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The Priorities of Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 21st Century

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Sweden: From Neutrality to International Solidarity

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Abstract

Gradual transformation of the Swedish foreign and security policy accompanied efforts to establish collective security guarantees in the early years of the 21st century.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Compare: Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999. The European Security and Defence Policy has been identified as an implementation instrument for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, see: Zięba (2009), pp. 110–111.

  2. 2.

    Compare: Bailes (2006).

  3. 3.

    Operation “Concordia” was launched in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in March 2003 and its aim was to prevent the escalation of the ethnic conflict which brought Macedonia to the brink of the civil war (in 2001).

  4. 4.

    The Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed by the government of the Republic of Macedonia and ethnic Albanian representatives, and it ended the armed conflict between the National Liberation Army and the Macedonian security forces. It set the groundwork for improving the rights of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia.

  5. 5.

    The Berlin Plus agreement was concluded in April, at the jubilee NATO Summit in Washington in 1999. The Berlin Plus formula was based on the provisions of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin on 3 June 1996 where the parties agreed on the conditions under which the WEU could draw on NATO assets and capabilities to carry out the Petersberg Tasks. The Berlin Plus agreement is based on the assumption that the European Union can carry out autonomous military operations and the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole is not involved. While carrying out these operations, the EU could be allowed to make use of NATO's assets, capabilities and planning support through a special agreement contracted on every occasion in the “Berlin Plus” format. For more on this topic, see: Ruten (2001), pp. 82–92.

  6. 6.

    Compare: Lee-Ohlsson (2009), p. 130.

  7. 7.

    The mission “Artemis” was launched in June 2003. The decision was taken at a rather sensitive moment, i.e. a few months following the deep divisions triggered in Europe by the involvement of the United States and its allies in the war in Iraq.

  8. 8.

    Compare: Lee-Ohlsson (2009), pp. 129–130.

  9. 9.

    For Sweden, crisis management carried out by the European Union under the European Security and Defence Policy was always to complement and support the United Nations and its global role in contributing to peace and stability. More about Sweden’s commitment to the activities of the United Nations in: Dośpiał–Borysiak (2007), pp. 144–156.

  10. 10.

    More in: Nordic Battlegroup. Nordic Battlegroup—strength of 2 000 soldiers from five countries (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia and Ireland)—remains at the disposal of the European Union at standby readiness since 2011 (previously, the NBG was led by Sweden in the first half of 2008).

  11. 11.

    The Nordic battle group must be: (a) capable of participating in EU crisis management operations; (b) capable of carrying out stand-alone operations for a specified period of time including both humanitarian assistance and combat operation; (c) capable of being on site in a crisis area within 10 days of the EU decision. The Battlegroup should be; able to be sustainable for 30 days and operate without resupply up to 120 days ND deployable over 6 000 km from Brussels (this is the planning target but not a limitation). In addition: “EU decision making process for and its peacekeeping operation: all Member States (MS) as well as the EU Commission are entitled to propose and its peacekeeping operation; there must be unanimity between the MS for such an operation; overall co-ordination of responsibility rests with the EU Political and Security Committee; when the design of the operation is agreed upon between the MS, the European Council makes an unanimous decision, which the Governments of the FN and its partners (i.e. NBG 15) acts upon (in Sweden after a decision by Parliament); the tasks for the Battlegroup are designed to conform to the principles of the UN Charter; each MS is funding its own contribution.” Retrieved from http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/siteassets/english/nbg15---eng/14mar_-fcdr_master-f.pdf.

  12. 12.

    Compare Lee-Ohlsson (2009), p. 132.

  13. 13.

    Bringéus, p. 69.

  14. 14.

    For more on the subject, see: Part III, Chap. 9.

  15. 15.

    Compare: Winnerstig (2001), p. 77; see also: Tunander (1999), p. 170.

  16. 16.

    Sweden and NATO laid out details of cooperation within the framework of the Individual Partnership Program (IPP) which is jointly agreed upon biannually. The Swedish Parliament approved Sweden’s membership of the PfP in May 1994. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a program that aims to enhance interoperability and cooperation within the framework of the military and civil exercises between NATO members and partner countries.

