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Match-Fixing

  • David Forrest
Chapter

Abstract

Match-fixing, whether to gain sporting advantage or facilitate gains from betting, has been present throughout the history of organised sport. But its prevalence appears to have increased sharply since the Millennium. The chapter links this greater prevalence to large increases in the liquidity of sports betting markets such that criminals can place larger bets and make greater profit from buying fixes from players. The problem is aggravated by much of the liquidity residing in illegal or barely regulated markets where sources of bets are essentially untraceable by investigators. Mitigation of risks from match-fixing would be achieved by large countries providing good-value legal and regulated betting facilities to deprive the illegal markets of liquidity. Since such reform is unlikely, sports need to address the willingness of their athletes to supply fixes. This requires improvements in sports governance as well as investment in prevention and detection programmes.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Sports Business, Management SchoolUniversity of LiverpoolLiverpoolUK

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