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The WTO Framework for the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China

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The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in Anti-Subsidy Law

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 4))

Abstract

After having created a profound understanding of both the background and the fundamental parameters for the use of alternative benchmark methodologies, this study now turns its focus to the legal framework at WTO level. Since the adoption of the original framework in the GATT 1947 and the subsequent changes and innovations in connection with the foundation of the WTO, the legal rules in this area have undergone several significant developments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the lack of stipulating a precise market conception for WTO anti-subsidy law see Sects. 2.4.2.4 and 6.1.1.1.

  2. 2.

    The only additions as far as multilateral agreements are concerned are the insertion of Article 31bis TRIPS in 2005 and the adoption of the new Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2013. Both additions have not yet reached the necessary quorum of ratifications and thus still lack legal effect. See Hughes in Dadush/Osakwe, 309, at 329 et seq.; Koul, Guide to the WTO & GATT, at 34.

  3. 3.

    Adamantopoulos in Wolfrum et al. (eds.), Article VI GATT, at para. 17 et seq.

  4. 4.

    WTO law today does not impose any rule of priority with regard to either methodology, so that the two methodologies may be applied interchangeably at the complete discretion of the respective national investigating authorities. The 1959 Report, WT/L/978, 21 December 2015, at para. 10, however, expressed concern that the use of third-country export prices may yield imprecise results, see Adamantopoulos in Wolfrum et al. (eds.), Article VI GATT para. 17, footnote 45.

  5. 5.

    Consenting Lynam, 42 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2010), 739, at 752.

  6. 6.

    E.g. Article XVII GATT; see also Hoogmartens, EC Trade Law, at xviii.

  7. 7.

    E.g. Article 29.1 ASCM; see also Matsushita et al., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy, at 244.

  8. 8.

    E.g. Section 15(d), third sentence CAP.

  9. 9.

    Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, at 27.

  10. 10.

    Trebilcock et al., The Regulation of International Trade, at 366.

  11. 11.

    Trebilcock et al., The Regulation of International Trade, at 367.

  12. 12.

    Bentley/Silberston, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Action, at 10.

  13. 13.

    See Sect. 3.1.1.1.

  14. 14.

    Wu (2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2306345 (last visited 1 January 2018), 1, at 4.

  15. 15.

    Zang, 14 Journal of International Economic Law (2012), 869, at 879.

  16. 16.

    The requirement of appropriateness does, however, not preclude that EU anti-dumping investigations render bizarre results at times. In Regulation (EC) No. 1355/2008, OJ 2008 L 350/35, the EU Commission used Spanish market prices for preserved mandarins, the product concerned, as substitutes for distorted Chinese prices. The Spanish National Federation of Associations of Processed Fruit and Vegetables had previously initiated the EU anti-dumping proceedings itself. See MacLean in Herrmann/Terhechte (eds.), 189, at 191.

  17. 17.

    Cornelis, 2 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 105, at 106.

  18. 18.

    See Sect. 3.2.2.2.1.4.

  19. 19.

    Request for Consultations by Canada, US – Softwood Lumber IV, WT/DS257/1, 13 May 2002.

  20. 20.

    Zheng, 19 Minnesota Journal of International Law (2010), 1, at 23 et seq. For detailed reports of US – Softwood Lumber IV see e.g. Lysons, 32 Seattle University Law Review (2009), 407; Carmody, 100 The American Journal of International Law (2006), 664; on the Softwood Lumber dispute saga as a whole see e.g. Zhang, The Softwood Lumber War.

  21. 21.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.48.

  22. 22.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.51.

  23. 23.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.51.

  24. 24.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.49.

  25. 25.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.51.

  26. 26.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.57.

  27. 27.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.57.

  28. 28.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.57.

  29. 29.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.58.

  30. 30.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.59.

  31. 31.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.59.

  32. 32.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 89.

  33. 33.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 90.

  34. 34.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 89.

  35. 35.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 91.

  36. 36.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 92.

  37. 37.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 93.

  38. 38.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 95.

  39. 39.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 96.

  40. 40.

    See Panel Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/R, adopted 25 March 2011, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS379/AB/R, DSR 2011:VI, 3143, at para. 10.24 et seq.; Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 427, where China appealed only the finding that rejecting existing in-country prices solely based on the evidence of the government being the predominant supplier of the respective good was in breach of Article 14(d) ASCM, not the question of permissibility of deviation as a whole.

  41. 41.

    Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/R and Add.1, adopted 16 January 2015, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS437/AB/R, at para. 7.190, 7.192 and 7.195.

  42. 42.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.57.

  43. 43.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 98 et seq.

  44. 44.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 99.

  45. 45.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 100.

  46. 46.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 101.

