Abstract
Jordana and Rosas explore the different institutional models for the regulation of banks and financial services that exist worldwide. They find, on the one hand, many countries in which central banks have significant responsibilities for the regulation of the banking system, but also, on the other hand, countries where banking regulation is completely separated from the central bank, remaining in the hands of the executive or being delegated to an independent agency without subordination to the central bank. The chapter identifies the distribution of institutional regulatory models around the world, the possibility of path dependence in the choice of these models, and the relationship between these institutional models and the objectives of price stability and bank stability in different economies.
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Jordana, J., Rosas, G. (2019). Central Banks and Banking Regulation: Historical Legacies and Institutional Challenges. In: Bach, T., Wegrich, K. (eds) The Blind Spots of Public Bureaucracy and the Politics of Non-Coordination. Executive Politics and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76672-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76672-0_10
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