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Conclusion

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Part of the book series: Federalism and Internal Conflicts ((FEINCO))

Abstract

The conclusion compares the experiences of the five countries examined in the book. Through this comparison findings are presented as to the strengths and weaknesses of different guarantees. It then explores the role of international guarantees highlighting how such supports can prevent the recurrence of violence in the short and medium term but that in the long-term legitimacy concerns arise and self-interest undermine these guarantees. Finally, it advises domestic and international actors to (1) avoid ambiguity which encourages competing and incompatible interpretations of how the TSG should operate, (2) to focus guarantee mechanisms on avoiding both secession and re-centralisation, (3) to keep in mind the potential destabilising effect of pursuing policies driven by wider economic and security concerns.

United we stand, divided we fall

(Aesop, The Four Oxen and the Lion)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Northern Ireland (St Andrew’s Agreement) Act 2006, Part 2, Section 12. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

  2. 2.

    Framework Agreement Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia, on 13 August 2001. Accessed 31 December 2017, http://peacemaker.un.org/fyrom-ohridagreement2001.

  3. 3.

    Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri), Article 13. Accessed 31 December 2017, http://www.regione.taa.it/biblioteca/minoranze/gagauziaen.pdf.

  4. 4.

    Bunreacht na hÉireann (The Constitution of Ireland), Articles 2 & 3. Accessed 31 December 2017, https://www.constitution.ie/Documents/Bhunreacht_na_hEireann_web.pdf.

  5. 5.

    Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri), Article 13. Accessed 31 December 2017, http://www.regione.taa.it/biblioteca/minoranze/gagauziaen.pdf.

  6. 6.

    Iraqi Constitution (2005), Article 140. Accessed 31 December 2017, http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf.

  7. 7.

    Framework Agreement Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia, on 13 August 2001. Accessed 31 December 2017, http://peacemaker.un.org/fyrom-ohridagreement2001.

  8. 8.

    General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995). Accessed 31 December, https://peacemaker.un.org/bosniadaytonagreement95.

  9. 9.

    Bzdera, A. (1993). Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of Judicial Review. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 26, No. 1, 3–29. Eskridge, W.N. Jr., & Bednar, J. (1995). Steadying the Court’s ‘Unsteady Path’: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism. Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 3799.

  10. 10.

    Dickson, B. (2006). The House of Lords and the Northern Ireland Conflict—A Sequel. Modern Law Review, Vol. 69, No. 3, 383–417.

  11. 11.

    House of Lords (2002). Robinson vs Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Others [2002] UKHL 32. London, HMO. United Kingdom Supreme Court. (2017). JUDGMENT R (on the Application of Miller and Another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant), London, HMO.

  12. 12.

    Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000). U-5/98 (Partial Decision Part 3), July 1. Sarajevo: Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  13. 13.

    See Popović’s dissenting decision in Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000). U-5/98 (Partial Decision Part 3), July 1. Sarajevo: Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  14. 14.

    Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 8 March 2004, Article 44. Accessed 31 December 2017, http://www.refworld.org/docid/45263d612.html.

  15. 15.

    Ker-Lindsay, J. (2016). The Hollow Threat of Secession in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Legal and Political Impediments to a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Republika Srpska. London: London School of Economics Research on South East Europe.

References

  • Bunreacht na hÉireann (The Constitution of Ireland). Articles 2 & 3. Accessed December 31, 2017, from https://www.constitution.ie/Documents/Bhunreacht_na_hEireann_web.pdf.

  • Bzdera, A. (1993). Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of Judicial Review. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, 26(1), 3–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2000, July 1). U-5/98 (Partial Decision Part 3). Sarajevo: Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dickson, B. (2006). The House of Lords and the Northern Ireland Conflict—A Sequel. Modern Law Review, 69(3), 383–417.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eskridge, W. N. Jr., & Bednar, J. (1995). Steadying the Court’s ‘Unsteady Path’: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism. Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 3799.

    Google Scholar 

  • Framework Agreement Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia, on 13 August 2001. Accessed December 31, 2017, from http://peacemaker.un.org/fyrom-ohridagreement2001.

  • General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (1995). Accessed December 31, from https://peacemaker.un.org/bosniadaytonagreement95.

  • House of Lords. (2002). Robinson vs Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Others [2002] UKHL 32. London: HMO.

    Google Scholar 

  • Iraqi Constitution. (2005). Article 140. Accessed December 31, 2017, from http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf.

  • Ker-Lindsay, J. (2016). The Hollow Threat of Secession in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Legal and Political Impediments to a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Republika Srpska. London: London School of Economics Research on South East Europe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period. (2004, March 8). Article 44. Accessed December 31, from http://www.refworld.org/docid/45263d612.html.

  • Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri). Article 13. Accessed December 31, from http://www.regione.taa.it/biblioteca/minoranze/gagauziaen.pdf.

  • Northern Ireland (St Andrew’s Agreement) Act. (2006). Part 2, Section 12. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

    Google Scholar 

  • United Kingdom Supreme Court. (2017). JUDGMENT R (on the Application of Miller and Another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant). London: HMO.

    Google Scholar 

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Walsh, D. (2018). Conclusion. In: Territorial Self-Government as a Conflict Management Tool. Federalism and Internal Conflicts. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77234-9_7

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