  47. 47.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 102.

  48. 48.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 102.

  49. 49.

    Request for Consultations by China, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/1, 22 September 2008.

  50. 50.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.46.

  51. 51.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.46.

  52. 52.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.38 et seq.

  53. 53.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.40.

  54. 54.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.41.

  55. 55.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.42 et seq.

  56. 56.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.45.

  57. 57.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.47.

  58. 58.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 444.

  59. 59.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 446 and 453.

  60. 60.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 93.

  61. 61.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 444.

  62. 62.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 441.

  63. 63.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 442.

  64. 64.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 441.

  65. 65.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 443.

  66. 66.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 445.

  67. 67.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 444.

  68. 68.

    Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), at para. 7.162.

  69. 69.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 320 and 346.

  70. 70.

    Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), at para. 7.162.

  71. 71.

    Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/R, adopted 16 January 2015), at para. 4.61; Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), at para. 7.194.

  72. 72.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), at para. 4.60.

  73. 73.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), at para. 4.62.

  74. 74.

    Panel Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), at para. 7.194 et seq.

  75. 75.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 106.

  76. 76.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 106.

  77. 77.

    Appellate Body Report, Japan – DRAMs (Korea), at para. 7.275; Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, at 63.

  78. 78.

    See e.g. Rubini, EUI Working Paper RSCAS No. 5 (2014), 1; Genest, 10 International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy (2014), 239; Nedumpara, 9 Indian Journal of Law & Technology (2013), 1; Charnovitz/Fischer, FEEM Working Paper No. 94 (2014), 1.

  79. 79.

    Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, at 81 et seq.

  80. 80.

    Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, at para. 7.59.

  81. 81.

    See Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), at para. 4.189.

  82. 82.

    Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, at 466 [emphasis in original].

  83. 83.

    Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT Program, at para. 7.274.

  84. 84.

    Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT Program, at para. 7.308.

  85. 85.

    Panel Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT Program, at para. 7.320.

  86. 86.

    Other appellant submission by the European Union, Canada – FIT Program, AB-2013-1 / DS426, 11 February 2013, at para. 162.

  87. 87.

    Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT Program, at para. 5.188.

  88. 88.

    Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT Program, at para. 5.188.

  89. 89.

    Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT Program, at para. 5.189.

  90. 90.

    Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT Program, at para. 5.228.

  91. 91.

    Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT Program, at para. 5.190.

  92. 92.

    Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT Program, at para. 5.228.

  93. 93.

    Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – FIT Program, at para. 5.228.

  94. 94.

    https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds379_e.htm (last visited 1 January 2018).

  95. 95.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.105.

  96. 96.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.130.

  97. 97.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.107.

  98. 98.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.110.

  99. 99.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.117.

  100. 100.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.118.

  101. 101.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 472.

  102. 102.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 482.

  103. 103.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 472.

  104. 104.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 475.

  105. 105.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 476.

  106. 106.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 476.

  107. 107.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 478.

  108. 108.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 479.

  109. 109.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 478.

  110. 110.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 480, 487.

  111. 111.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 480.

  112. 112.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 484.

  113. 113.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 485.

  114. 114.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 487.

  115. 115.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.130.

  116. 116.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.119.

  117. 117.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.119.

  118. 118.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.128 et seq.

  119. 119.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.130.

  120. 120.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 479, 484.

  121. 121.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 484.

  122. 122.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 485.

  123. 123.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 494, 498.

  124. 124.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.111.

  125. 125.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 479.

  126. 126.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 506.

  127. 127.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.118.

  128. 128.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.112.

  129. 129.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.113.

  130. 130.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.119.

  131. 131.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.119.

  132. 132.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.117.

  133. 133.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 484.

  134. 134.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 485 et seq.

  135. 135.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 484, 487.

  136. 136.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.122.

  137. 137.

    For an analysis of Article 14(a) and (c) ASCM regarding the permissibility of using alternative benchmarks see Sects. 2.4.2.4.1.2 and 2.4.2.4.1.4.

  138. 138.

    Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes, LT/UR/A-2/DS/U/1, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 401.

  139. 139.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.

  140. 140.

    Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 3, at para. 16 et seq.; Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97, at para. 104; Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22 February 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, 3501, at para. 7.114 et seq.; Tyagi, 15 Journal of International Economic Law (2012), 391, at 399; Palmeter/Mavroidis, 92 The American Journal of International Law (1998), 398, at 409; for details of the principles of treaty interpretation by the Appellate Body see Miranda, 9 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2014), 94, at 101 et seq.

  141. 141.

    Steinberg, 98 The American Journal of International Law (2004), 247, at 255 et seq.; on the implications of a “too effective” WTO judiciary for the organisation’s basic framework see Bronckers, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999), 547, at 553 et seq.