  17. 17.

    See: Forsberg and Vaahtoranta (2001), p. 75.

  18. 18.

    ISAF'S mission ended after 13 years in December 2014.

  19. 19.

    See: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue3/english/history.html.

  20. 20.

    See: Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2005.

  21. 21.

    See: Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs 2009.

  22. 22.

    See: Williams (2001). Compare also: Simpson (2009).

  23. 23.

    See: Moćkun (2009).

  24. 24.

    It was the nation's first such overseas activity with Swedish fighter jets in more than 50 years.

  25. 25.

    Within the framework of the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) several NATO countries, including the United States have jointly bought and operated three heavy transport aircraft.

  26. 26.

    See on this subject: Säkerhetspolitik för en ny tid 2016. Currently, apart from the already-mentioned states, the following countries belong to the SAC: Poland, Norway, Netherlands, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Estonia, and Lithuania, see: https://www.sacprogram.org/en/Pages/The%20Strategic%20Airlift%20Capability.aspx (retrieved July 20, 2017).

  27. 27.

    See: Report by: Blix et al. (2016), p. 158.

  28. 28.

    One of the arguments was Finland's position on the issue. The matter is that among the political elites of Finland, the threat from Russia is seen as serious, so the issue of NATO membership has been the subject of deliberations and statements of leading politicians. Nevertheless, the government refrains from addressing the issue given the fact that joining the alliance is lacking sufficient public support, and, consequently, the membership bid would likely be defeated in a national referendum.

  29. 29.

    The Memorandum entered into force on July 1, 2016.

  30. 30.

    See: http://www.svd.se/avtalen-med-usa-och-nato-ar-inte-tillrackliga (retrieved October 05, 2016).

  31. 31.

    See: http://www.dn.se/debatt/fem-myter-om-svenskt-medlemskap-i-nato/ (retrieved September 05, 2017).

  32. 32.

    See: Dagens Nyheter of July 02, 2013.

  33. 33.

    In this context, one should bring the activities of Alva Myrdal and Maj Britt Theorin as heads of Swedish delegation to the UN for disarmament negotiations during the 1970 and 1980s, and the International Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the Palme Commission) or the initiative by Anna Lindh of 2003 to set up the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission aa well as the work of the Swedish diplomat Hans Blix as Chairman of the Commission. See: Sverige, Nato Oh säkerheten, pp. 15, 37.

  34. 34.

    The 2012 poll, conducted prior to the famous statement by Sweden's Supreme Commander Sverker Göransson revealed that 17% of respondents were in favor of Sweden seeking NATO membership while 45% opposed it; see: Bjereld.

  35. 35.

    The participation of the representatives of Sweden and Finland in discussions of a strategic nature, which took place during the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016, has shown that in the face of changing security environment in the Baltic Sea region these States play an important role in NATO policy.

  36. 36.

    See: Tiden, the social-democratic think-tank, Framtidsarvet 2016, p. 20.

  37. 37.

    See: Smolny and Wysocki (2016).

  38. 38.

    One should note Russia’s hybrid actions directed against Sweden and Finland. In April 2013, near the island of Gotland, Russia practiced simulated nuclear attack on Sweden, and in October 2014, a Russian submarine had violated Swedish territorial waters. The Finns have reported several airspace violations by Russian combat aircraft.

  39. 39.

    “Nordic networks offer new avenues into Russia for the EU and regional actors around the Baltic Sea. That was one of the conclusions of a seminar on synergies between the work of the Nordic Council of Ministers and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) held in Brussels on November 12.” Baltic Sea Cooperation requires Russian partnerships, www. norden.org (retrieved November 13, 2013).

  40. 40.

    Halldór Ásgrímsson, Secretary General of the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), in his speech (at the EU representation of the German region of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), stated, inter alia, that: “Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region makes no sense without Russia. It is important that we reach out to Russia and the Nordic Council of Ministers can help facilitate this through our networks.” Quoted after: Baltic Sea Cooperation.

