Abstract
In the context of security, risk analyzes are widely recognized as essential. However, such analyzes need to be replayed frequently to take into account new vulnerabilities, new protections, etc. As exploits can now easily be found on internet, allowing a wide range of possible intruders with various capacities, motivations and resources. In particular in the case of industrial control systems (also called SCADA) that interact with the physical world, any breach can lead to disasters for humans and the environment. Alongside of classical security properties such as secrecy or authentication, SCADA must ensure safety properties relative to the industrial process they control. In this paper, we propose an approach to assess the security of industrial systems. This approach aims to find applicative attacks taking into account various parameters such as the behavior of the process, the safety properties that must be ensured. We also model the possible positions and capacities of attackers allowing a precise control of these attackers. We instrument our approach using the well known model-checker UPPAAL, we apply it on a case study and show how variations of properties, network topologies, and attacker models can drastically change the obtained results.
This work has been partially funded by the SACADE (ANR-16-ASTR-0023) project.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
In UPPAAL, messages are not exchanged directly on channels. Instead signals are sent telling processes to access messages as global variables.
- 3.
This models the actual behavior of the client in VirtualPlant and is not a limitation of our approach.
References
Langner, R.: Stuxnet: dissecting a cyberwarfare weapon. IEEE Secur. Priv. 9(3), 49–51 (2011)
Lee, R.M., Assante, M.J., Conway, T.: German steel mill cyber attack. Industrial Control Systems, 30 (2014)
Lee, R.M., Assante, M.J., Conway, T.: Analysis of the cyber attack on the Ukrainian power grid. SANS Industrial Control Systems (2016)
Puys, M., Potet, M.-L., Lafourcade, P.: Formal analysis of security properties on the OPC-UA SCADA protocol. In: Skavhaug, A., Guiochet, J., Bitsch, F. (eds.) SAFECOMP 2016. LNCS, vol. 9922, pp. 67–75. Springer, Cham (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45477-1_6
Dreier, J., Puys, M., Potet, M.-L., Lafourcade, P., Roch, J.-L.: Formally verifying flow integrity properties in industrial systems. In: SECRYPT 2017–14th International Conference on Security and Cryptography, Madrid, Spain, p. 12, July 2017
Byres, E.J., Franz, M., Miller, D.: The use of attack trees in assessing vulnerabilities in SCADA systems. In: Proceedings of the International Infrastructure Survivability Workshop (2004)
Cherdantseva, Y., Burnap, P., Blyth, A., Eden, P., Jones, K., Soulsby, H., Stoddart, K.: A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. Comput. Secur. 56, 1–27 (2015)
Piètre-Cambacédès, L., Bouissou, M.: Cross-fertilization between safety and security engineering. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 110, 110–126 (2013)
Kriaa, S., Pietre-Cambacedes, L., Bouissou, M., Halgand, Y.: A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 139, 156–178 (2015)
Kriaa, S., Bouissou, M., Piètre-Cambacédès, L.: Modeling the Stuxnet attack with BDMP: towards more formal risk assessments. In: 2012 7th International Conference on Risk and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS), pp. 1–8. IEEE (2012)
Piètre-Cambacédès, L., Deflesselle, Y., Bouissou, M.: Security modeling with BDMP: from theory to implementation. In: 2011 Conference on Network and Information Systems Security (SAR-SSI), pp. 1–8. IEEE (2011)
Kriaa, S., Bouissou, M., Laarouchi, Y.: A model based approach for SCADA safety and security joint modelling: S-Cube. In: IET System Safety and Cyber Security. IET Digital Library (2015)
Rocchetto, M., Tippenhauer, N.O.: Towards formal security analysis of industrial control systems. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 114–126. ACM (2017)
Turuani, M.: The CL-Atse protocol analyser. In: Pfenning, F. (ed.) RTA 2006. LNCS, vol. 4098, pp. 277–286. Springer, Heidelberg (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/11805618_21
Rocchetto, M., Tippenhauer, N.O.: CPDY: extending the Dolev-Yao attacker with physical-layer interactions. In: Ogata, K., Lawford, M., Liu, S. (eds.) ICFEM 2016. LNCS, vol. 10009, pp. 175–192. Springer, Cham (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47846-3_12
Behrmann, G., David, A., Larsen, K.G.: A tutorial on UPPAAL. In: Bernardo, M., Corradini, F. (eds.) SFM-RT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3185, pp. 200–236. Springer, Heidelberg (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30080-9_7
Puys, M., Potet, M.-L., Roch, J.-L.: Génération systématique de scénarios d’attaques contre des systèmes industriels. In: Approches Formelles dans l’Assistance au Développement de Logiciels, AFADL 2016, Besançon, France (2016)
ANSSI. Expression des besoins et identification des objectifs de sécurité. Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (2010)
CLUSIF. Méthode harmonisée d’analyse des risques (2010)
Clarke, E.M., Emerson, E.A.: Design and synthesis of synchronization skeletons using branching time temporal logic. In: Kozen, D. (ed.) Logic of Programs 1981. LNCS, vol. 131, pp. 52–71. Springer, Heidelberg (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0025774
Dolev, D., Yao, A.C.: On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 29(2), 198–208 (1981)
Cervesato, I.: The Dolev-Yao intruder is the most powerful attacker. In: 16th Annual Symposium on Logic in Computer Science–LICS, vol. 1 (2001)
IEC-60812. Analysis techniques for system reliability - Procedure for failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). International Electrotechnical Commission (1985)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this paper
Cite this paper
Puys, M., Potet, ML., Khaled, A. (2018). Generation of Applicative Attacks Scenarios Against Industrial Systems. In: Imine, A., Fernandez, J., Marion, JY., Logrippo, L., Garcia-Alfaro, J. (eds) Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10723. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75650-9_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75650-9_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75649-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-75650-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)