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Action Theories

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Introduction to Formal Philosophy

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Abstract

We present the main logical theories of action. We distinguish theories identifying an action with its result from theories studying actions in terms of both their results and the means that result is obtained. The first family includes most prominently the logic of seeing-to-it-that and the logic of bringing-it-about-that. The second includes propositional dynamic logic and its variants. For all these logics we overview their extensions by other modalities such as modal operators of knowledge, belief, and obligation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There is no well-established name in the literature, we therefore opted for the acronym BIAT, justs as the well-established STIT stands for ‘seeing-to-it-that’.

  2. 2.

    Instead of Biat i Jones and Pörn use E i and Elgesem uses Does i. Instead of Can i Elgesem uses Ability i.

  3. 3.

    The standard notation is 〈π〉ϕ; we here deviate in order to be able to distinguish actual action from potential action.

  4. 4.

    The original notation is Choice i instead of Pref i, but we preferred to avoid any confusion with the concept of choice in stit theory.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT), CNRS, France

    Andreas Herzig & Emiliano Lorini

  2. Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Bozen-Bolzano, Italy

    Nicolas Troquard

Authors
  1. Andreas Herzig
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  2. Emiliano Lorini
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  3. Nicolas Troquard
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Correspondence to Andreas Herzig .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Division of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Stockholm, Sweden

    Sven Ove Hansson

  2. Center for Information and Bubble Studies, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Vincent F. Hendricks

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Herzig, A., Lorini, E., Troquard, N. (2018). Action Theories. In: Hansson, S., Hendricks, V. (eds) Introduction to Formal Philosophy. Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3_33

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