A Simpler Bitcoin Voting Protocol

  • Haibo Tian
  • Liqing Fu
  • Jiejie He
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10726)


Recently, Zhao and Chan proposed a Bitcoin voting protocol where n voters could fund Bitcoins to one of two candidates determined by majority voting. Their protocol preserves the privacy of individual ballot while they cast ballots by Bitcoin transactions. However, their protocol supports only two candidates and relies on a threshold signature scheme. We extend their method to produce a ballot by a voter selecting at least \(k_{min}\), at most \(k_{max}\) from L candidates. We also redesign a vote casting protocol without threshold signatures to reduce transaction numbers and protocol complexities. We also introduce new polices to make the Bitcoin Voting protocol more fair.


Bitcoin Voting Privacy 



This work is supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (2017YFB0802503), Natural Science Foundation of China (61672550, 61379154), Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province, China (2015A030313133), and Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 17lgjc45).


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Guangdong Key Laboratory of Information Security, School of Data and Computer ScienceSun Yat-Sen UniversityGuangzhouPeople’s Republic of China

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