  142. 142.

    Steinberg, 98 The American Journal of International Law (2004), 247, at 252 and 257. On the reasons for the development of a powerful judiciary in times of political and legislative impotence see Ferejohn, 65 Law and Contemporary Problems (2002), 41, at 55 et seq.

  143. 143.

    Ferejohn, 65 Law and Contemporary Problems (2002), 41, at 41.

  144. 144.

    Steinberg, 98 The American Journal of International Law (2004), 247, at 254.

  145. 145.

    Luo, Anti-dumping in the WTO, the EU, and China, at 98; van Damme, 21 European Journal of International Law (2010), 605, at 611.

  146. 146.

    On the inutility of the WTO’s procedural mechanisms for the clarification of rules through authoritative interpretation and amendment see Bronckers, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999), 547, at 551 et seq.

  147. 147.

    Steinberg, 98 The American Journal of International Law (2004), 247, at 258; Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 09-18 (2009), 1, at 17 and 48 et seq.

  148. 148.

    McNelis, 37 Journal of World Trade (2003), 647, at 652; Palmeter/Mavroidis, 92 The American Journal of International Law (1998), 398, at 404.

  149. 149.

    Steinberg, 98 The American Journal of International Law (2004), 247, at 254.

  150. 150.

    Whether judicial interpretation by WTO Panels and the Appellate Body suffices to render legally sound alternative benchmark regimes will be addressed further below, see Sect. 5.2.3.1.6.

  151. 151.

    Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001.

  152. 152.

    Yu, 8 Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law (2013), 77, at 87.

  153. 153.

    Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 237; Gertler in Bhattasali et al. (eds.), 21, at 24.

  154. 154.

    Gertler in Bhattasali et al. (eds.), at 21.

  155. 155.

    Gertler in Bhattasali et al. (eds.), at 21.

  156. 156.

    United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, A/RES/2758(XXVI), 25 October 1971; see Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 230; Rhodes/Jackson, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999), 497, at 499.

  157. 157.

    Hoogmartens, EC Trade Law, at 51; Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 230 et seq.; Gertler in Bhattasali et al. (eds.), at 21; Rhodes/Jackson, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999), 497, at 500.

  158. 158.

    Hoogmartens, EC Trade Law, at 51 et seq.; Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 231; Gertler in Bhattasali et al. (eds.), at 21.

  159. 159.

    Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 231 et seq.

  160. 160.

    Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 233.

  161. 161.

    Barfield/Groombridge in Ostry et al. (eds.), 30, at 31 and 36 et seq.; Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 233 et seq.

  162. 162.

    Grynberg et al., Paying the Price for Joining the WTO, at 5; Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 234 et seq.

  163. 163.

    Gertler in Bhattasali et al. (eds.), 21, at 22; Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 235.

  164. 164.

    Thorstensen et al., 1 Latin American Journal of International Trade Law (2013), 765, at 782.

  165. 165.

    Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 236.

  166. 166.

    Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 232.

  167. 167.

    Cattaneo/Primo Braga, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5116 (2009), 1, at 12 et seq.; Michalopoulos in Hoekman et al. (eds.), 61, at 61 et seq.; Nguyen, 22 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal (2008), 243, at 246 et seq; Gertler in Bhattasali et al. (eds.), at 21; Grynberg et al., Paying the Price for Joining the WTO, at 4.

  168. 168.

    Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 389.

  169. 169.

    Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 07-31 (2008), 1, at 5; Qin, 37 Journal of World Trade (2003), 483, at 484.

  170. 170.

    Grynberg et al., Paying the Price for Joining the WTO, at 5; Qin, 37 Journal of World Trade (2003), 483, at 485.

  171. 171.

    Qin, 37 Journal of World Trade (2003), 483, at 485.

  172. 172.

    Nguyen, 22 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal (2008), 243, at 258.

  173. 173.

    Qin, 37 Journal of World Trade (2003), 483, at 488 et seq.; Nguyen, 22 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal (2008), 243, at 257; Grynberg et al., Paying the Price for Joining the WTO, at 5 et seq. Exact definitions of the terms “WTO-plus” and “WTO-minus” are, however, still in a state of controversial academic discussion, see only Nguyen, 22 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal (2008), 243, at 257.

  174. 174.

    Qin, 37 Journal of World Trade (2003), 483, at 488 and 490.

  175. 175.

    For an overview and assessment of China’s market accession commitments and the underlying Open Door policy (门户开放, menhu kaifang) see Kong, China and the World Trade Organization, at 18 et seq.

  176. 176.

    Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 07-31 (2008), 1, at 5; on the amendments of China’s foreign trade-related laws in adoption of the WTO legal acquis see He/Sappideen, 43 Journal of World Trade (2009), 847, at 851 et seq.

