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Introduction: Drug Markets and Violence in Recife, Brazil

  • Jean Daudelin
  • José Luiz Ratton
Chapter

Abstract

In a country already ravaged by violence, Recife has stood out, for a generation, as a champion of homicides. The share of harm contributed by drug markets to this tragedy must be approached without assuming that violence is inherent to their functioning. The analysis must focus instead on the governance of those markets and on the extent to which their participants are deterred, or not, from resorting to violence. In Recife, inequality structures the scope and limits of that deterrence and the challenges of drug markets governance. Exploring these problems, in such a context, poses in turn peculiar methodological problems whose imperfect solution implies significant trade-offs.

Keywords

Drug markets Drug violence Inequality Brazil 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean Daudelin
    • 1
  • José Luiz Ratton
    • 2
  1. 1.Carleton UniversityOttawaCanada
  2. 2.Federal University of PernambucoRecifeBrazil

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