  41. 41.

    More on this topic in: Czarny (2009a), pp. 239–247.

  42. 42.

    See, for example: Nordiska gemenskaper.

  43. 43.

    As far as Helsinki aspires to a dialog with Russia as the EU, and not only as a specific State, it also tries to shape its own policies towards Russia Oslo prefers relations at the bilateral level. In this context, it is interesting that Norwegian experts believe that the issues of the relationship of both countries e.g. in the Arctic, go beyond bilateral relations and should be settled in the European arena.

  44. 44.

    Krister Bringeus is highly regarded diplomat in Sweden who had been head of the Swedish delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna, Ambassador to Belgrade, Senior Civilian Representative at the Swedish Mission in Afghanistan and the Ambassador for the Arctic at the Foreign Ministry. He had also been Head of the European Security Policy Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His postings abroad include the embassies in Washington, Bonn, Moscow and London.

  45. 45.

    More on this subject in: Czarny and Tomala (2009).

  46. 46.

    Carl Bildt has said that Sweden will continue to push for the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons on the Kola Peninsula, which will contribute to stability and security in the region. See: Statement of Government Policy 2011, and: Sweden Makes Arctic Strategy.

  47. 47.

    See: Czarny (2015), pp. 171–177.

  48. 48.

    On November 8, 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment was published and developed by an international team of 300 scientists and other experts. The key conclusion is that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as any other place on Earth. Compare: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis 2007.

  49. 49.

    See on this subject: Czarny (2002), pp. 36–55.

  50. 50.

    See: New threats for the Nordic armed forces.

  51. 51.

    The text of the report: T. Stoltenberg, Nordisk Samarbeid om Utenriks-og Sikkerhetspolitikk. Forslag overlevert de nordiske utenriksministere på ekstraordinært nordisk utenriksministermøte, Oslo 9. February 2009.

  52. 52.

    Currently, the abandoned U.S. Navy base in Iceland begins to play a central role in the Stoltenberg Report. The author suggests that it may become a base for the joint Nordic surveillance of the airspace of Iceland and thus a starting point leading to the adoption of collective responsibility for their space air by the Nordic countries.

  53. 53.

    http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/9133/a/82276;jsessionid = a1Cr-> JF98ROf.

  54. 54.

    The resumption of flights of Russian strategic bombers over the High North, cyber-attacks or quite recent violations of national airspace of the Nordic and Baltic countries.

  55. 55.

    See: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/pressesenter/pressemeldinger/2011/norden_enige.html?id.

  56. 56.

    For the entirety of T. Stoltenberg’s statement, see: http://www.norden.org/sv/nordiska-raadet/sessioner-moeten-och-konferenser/sessioner/66-e-sessionen-2014/protokoll-nordiska-raadets-66-e-session-2014/12.-aktualitetsdebat/thorvald-stoltenberg-hovedindlaeg.

  57. 57.

    See: http://www.norden.org/sv/aktuellt/nyheter/thorvald-stoltenberg-etabler-en-nordisk-forsvars-og-sikkerhetskommisjon.

  58. 58.

    See: http://www.norden.org/sv/aktuellt/nyheter/thorvald-stoltenberg-etabler-en-nordisk-forsvars-og-sikkerhetskommisjon.

  59. 59.

    For more on their energy security, see: Czarny (2009b).

  60. 60.

    It is quite debatable whether the term “neutral nations” is truly applicable to Sweden and Finland. In my opinion, they can be at best identified as States leading a policy of neutrality.

  61. 61.

    See: http://www.nordefco.org/Finnish-Defence-Forces-to-Participate-in-AURORA-17-in-Sweden.

  62. 62.

    See: http://www.government.se/articles/2017/06/norwegian-minister-of-defence-visits-sweden/.

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  1. University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Trnava, Slovakia

    Ryszard M. Czarny

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Czarny, R.M. (2018). The Priorities of Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 21st Century. In: Sweden: From Neutrality to International Solidarity. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77513-5_16

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