Abstract
In this chapter, we demonstrate that the primary security assumption on the infeasibility of direct delay measurements in delay-based PUFs is not valid. By performing an experiment on a PoC Arbiter PUF implementation on reconfigurable hardware, it becomes apparent that The Arbiter PUF family and more generally, the delay-based PUFs can be characterized by a high-resolution temporal photonic emission analysis. This approach does require neither any access to the PUF’s response nor a significant number of challenges to characterizing the PUF.
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© 2019 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
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Tajik, S. (2019). Photonic Side-Channel Analysis. In: On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions. T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75820-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75820-6_4
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Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75819-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-75820-6
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