Abstract
I bring to bear what has been said about primary recognition and basic moral certainty to current metaethics. I show how it gives us reason to resist three popular notions in metaethical debate—(i) that we are basically amoral creatures (I argue that primary recognition means we are necessarily morally concerned); (ii) that modern morality has lost its grounding (both G. E. M. Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre argue that modern morality is not properly grounded because it lacks rational grounding I argue all morality is arationally grounded); and (iii) the notion that moral norms are completely culture relative (some are but some are universal, and the universal set limits to what can count as local moral certainties).
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- 1.
Logically indubitable in that there is no possibility of sensical doubt at the level of primary recognition or of basic moral certainty in general.
- 2.
Though Mary Midgley argues that such views are at least as old as Aristotle , who displayed an egoist view of humanity in his ‘attempt to derive the love we feel for others from our love of ourselves (Ethics 9.4, 8)’ (Midgley 1995, 116).
- 3.
Though I will not claim that the content of our moral thought is not the result of education and training , but that the source of morality is not derived from training .
- 4.
I am supporting a philosophical rather than an empirical claim here (i.e. that morality has its source in primary recognition ), but getting clear about some empirical facts about the nature of interpersonal concern will help motivate philosophical investigation of its role in morality.
- 5.
In this case subject’s skin conductivity response was measured (ibid., 479). This measure is used based on evidence that a person’s skin becomes more conductive (conducts electricity better) when they experience certain strong, basic emotions like anger, fear or distress, and is a standard measure in psychological research (cf. Greenwald et al. 1989). One advantage of this method is that it avoids certain worries about methods that involve asking the subject (i.e. we need not worry if the subject is lying or concealing their true responses for some reason e.g. not appearing racist on implicit bias tests, or not appearing uncaring about the distress of others).
- 6.
This is not to suggest that putting oneself in another’s place is not a useful tool in moral thought, but only to say that that isn’t the foundation of our moral thought. Indeed, research by Batson et al. (2003) suggests that putting oneself in another’s place does increase pro-social, or morally good behaviour.
- 7.
For instance, another’s feeling fear might cause me to feel not fear but anxiety or sadness. Though I do not want to claim that primary recognition amounts to feeling concern for another, but involves reacting to them with concern or care.
- 8.
Hume of course is somewhat of an exception, grounding morality in our emotions. And it should also be noted that I am not saying morality as such is not rational i.e. that we may not come to moral knowledge based on sufficient reasons. I just mean that it is rooted in the pre-rational.
- 9.
The convergences between their views on the point I will discuss are such that the position they express has been called ‘the Anscombe -MacIntyre attack’ (Adkins et al. 1991). There are some differences which will be noted below, but the main one is that MacIntyre ’s is more fully worked out. He does in fact acknowledge that his argument is ‘both deeply indebted to and rather different from’ Anscombe ’s (2007 [1981], 64).
- 10.
Here we see, I think, the modern roots of Williams ’ critique of the moral, which he describes somewhat disparagingly as ‘the morality system’, and his development of the moral/ethical distinction.
- 11.
Some have thought it strange that a committed Catholic like Anscombe would put forward such a view, one that appears to reject Divine Law theory (e.g. Roger Crisp 2004, 86). To make sense of this it has been suggested that Anscombe actually intends here to show the necessity of a divine law framework if morality is to have any sense. i.e. arguing that neither the moral ought or the divine law framework should be jettisoned. This is not, however, the standard reading.
- 12.
Like Anscombe I think moral thought is about flourishing (specifically, about being motivated by the flourishing of the other). But unlike her, I have no problem with ought-based language, as it gets sense from our necessarily seeing others as owed some concern, rather than from a particular theoretical framework.
- 13.
Though it should be noted that in later works MacIntyre ’s Aristotelianism becomes increasingly indebted to Thomism (in part because he ‘became convinced that Aquinas was in some respects a better Aristotelian than Aristotle ’ (ibid., xi)), as he makes clear in his preface to the third edition of After Virtue.
- 14.
In fact MacIntyre goes further in saying that the human telos is partly to embody the virtue s, and that the concept of the flourishing human is in some sense constituted by the notion of the human being displaying the virtues .
- 15.
He is certainly not alone in this, such an assumption is ubiquitous in the philosophical literature.
- 16.
If it turns out that morality does help us achieve the good life, that fact would be, to use an old philosophical distinction rather loosely, accidental rather than essential to the nature of morality.
- 17.
Whether or not we agree that these are virtue s is beside the point here—MacIntyre takes them as examples of what the Athenians took to be virtue s. And he uses them partly, I think, to demonstrate the variety of personal qualities that have been taken for virtue s in different historical contexts.
- 18.
I do not by this wish to imply that all talk of the virtue s is ethical talk and not at home in moral philosophy. All I would insist on is that we distinguish between moral and ethical virtue s, depending on the aim of that virtue in each instance. For instance, if I were to develop the virtue of patience in order to be a better listener, or a better friend, I would be thinking of patience as a moral virtue . If I sought patience in order to be a better sportsman I would be thinking of it as an ethical virtue . For an excellent defence of virtue ethics against the charge that it is only self-facing see Annas (2008, 205–11).
- 19.
Or as MacIntyre has it, no ground beyond how we feel about them (see also Anscombe ’s talk of the ‘purely psychological’ force of moral oughts (1958, 18)). He sees emotivism as the characteristic moral theory of our age, and one that cannot properly ground our moral claims (see MacIntyre 2007 [1981], 7–41). Whether or not he is right about that is not necessary to decide here.
