Abstract
The literature on bureaucratic cooperation is replete with examples of deficiency and failure, while conventional wisdom holds that cooperation is bound to fail because bureaucratic organizations jealously guard their turf. Heims questions the notion that turf protection dynamics are bound to result in non-cooperation and, by drawing on examples of regulatory cooperation in the European Union, shows that turf protection dynamics can enable, as well as obstruct, cooperation. On this basis, the chapter develops a typology of the politics of (non-)cooperation by outlining four different cooperation dynamics and associated cooperation outcomes. This matrix portrays cooperation outcomes as a function of the overlap of organizations’ resources and core missions, describing how turf protection dynamics can enable cooperation and coordination when missions overlap and resources are complementary.
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Heims, E. (2019). Why Cooperation Between Agencies is (Sometimes) Possible: Turf Protection as Enabler of Regulatory Cooperation in the European Union. In: Bach, T., Wegrich, K. (eds) The Blind Spots of Public Bureaucracy and the Politics of Non-Coordination. Executive Politics and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76672-0_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76672-0_6
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