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Challenge Two: The First Taiwan Crisis of 1954–1955

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Book cover Eisenhower and American Public Opinion on China

Abstract

Soon after the Indochina crisis, the Eisenhower administration faced its second challenge to its China policy. On September 3rd, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower was vacationing at the Summer White House in Denver. At approximately seven o’clock that evening, he received a message from Deputy Defense Secretary Robert B. Anderson from Washington, DC. He reported that at two o’clock that morning, the Chinese Communists had begun heavy artillery shelling of Jinmen (Quemoy), one of approximately 25 small islands off the Chinese mainland coast held by the Nationalist regime. Two American members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group had been killed and 14 were being evacuated. Anderson’s message marked the beginning of a nine-month crisis which carried the country to the brink of nuclear war, almost caused a split between the US and its allies, and seriously tested the administration’s ability to uphold its views on national security while preserving domestic consensus for its foreign policy. In the President’s own words, “It was the most serious problem of the first eighteen months of my administration.”

The vast scholarly literature on United States policy during the crisis has treated the Executive branch’s relationship with public opinion, and particularly Congress, as an example of successful public relations management and of Congressional deference to the White House on national security issues during the early decades of the Cold War. Attention has focused on the overwhelming approval by Congress on January 28th, 1955 of the Formosa Resolution, granting the President unprecedented authority to employ US armed forces in the Taiwan (Formosa) Straits.

A more in-depth analysis, however, shows that the administration’s management of public opinion and its relationship with Congress during the crisis are more complex than the lopsided passage of the Formosa Resolution suggests. This chapter analyzes the way which President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles perceived and handled popular and Congressional feelings throughout the entire crisis and argues that their public relations strategy was not always successful.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: A Mandate for a Change (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 549–550.

  2. 2.

    See Chap. 2 for details on the Cairo Declaration; Gordon, Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink, Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu,” International Security 12 (1988): 98–99; Eisenhower, Mandate for a Change, 551.

  3. 3.

    See Chap. 3 for details on US policy toward Taiwan; “United States Objectives and Course of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government,” NSC146, November 6, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, XIV, 1952–1954 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), 307–377 (hereafter FRUS, followed by volume, date and page number); “Special Intelligence Estimate: the Situation with Respect to Certain Islands off the Coast of Mainland China,” September 4, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, 563–571.

  4. 4.

    Eisenhower, A Mandate for a Change, 552.

  5. 5.

    Gordon Chang and Di He, “The Absence of War in the US-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954–1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?” American Historical Review 98 (1993): 1500–1524. The article is one of the first collaborative efforts between an American historian and a scholar from the People’s Republic of China and it draws from a wide documentary base from American and Chinese archives.

  6. 6.

    Eisenhower’s press conference, August 17, 1954, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online], Santa Barbara, CA, http:www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid+9987, Retrieved May 9, 2010 (hereafter The American Presidency Project followed by retrieved date); Dulles ’ press conference, August 24, 1954, Records of the State Department Bureau of Public Affairs, 1954, box 5, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland (hereafter DOS, followed by box number and NAII).

  7. 7.

    Eisenhower, Mandate for a Change, 463; Chang and Di, “The Absence of War in the US-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954–1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?” 1507.

  8. 8.

    The Acting Secretary of Defence (Anderson) to the President, September 3, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, 556–557; The Acting Secretary of State (Smith) to the Embassy in the Philippines, September 3, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, pp. 557–558; H.W., Brands Jr. “Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Straits,” International Security 12 (1988): 124–151; Bennett, C. Rushkoff, “Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 96 (1981): 465–480.

  9. 9.

    Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to State Department, Manila, September 5, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, 278.

  10. 10.

    Memorandum of Discussion at the 231 meeting of the NSC, September 9, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, 583–595.

  11. 11.

    Ibid.; Eisenhower, A Mandate for a Change, 464.

  12. 12.

    Memorandum of Discussion at the 231 meeting of the NSC, September 9, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, 583–595; Brands, “Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Straits,”127–128.

  13. 13.

    The President to the Acting Secretary of State (Smith) , September 8, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, 577–579; Memorandum of Discussion at the 231 meeting of the NSC, September 9, 1954, XIV, 1952–1954, 583–595.

  14. 14.

    “Special Report on the Nation After Chinese Communist Attack on the Offshore Islands,” September 15, 1954, Records of the Office of Public Opinion Studies, Department of State, 1943–1975, AI568J, box 1, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland (hereafter survey title followed by date, DOS, file reference, box number, NAII); China Telegram (CT), September 2 through 15, 1954, DOS, AI568P, box 29, NAII.

  15. 15.

    Ibid.

  16. 16.

    “Special report on American Public Opinion,” September 1954, DOS, AI568N, box 20, NAII; Gallup, George, The Gallup Poll: 1949–1958, vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1972), 1273 (hereafter Gallup poll, followed by page number); CT, September 16 through 22, 1954, DOS, AI568P, box 29, NAII.

  17. 17.