- 20.
For a defence of the non-propositionality of Wittgenstein ’s account of basic certainty see Stroll (1994, 134, 146, 155–9) and especially Moyal-Sharrock (2005, 87–9); and for a further, I think decisive, more general defence of the non-propositionality of our basic beliefs see (ibid., 183–91). For propositional accounts of our basic beliefs , see for example Kornblith (2002, 2005) and Stalnaker (1999). For Ryle-inspired arguments against the propositionality of basic moral certainty , see Hermann (2015, 119–66).
- 21.
For this motivation for moral relativism see, Berlin (1991, 80, cited in Baghramian 2004); Harman (1975); Ryan (2003, 377–86); Nicholas Sturgeon, though not a moral relativist discusses this motivation for relativism at (1994, 80–115); Wong (2006, 6), though whether Wong ’s position merits the name ‘relativism ’ is debatable (he calls it ‘pluralistic relativism ’)—if it does it is a very conservative form of relativism in that for him there is a limit to what can qualify as a moral norm. See also Williams (1981) and his distinction between ‘real’ and ‘notional confrontation’ between moral norms from distant societies (137–43).
- 22.
See for instance, Baghramian (2004, 270); Beebe (2010, 692); Harman and Thomson (1996, 18) (though to be precise Harman says moral relativism is not entailed by moral diversity but is the best explanation for it); Park (2011, 159); Wiggins discusses it at (2006, 344–7); Wong (2006, 5) (though see previous note).
- 23.
The latter is not implied by the former—interminable disagreement does not follow necessarily from variety in moral belief . The possibility of coming to see the variety as expressing deeper principles about which the parties agree would be one way of having variety and terminable disagreement.
- 24.
- 25.
It is not unthinkable that some cultures would approve of such burnings. Consider the now outlawed Indian practice of suttee, whereby wives were burned alive on the death of their husbands.
- 26.
- 27.
See Sect. 4.3 for a more extended discussion of this point.
- 28.
Such contradictions in moral foundations are what power the tragic moral dilemmas that are the bread and butter of Athenian tragedy. I have already discussed the character of Orestes at Sect. 5.5. A common factor of tragic narratives like these is that such contradictions must be rectified, not just lived with, and the dramatic tension comes from the struggle to find a way out of the contradiction and, in the case of the Oresteia at least, a new way of living. MacIntyre makes much of moral dilemmas found in Athenian tragedy, seeing them as examples of moral systems in interminable conflict because they lack a common ground. He is right to see some of them as representing a conflict of moral systems, but wrong to think this is necessarily between several unanchored moral systems. Often the conflict is between local moral certainties embedded in different moral traditions.
- 29.
This is contra James Dreier (1990) who seems happy to call a morality an imaginary system of thought that recognizes what we call ‘moral goods’ but ‘hate[s] them [and]… find those things repulsive and avoid them at all costs’ (ibid., 10). It seems to me the term ‘anti-morality’ is more apt for such a system.
- 30.
- 31.
This is typical of Spartan trickiness, but is not entirely disingenuous. The helot population was (understandably) constantly looking for opportunities to revolt. And when they did they were suppressed sometimes only with great difficulty, requiring the Spartans to seek military aid from other states so that, as Aristotle puts it, the helots were ‘like an enemy constantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the [Spartans]’ (1944, 133).
- 32.
I should also make clear that not all moral disagreement goes on at the level of moral certainty . We can disagree in our moral knowledge claims, at the epistemic level, and exchange reasons for our various beliefs . To say otherwise would be to effectively rule out the possibility of change in our moral opinions, at least change through discussion and debate.
- 33.
It could be said that my account lacks depth because I so often use everyday examples of moral actions, like giving someone a drink. I would only say in response that I’m trying to get to grips here with the basic, uncontroversial aspects of our morality, its foundations . And while discussion of things like acts of supererogatory goodness might be a good deal less pedestrian, they wouldn’t show what I need to show here.
- 34.
It might be objected that rather than a moral heuristic the belief that ‘Stealing is wrong’ is better characterised as a local moral certainty . I would resist this characterisation however because, that an act is stealing is not always decisive in its being thought wrong in the same way that, say, an act being murder is (and this is not just because ‘murder’ means wrong killing, because wrongfulness is also part of the concept of ‘stealing’). So for example, stealing to feed one’s starving family is not certainly wrong even if it is stealing. And in our culture, downloading licenced online content, like music or films, for free is often considered permissible, even though from a legal point of view it is unlawful taking, that is, stealing. The point being that we can class an act as stealing and yet still doubt it’s wrongness—we could not say ‘Yes, its murder but it’s not wrong’, but we could say ‘Yes, it’s stealing but it’s not wrong’. And so it is better to characterise the belief ‘Stealing is wrong’ as a moral heuristic tool, not a (local ) moral certainty , as it is very broadly applicable as a rule but we can doubt it in non-extreme circumstances.
- 35.
Benjamin De Mesel (2016, 445–50) provides a useful discussion of instances where philosophical moral arguments are pushed to the point where they contradict basic moral certainties .
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O’Hara, N. (2018). Implications for Current Metaethics. In: Moral Certainty and the Foundations of Morality. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75444-4_6
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