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An Exposure Model for Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

  • Brian Koziel
  • Reza Azarderakhsh
  • David Jao
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10808)

Abstract

In this work, we present an exposure model for the isogeny computation in the quantum-resistant supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange protocol. Notably, we propose this exposure model to characterize the severity of new attacks that force an SIDH user to divulge certain intermediate values. In our model, we show how an attacker can break SIDH by discovering an intermediate kernel point and its corresponding curve. To strengthen an SIDH-user against the exposure of intermediate values, we propose a random curve isomorphism that is performed just before the large-degree isogeny. We show that this countermeasure is computationally inexpensive compared to the whole of SIDH and can still operate with the Kirkwood et al. validation model that allows a static-key user to ensure the first round of the other party was performed honestly. The goal of this paper is to present an additional protection against future attacks for implementations of SIDH.

Keywords

Post-quantum cryptography Isogeny-based cryptography Exposure model 

Notes

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their comments. Also, the authors would like to thank Dr. Luca De Feo for discussion and feedback. This work is supported in part by the grants NIST-60NANB17D184, NIST-60NANB16D246, ARO W911NF-17-1-0311, and NSF CNS-1661557, as well as CryptoWorks21, Public Works and Government Services Canada, Canada First Research Excellence Fund, and an RBC Fellowship.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Texas Instruments Inc.DallasUSA
  2. 2.Computer and Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department and I-SENSEFlorida Atlantic UniversityBoca RatonUSA
  3. 3.Centre for Applied Cryptographic ResearchUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada
  4. 4.evolutionQ Inc.WaterlooCanada

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