  177. 177.

    Qin, 7 Journal of International Economic Law (2004), 863, at 913.

  178. 178.

    The Working Party Report on the Accession of China was also integrated into the CAP to a large extent, see Section 342 Working Party Report of China; Qin, 7 Journal of International Economic Law (2004), 863, at 913; On the impact of the CAP during the first 15 years of China’s membership in the WTO see Mueller, 27 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2016), 291 et seq.

  179. 179.

    Qin, 7 Journal of International Economic Law (2004), 863, at 913; Barry, International Economic Review (February/March 2000), at 7; Barfield/Groombridge in Ostry et al. (eds.), 30, at 32.

  180. 180.

    Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 236.

  181. 181.

    Qin, 7 Journal of International Economic Law (2004), 863, at 912.

  182. 182.

    Thorstensen et al., 1 Latin American Journal of International Trade Law (2013), 765, at 782.

  183. 183.

    Hoogmartens, EC Trade Law, at 57; Qin, 7 Journal of International Economic Law (2004), 863, at 913. Regarding the question whether the adoption of country-specific WTO rules commitments through accession protocols constitutes a legal and legitimate approach see Sect. 5.2.2.

  184. 184.

    Wu, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011), 227, at 244 (words originally used by US President Clinton).

  185. 185.

    Qin, 7 Journal of International Economic Law (2004), 863, at 912.

  186. 186.

    Consentient Du, 63 International & Comparative Law Quarterly (2014), 409, at 433; Ahn/Lee, 14 Journal of International Economic Law (2011), 329, at 343; especially for the prerequisite of “special difficulties” He, The WTO and Infant Industry Promotion in Developing Countries, at 205.

  187. 187.

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    Gao in Deere-Birkbeck (ed.), 153, at 171, who also raises concerns that following such an interpretation, Section 15(b) CAP would be rendered virtually inapplicable.

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    Request for Consultations by China, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/1, 22 September 2008, at p. 4.

  192. 192.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.10, footnote 460.

  193. 193.

    Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.12.

  194. 194.

    See Sect. 3.2.1.3.

  195. 195.

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  196. 196.

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    Cornelis argues in this way. According to him, the only legally feasible solution to continue the application of the NMES methodologies to China after its WTO accession, is via Note 2 Ad Article VI:1 GATT. Thus, investigating authorities would have to prove that China still was a state-trading economy in the sense of the ad note. Because this would have turned out impossible, upon accession, the adoption of Section 15(a) CAP for the purpose of securing further applicability of the alternative benchmark regime for NMES in anti-dumping investigation was essential, see Cornelis, 2 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 105, at 108 et seq.

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    The approach corresponds the concept of autonomous meaning, that only takes into account a meaning that can be attributed to a wording as part of a certain treaty and rejects any comparison with or transfer from other treaties. For details see Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law, at 335 et seq.

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    See Sect. 3.1.2.4.1.

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    See Sect. 3.2.1.3.

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    Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, at para. 158; Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000, at para. 166; in particular in connection with trade remedies (anti-dumping) Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 2001, at para. 101.

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    Appellate Body Report, China – Rare Earths, at para. 5.55 and 5.57.

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    Appellate Body Report, China – Rare Earths, at para. 5.57. and 5.61. By its reasoning, the Appellate Body dismissed a promising rule of conflict, Article 30(3) VCLT, as being “not [..] apposite”, Appellate Body Report, China – Rare Earths, at para. 5.70. This is heavily criticised by Qin, 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2015), 369, at 428 et seq., who subsequently offers proposals for the necessary missing WTO provisions to solve the legal conflict. In particular, Qin rejects the “objective link” approach and suggests “systemic coherence” as guiding principle for the interpretation of the relationship between a general WTO provision and an accession protocol provision, see Qin, Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2016-05 (2016), 1, at 20 et seq.

  229. 229.

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  230. 230.

    China initially alleged contraventions of the US authorities against Section 15(b) CAP in its Request for Consultations in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) but dropped its claims later, see Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), at para. 10.10, footnote 460. In US – Countervailing Measures (China) China opened its Request for Consultations with an allegation that the US had violated Section 15 CAP, but did not raise any precise claims in this regard, see Request for Consultations by China, US – Countervailing Measures (China), WT/DS437/1, 30 May 2012, at p. 1.

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  235. 235.

    Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, at 23.

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    Appellate Body Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, DSR 2000:I, 3, at para. 77.

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    Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R, adopted 8 March 2002, DSR 2002:IV, 1403, at para. 69.

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Müller, S. (2018). The WTO Framework for the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China. In: The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in Anti-Subsidy Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77613-2_3

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