Abstract
In this chapter, I compare my findings with the work of other responsibility skeptics: Ishtiyaque Haji, Neil Levy, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. I will focus how their skepticism bolsters my conclusion about responsibility and, also, how their conclusions with regard to morality relate to mine.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
The idea for this account comes from Manuel Vargas, “The Revisionist’s Guide to Responsibility,” The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwVargas.html, accessed July 19, 2017.
- 2.
See P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 1–25.
- 3.
For a defense of the claim that such reactive attitudes are not necessary, see Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will and Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil,” 256–286.
- 4.
See Morritz Schlick, The Problems of Ethics, ch. 7 and J. J. C. Smart, “Free Will, Praise, and Blame,” 291–306. The discussion of Smart was informed by Richard Arneson, “The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility and Desert, 233–258.
- 5.
See Manuel Vargas, Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility ch. 6, esp. pp. 173 and 196 and Manuel Vargas, “Revisionism,” chs. 4 and 8. The value promoted need not be maximized. See Vargas, Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, 194.
- 6.
See Vargas, ch. 7, esp. p. 213.
- 7.
See Vargas, chs. 6 and 7, esp. pp. 203, 213, and 214.
- 8.
The idea for this comes from Michael McKenna, “Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents,” 169–192.
- 9.
See John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” 3–32.
- 10.
For a discussion of this argument, see Stephen Kershnar, “The Justification of Deserved Punishment via General Moral Principles,” 461–484.
- 11.
See Galen Strawson, “The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility,” 289–306, esp. pp. 290–291 and 296–297. For a similar argument against compatibilism, see Saul Smilansky, Free Will and Illusion.
- 12.
A criticism of Strawson’s and my theories is that it requires too much control for responsibility. See John Martin Fischer, Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value ch. 10. For the claim that in fact factors beyond our control explain much of our action, see Gregg Caruso, Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will.
- 13.
See Neil Levy, Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will & Moral Responsibility, ch. 4, esp. p. 84. For the notion that goes all the way our lives, see Saul Smilansky, “Compatibilism: The Argument from Shallowness,” 257–282.
- 14.
See Levy, Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will & Moral Responsibility, 29.
- 15.
For a developed argument that consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility, see Neil Levy, Consciousness & Moral Responsibility.
- 16.
See Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, chs. 6–8.
- 17.
See Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, p. 12.
- 18.
See Pereboom, pp. 14–15.
- 19.
See ibid., ch. 6.
- 20.
See ibid.
- 21.
See ibid., ch. 7.
- 22.
See ibid.
- 23.
I am grateful to Alice Hodge and Robert Kelly for their extremely helpful comments and criticisms.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kershnar, S. (2018). Responsibility Revisionists and Skeptics. In: Total Collapse: The Case Against Responsibility and Morality. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76950-9_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76950-9_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-76949-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-76950-9
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)