Evaluating the Impact of Juice Filming Charging Attack in Practical Environments

  • Weizhi Meng
  • Wang Hao Lee
  • Zhe Liu
  • Chunhua Su
  • Yan Li
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10779)


Nowadays, smartphones are widely adopted in people’s daily lives. With the increasing capability, phone charging has become a basic requirement and a large number of public charging facilitates are under construction for this purpose. However, public charging stations may open a hole for cyber-criminals to launch various attacks, especially charging attacks, to steal phone user’s private information. Juice filming charging (JFC) attack is one such threat, which can refer users’ sensitive information from both Android OS and iOS devices, through automatically monitoring and recording phone screen during the whole charging period. Due to the potential damage of JFC attacks, there is a need to investigate its influence in practical scenarios. Motivated by this, in this work, we firstly conduct a large user survey with over 2500 participants about their awareness and attitude towards charging attacks. We then for the first time investigate the impact of JFC attack under three practical scenarios. Our work aims to complement the state-of-the-art and stimulate more research in this area.


Smartphone privacy Android and iOS Video recording Charging station Juice filming charging attack Practical evaluation 



We would like to thank all participants for their efforts made in the survey and the collaborating organizations for assisting the real deployment and evaluation.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Weizhi Meng
    • 1
  • Wang Hao Lee
    • 2
  • Zhe Liu
    • 3
  • Chunhua Su
    • 4
  • Yan Li
    • 5
  1. 1.Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer ScienceTechnical University of DenmarkKongens LyngbyDenmark
  2. 2.Infocomm Security DepartmentInstitute for Infocomm ResearchSingaporeSingapore
  3. 3.APSIA, Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and TrustUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourgLuxembourg
  4. 4.Division of Computer ScienceUniversity of AizuAizuwakamatsuJapan
  5. 5.Advanced Digital Sciences CenterSingaporeSingapore

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