    Douglas Foyle, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating Variable,” International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997), 141–169; and Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 53; Memorandum prepared by the Secretary of State, September 12, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, 611.

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Robert Accinelli, “Eisenhower, Congress and the 1954–1955 Offshore Islands Crisis,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 20 (1990), 329–348; and Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy Toward Taiwan, 1950–1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996).

  21. 21.

    Memorandum prepared by the Secretary of State, September 12, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, 611; “Special Intelligence Estimate—the situation with respect to certain islands off the coast of Mainland China,” September 4, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 563–567.

  22. 22.

    Memorandum of Discussion at the 213 meeting of the NSC, September 9, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, 583–595.

  23. 23.

    Memorandum of Discussion at the 231 meeting of the NSC, November 2, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, 827–893.

  24. 24.

    Brands, “Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Straits”, 133–134.

  25. 25.

    Memorandum of Discussion at the 231 meeting of the NSC, November 2, 1954, FRUS, XIV, 1952–1954, pp. 827–893; Dulles ’ press conference, December 2, 1954, DOS, 1954, box 5, NAII.

  26. 26.

    CT, December 2 through 9, 1954, DOS, AI568P, box 29, NAII; “Public Reaction to Mutual Defence Treaty,” December 1954, AI568J, box 1, NAII.

  27. 27.

    James C. Hagerty, The Diary of James C. Hagerty, ed. Ferrell Robert (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), 117–118 (hereafter Hagerty’s Diaries followed by page number).

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Ibid.; Eisenhower’s press conference December 13, 1954, The American Presidency Project [retrieved May 10, 2010].

  30. 30.

    Memorandum of Discussion at the 331 meeting of the NSC, January 13, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 17–30; Daily Summaries of Public Opinion, January 13, 1955, DOS, AI568K, box 7, NAII.

  31. 31.

    Ibid.

  32. 32.

    Memorandum of Discussion at the 331 meeting of the NSC, January 13, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 17–30.

  33. 33.

    Memorandum of Conversation with Senator Knowland , January 15, 1955, JFD Papers, General Correspondence Series, box 1, DDEL; Memorandum of Conversation with Senator Walter F. George, January 16, 1955, JFD Papers, Subject Series, box 5, DDEL.

  34. 34.

    Hagerty’s Diaries, 161–162.

  35. 35.

    Telegram from Representative at the UN (Lodge) to the Department of State, January 17, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 35–36; Hagerty’s Diaries, 161–163.

  36. 36.

    Ibid. “Public Opinion Reaction to PRC’s visas offer and prisoners’ photographs,” February 1955, DOS, AI568J, box I, NAII.

  37. 37.

    Memorandum of Conversation between the President and the Secretary of State at the White House, January 17, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 34; CT, January 13 through 20, DOS, AI568P, box 29, NAII.

  38. 38.

    The Committee for One Million also changed name into The Committee of One Million, here still abbreviated as COOM; Publications relating to the Committee of One Million Against Admission of Red China to the United Nations, 1954–1966, Tamiment Library, New York University, New York (NYU); Stanley, Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, “China Lobby” Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 102–111.

  39. 39.

    Ibid.

  40. 40.

    “Public Opinion Survey,” February 1955, AI568J, box I, NAII; Telegram from the Representative at the UN (Lodge) to the Department of State, January 17, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 35–36.

  41. 41.

    Memorandum of phone conversation between the President and Dulles , January 18, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 37.

  42. 42.

    Memorandum of Luncheon Conversation with the President, January 19, 1955, JFD Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 3, DDEL.

  43. 43.

    Ibid.

  44. 44.

    Ibid.

  45. 45.

    Memorandum of Phone Conversation Between the President and Dulles , January 18, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 37; Eisenhower’s press conference, January 19, 1955, The American Presidency Project [retrieved May 9, 2010]; JFD’s press conference, January 18, 1955, State Department press release 32, JFD Papers, box 90, Seely G. Mudd Manuscripts Library, Princeton University, New Jersey (hereafter JFD Papers, followed by record reference, box number, ML).

  46. 46.

    CT, January 19 through 25, DOS, AI568P, box 29, NAII; Life, January 27, 1955, 21.

  47. 47.

    Luce to Eisenhower, January 22, 1955, DDE Papers, Central Files, Official Files, box 866, DDEL.

  48. 48.

    Eisenhower to Luce , January 24, 1955, DDE Papers, Diary Series, box 9, DDEL.

  49. 49.

    Memorandum of Phone Conversation Between the President and Dulles , January 18, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 37.

  50. 50.

    Memorandum of Conversation with Congressional leaders, January 21, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 55–68.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Transcript of background news conference, January 24, 1955, JFD papers, box 10, ML; Memorandum of Discussion at the 223 meeting of the NSC, January 20, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 69–82.

  53. 53.

    Memorandum of Conversation, January 22, 1955, II, 1955–1957, 106–107.

  54. 54.

    Memorandum of Discussion at the 233 Meeting of the NSC, January 21, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 89–96.

  55. 55.

    Message from the President to Congress, January 24, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 115–119.

  56. 56.

