Advertisement

Conclusion

  • Dawn Walsh
Chapter
Part of the Federalism and Internal Conflicts book series (FEINCO)

Abstract

The conclusion compares the experiences of the five countries examined in the book. Through this comparison findings are presented as to the strengths and weaknesses of different guarantees. It then explores the role of international guarantees highlighting how such supports can prevent the recurrence of violence in the short and medium term but that in the long-term legitimacy concerns arise and self-interest undermine these guarantees. Finally, it advises domestic and international actors to (1) avoid ambiguity which encourages competing and incompatible interpretations of how the TSG should operate, (2) to focus guarantee mechanisms on avoiding both secession and re-centralisation, (3) to keep in mind the potential destabilising effect of pursuing policies driven by wider economic and security concerns.

References

  1. Bunreacht na hÉireann (The Constitution of Ireland). Articles 2 & 3. Accessed December 31, 2017, from https://www.constitution.ie/Documents/Bhunreacht_na_hEireann_web.pdf.
  2. Bzdera, A. (1993). Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of Judicial Review. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, 26(1), 3–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2000, July 1). U-5/98 (Partial Decision Part 3). Sarajevo: Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.Google Scholar
  4. Dickson, B. (2006). The House of Lords and the Northern Ireland Conflict—A Sequel. Modern Law Review, 69(3), 383–417.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Eskridge, W. N. Jr., & Bednar, J. (1995). Steadying the Court’s ‘Unsteady Path’: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism. Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 3799.Google Scholar
  6. Framework Agreement Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia, on 13 August 2001. Accessed December 31, 2017, from http://peacemaker.un.org/fyrom-ohridagreement2001.
  7. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (1995). Accessed December 31, from https://peacemaker.un.org/bosniadaytonagreement95.
  8. House of Lords. (2002). Robinson vs Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Others [2002] UKHL 32. London: HMO.Google Scholar
  9. Iraqi Constitution. (2005). Article 140. Accessed December 31, 2017, from http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf.
  10. Ker-Lindsay, J. (2016). The Hollow Threat of Secession in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Legal and Political Impediments to a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Republika Srpska. London: London School of Economics Research on South East Europe.Google Scholar
  11. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period. (2004, March 8). Article 44. Accessed December 31, from http://www.refworld.org/docid/45263d612.html.
  12. Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri). Article 13. Accessed December 31, from http://www.regione.taa.it/biblioteca/minoranze/gagauziaen.pdf.
  13. Northern Ireland (St Andrew’s Agreement) Act. (2006). Part 2, Section 12. London: The Stationery Office Limited.Google Scholar
  14. United Kingdom Supreme Court. (2017). JUDGMENT R (on the Application of Miller and Another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant). London: HMO.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Law and GovernmentDublin City UniversityDublinIreland

Personalised recommendations