Ruh, and M. Sievernich. 2014. Korruption und Sünde: eine Einladung zur Aufrichtigkeit. Herder-Spektrum 6684. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gephart, M. 2009. “Contextualizing Conceptions of Corruption: Challenges for the International Anti-corruption Campaign.” Working Paper 115, GIGA Working Papers, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1534589. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Gupta, S., H. Davoodi, and R. Alonso-Terme. 2002. “Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?” Economics of Governance 3 (1): 23–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hale, H. E. 2015. Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Problems of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Halling, S., and S. Stewart. 2016. “Die ‘Deoligarchisierung’ in Der Ukra.ne,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2016A69_hll_stw.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Heidenheimer, A. J. 2002. “Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption.” In Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts, 3rd ed., edited by A. J. Heidenheimer and M. Johnston. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huss, O. 2015. “Family Business Ukraine: Centralisation of Political Corruption under the Presidency of V. Yanukovych.” Presented at ECPR General Conference, Montreal.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huss, O. 2016a. “Anti-corruption Reform in Ukraine: Prospects and Challenges.” In Engaging Crimea and Beyond: Perspectives on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Development, edited by D. Carment and M. Nikolko. Global Dialogues 11. Duisburg: Käte Hamburger Kolleg/ Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/ GCR21).

    Google Scholar 

  • Huss, O. 2016b. “The Perpetual Cycle of Political Corruption in Ukraine and Post-revolutionary Attempts to Break Through It.” In Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine: The Challenge of Change, edited by O. Bertelsen. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society. Stuttgart: Ibidem.

    Google Scholar 

  • Interfax. 2005. “Zapadnaia pressa schitaet glavnymi prichinami krizisa na Ukraine peredel sobstvennosti I peregrupirovku sil pered parlamentskimi vyborami,” September 14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Interfax Information Services. 2005. “Yushchenko nazyvaiet sebia prezidentom vsei Ukrainy i obeshaet narodu izmenit’ zhizn’,” January 23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Interfax: Monitoring. 2005. “Putin iskliuchaet svoio vydvizhenie na tretii srok,” September 7.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaufmann, D. 2006. “Human Rights, Governance, and Development.” World Bank Institute Development Outreach Special Report, October. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSITETOOLS/Resources/KaufmannDevtOutreach.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Khavroniuk, M. 2011a. Naukovo-praktychnyi komentar do zakonu Ukrainy “Pro zasady zapobihannia koruptsii.” Kyiv: Atika.

    Google Scholar 

  • Khavroniuk, M. 2011b. “Pravyl’no Vyznachaite Slova…” ZN.ua. DT.ua, July 8. https://dt.ua/LAW/pravilno_viznachayte_slova__.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Khavroniuk, M. 2013. Za koruptsiiu peresliduvatymut’ usikh: vid uchyteliv i medsestr do cpivrobitnykiv zhekiv Centre of Policy and Legal Reform. http://pravo.org.ua/ua/news/4754. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Klitgaard, R. 1988. Controlling Corruption. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klitgaard, R. 1998. “International Cooperation Against Corruption.” Finance and Development 35 (1). Reprinted in New Perspectives on Combating Corruption, A Joint Publication of Transparency International and the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klitgaard, R. 2009. Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koechlin, L. 2013. Corruption as an Empty Signifier: Politics and Political Order in Africa. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kommersant Ukraina. 2007a. “Kak prezident nameren pobedit’ korruptsiiu,” September 3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kommersant Ukraina. 2007b. “Viktor Yushchenko podal izbiratelnyi golos,” April 13.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kommersant Ukraina. 2008. “Viktor Yushchenko skhlesnulsia s korruptsiei,” April 16.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kommersant Ukraina. 2009. “Prezident pomenial Viktora Balogu na Veru Uliachenko,” May 20.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laclau, E. 2007. Emancipation(s). London: Verso.

    Google Scholar 

  • Langseth, P. 2002. “Global Dynamics of Corruption, The Role of the United Nations Helping Member States Build Integrity to Curb Corruption.” Vienna: United Nations ODCCP, Centre for International Crime Prevention. https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp3.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Leshchenko, S. 2015. “Oligarkhi Ustali Ot Novoi Vlasti. Tainaia Vstrecha v ‘Khaiiate’,” August 4. http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/leschenko/55c1023769875/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Luchterhandt, O. 2010. “Der Kampf um das Regierungssystem der Ukraine – eine unendliche Geschichte.” Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität Bremen, Ukraine-Analysen 80 (October): 2–6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Makarenko, O. 2017. “Supporting Transparency or Fighting It? New Law on Assets Declarations for NGOs Raises Scandal in Ukraine.” Euromaidan Press, March 28. http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/03/28/new-law-on-e-declarations-for-anti-corruption-ngos-seen-as-return-to-authoritarianism-in-ukraine/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Melnykovska, I. 2015. “Big Business and Politics in Ukraine: The Evolution of State-Business Relations.” Employment and Economy in Central and Eastern Europe 1. http://www.emecon.eu/fileadmin/articles/1_2015/1%202015%20MelnykovskaN.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Miller, W. L., Å. B. Grødeland, and T. Y. Koshechkina. 2001. A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Post-communist Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Myers, S. L. 2004. “Farce and Drama Mix as Election Day Nears in Fierce Ukraine Race.” The New York Times, October 11. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/11/news/farce-and-drama-mix-as-election-day-nears-in-fierce-ukraine-race.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Myers, S. L. 2005. “Deal for Ukraine Company Renews Charges of Abuse.” The New York Times, September 15. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/15/world/europe/deal-for-ukraine-company-renews-charges-of-abuse.html. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Mylovanova, Z., and V. Yurmanovych. 2016. “Legal Analysis of the Apartment Scandal: Leshchenko, Lyashko or Khomutynnyk—Whose Abuse Is Worse?” VoxUkraine, September 14. https://voxukraine.org/2016/09/14/leshchenko-en/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Nabers, D. 2015. A Poststructuralist Discourse Theory of Global Politics. Houndsmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pleines, H. 2009. “The Political Role of the Oligarchs.” In Ukraine on Its Way to Europe. Interim Results of the Orange Revolution, edited by J. Besters-Dilger. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.