    CT, January 19 through 25, 1955, DOS, AI568P, NAII; James, Reston , “The Formosa Resolution: A Calculated Imprecision,” the New York Times, April 7, 1955, 13.

  57. 57.

    “Public Opinion Reaction to Formosa Resolution,” January 25, 1955, DOS, AI568J, box 1, NAII.

  58. 58.

    Philip J. Briggs, “Congress and the Cold War: US-China Policy, 1955,” The China Quarterly 85 (1981): 80–95.

  59. 59.

    Hearings on Senate Joint Report, January 24, 1955, JFD Papers, box 17, ML.

  60. 60.

    The New York Times, January 25, 1955, 3.

  61. 61.

    Eisenhower to Senator George, January 27, 1955, DDE Papers, Diary Series, box 9, DDEL.

  62. 62.

    Briggs, “Congress and the Cold War: US-China Policy, 1955,” 90–95.

  63. 63.

    Meeting with the President, January 28, 1955, JFD Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 3, DDEL.

  64. 64.

    The New York Times, January 27, 1955, 1–5.

  65. 65.

    “Public Opinion Survey on Formosa Resolution,” February 15, 1955, DOS, AI568J, box I, NAII.

  66. 66.

    CT, February 3 through 16, 1955, DOS, AI568P, box 29, NAII; “Recent Opinion Polling Results on US-Chinese Relations,” August 5, 1955, DOS, AI568J, box I, NAII.

  67. 67.

    Editorial note, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 178–179.

  68. 68.

    Memorandum of Conversation with Sir Roger Makins, February 2, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 195–197.

  69. 69.

    Telegram from Ambassador Rankin in the Republic of China to Department of State, February 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 193–195; Editorial Note, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 199.

  70. 70.

    “Dulles did pledge defence of Quemoy and Matsu,” the New York Times, February 11, 1955, 1–6.

  71. 71.

    Alsop, Joseph, “A Matter of Fact,” the New York Herald Tribune, February 14, 1955, 3; CT, February 25 through March 2, 1955, AI568N, box 29, NAII.

  72. 72.

    Eisenhower’s press conference, March 2, 1955, The American Presidency Project [retrieved: May 24, 2010].

  73. 73.

    CT, February 25 through March 2, 1955, DOS, AI568N, box 29, NAII.

  74. 74.

    “Special Public Opinion Survey,” February 1955, DOS, AI568J, box 1, NAII.

  75. 75.

    Save Our Sons Committee to Eisenhower, February 20, 1955, DDE Papers as a President, Central Files, General Files, box 802, DDEL.

  76. 76.

    Memorandum of Discussion at the 237 meeting of the NSC, February 17, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 279–286.

  77. 77.

    Memorandum of Conversation with the President, February 24, 1955, JFD Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 3, DDEL.

  78. 78.

    Ibid.; Hagerty’s Diaries, 201–203.

  79. 79.

    Memorandum of Conversation with the President, March 6, 1955, JFD Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 3, DDEL; Memorandum of Discussion at the 240 NSC meeting, March 10, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 345–350.

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    Ibid.

  82. 82.

    “Secretary of State’s report to the Nation on Asian trip,” Department of State Bulletin, 25, March 23, 1955, 34–38 (hereafter DSB followed by issue number, date and page reference); Dulles ’ press conference, March 15, 1955, JFD Papers, box 90, ML.

  83. 83.

    Eisenhower’s press conference, March 16, 1955, The American Presidency Project [retrieved: May 27, 2010]; the New York Times, March 16, 1955, 1–8; and March 18, 1955, 1; and March 22, 1955, 1–5.

  84. 84.

    Memorandum for the files, March 10, 1955, DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Diary Series, box 4, DDEL.

  85. 85.

    CT, March 2 through 30, 1955, DOS, AI568P, box 29. NAII; Harkness, Richard (CBS) to Eisenhower, March 31, 1955, DDE Papers, Central files, Official Files, box 856, DDEL.

  86. 86.

    Hagerty’s Diaries, 218–219.

  87. 87.

    Special Opinion Survey, April 1955, DOS, AI568J, box 1, NAII.

  88. 88.

    Memorandum of Breakfast Conversation with Senator George, March 24, 1955, JFD Papers, Subject Series, box 5, DDEL; Bipartisan Meeting with Congressional Leaders, March 30, 1955, Hagerty Papers, box 2, DDEL.

  89. 89.

    Diary Entry, April 5, 1955, Alsop Stewart’s Papers, box 7, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, DC (hereafter LoC).

  90. 90.

    Memorandum of Conversation with the President, April 17, 1955, JFD Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 9, DDEL.

  91. 91.

    Ibid.

  92. 92.

    Taipei US Embassy to State Department, April 23, 1955, FRUS, II, 1955–1957, 509.

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  1. Department of History, University of Reading, Reading, UK

    Mara Oliva

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Oliva, M. (2018). Challenge Two: The First Taiwan Crisis of 1954–1955. In: Eisenhower and American Public Opinion on China. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76195-4_5

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