Recipient Revocable Broadcast Encryption with Dealership

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10779)


The broadcast encryption with dealership (BED) scheme allows a dealer, instead of a broadcaster, to manage a recipient. Unlike prior broadcast encryption schemes, BED reduces the burden placed on the broadcaster to manage recipient, which makes it suitable for a broadcasting service targeting a large number of recipients. Subscribing and unsubscribing from the broadcast service occur frequently at the request of the user, however, early versions of BED schemes do not support recipient revocation. In this paper, we propose a recipient revocable broadcast encryption with dealership and show that it is secure in the adaptive security model without random oracles.


Broadcast encryption with dealership Adaptive security Revocation Chosen plaintext attack 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Information SecurityKorea UniversitySeoulKorea

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