    Google Scholar 

  • Razumkov Centre. 2009. “Political Corruption in Ukraine: Actors, Manifestations, Problems of Countering,” 7 (111). National Security and Defence. Kyiv: Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reanimation Package of Reforms Civil Platform. 2016. “Open Appeal to the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko to Put an End to the Pressure on the NGO ‘Anticorruption Action Center’ Exerted by the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine.” Reanimation Package of Reforms, March 29. http://rpr.org.ua/en/news/open-appeal-to-the-president-of-ukraine-petro-poroshenko-to-put-an-end-to-the-pressure-on-the-ngo-anticorruption-action-center-exerted-by-the-prosecutor-general-s-office-of-ukraine/. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Riabchuk, M. 2012. Gleichschaltung: Authoritaian Consolidation in Ukraine 2010–2012. Kyiv: K.I.S.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rose-Ackerman, S. 1978. Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. New York: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothstein, B. 2005. “Social Traps and the Problem of Trust.” Theories of Institutional Design. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothstein, B. 2011. The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothstein, B. 2014. “What Is the Opposite of Corruption?” Third World Quarterly 35 (5): 737–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothstein, B., and M. Tannenberg. 2015. Making Development Work: The Quality of Government Approach. Stockholm: Swedish Government Expert Group for Aid Studies. http://eba.se/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Making_development_work_07.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Rothstein, B., and A. Varraich. 2014. “Corruption and the Opposite to Corruption a Map of the Conceptual Landscape.” http://anticorrp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/D1.1-State-of-the-art-report-on-theories-and-harmonised-concepts-of-corruption.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Rothstein, B., and A. Varraich. 2017. Making Sense of Corruption. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sushko, O., and O. Prystayko. 2011. “Freedom House Report, Nations in Transit 2011, Ukraine.” Nations in Transit. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2011/ukraine.

  • Sushko, O., and O. Prystayko. 2012. “Freedom House Report, Nations in Transit 2012, Ukraine.” Nations in Transit. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/ukraine. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Tajfel, H., ed. 1978. Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. European Monographs in Social Psychology 14. London and New York: Published in Cooperation with European Association of Experimental Social Psychology by Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tajfel, H., and J. C. Turner. 1986. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour.” In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by S. Worchel and W. G. Austin. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turner, J. C., and P. J. Oakes. 1986. “The Significance of the Social Identity Concept for Social Psychology with Reference to Individualism, Interactionism and Social Influence.” British Journal of Social Psychology 25 (3): 237–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 2003. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • UNIAN. 2004. “Posle izbraniia prezidentom Ukrainy Yushchenko podpishet ukraz o sozdanii komiteta narodnoho kontrolia s otdeleniiami v oblastiakh,” October 14.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNIAN. 2005a. “Yushchenko podcherkivaet neobkhodimost’ polnoi zameny starykh kadrov v rukovodstve MVD,” July 18.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNIAN. 2005b. “Brodskii zaiavliaet o koruptsii v okruzhenii Yushchenko,” September 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNIAN. 2005c. “Yushchenko zaiavliaet, chto obvinenie v korruptsii koe-koho iz eho okruzhenia, bylo sdelano dlia razrushenia osnovy komandy,” September 8.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNIAN. 2005d. “Yushchenko podcherkivaet, chto vse obvineniia eho okruzhenia v koruptsii nosily iskliuchitelno politicheskii kharakter,” November 10.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNIAN. 2005e. “Sleduiushim etapom posle sudebnoi reform stanet reorganizaciia SBU, prokuratury, drugikh silovykh struktur,” November 29.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNIAN. 2011. “Yanukovich schitaet, chto korruptsionery pytaiutsia vliiat’ na zhurnalistov,” February 25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varraich, A. 2014. “Corruption: An Umbrella Concept.” QoG Working Paper Series (5): 5. https://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1551/1551604_2014_05_varraich.pdf. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Way, L. 2005. “Kuchma’s Failed Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 16 (2): 131–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wickberg, S. 2016. “Scandales et corruption dans le discours médiatique français : la partie émergée de l’iceberg?” Éthique publique 18 (2). http://journals.openedition.org/ethiquepublique/2745. Accessed January 28, 2018.

  • Yaffa, J. 2016. “Reforming Ukraine After the Revolutions.” The New Yorker, May 9. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/09/05/reforming-ukraine-after-maidan. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Yushchenko, V. 2004. “Ukraine’s Choice.” Wall Street Journal, August 24. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109329771672198865. Accessed January 27, 2018.

  • Yushchenko, V. 2014. Nederzhavni Taiemnytsi Notatky Na Berehakh Pamiati, edited by O. Zinchenko. Kharkiv: Folio.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany

    Oksana Huss

Authors
  1. Oksana Huss
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Brazilian War College, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

    Erica Resende

  2. School of Liberal Arts, Georgia Gwinnett College, Lawrenceville, Georgia, USA

    Dovilė Budrytė

  3. İzmir University of Economics, İzmir, Turkey

    Didem Buhari-Gulmez

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Huss, O. (2018). Corruption, Crisis, and Change: Use and Misuse of an Empty Signifier. In: Resende, E., Budrytė, D., Buhari-Gulmez, D. (eds) Crisis and Change in Post-Cold War Global Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78589-9_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation