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A Game-Based Framework Towards Cyber-Attacks on State Estimation in ICSs

  • Cong Chen
  • Dongdai Lin
  • Wei Zhang
  • Xiaojun Zhou
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10726)

Abstract

The security issue on remote state estimation process against false data injection (FDI) attacks in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) is considered in this paper. To be practically, it is more reasonable to assume whether or not a meter measurement could be compromised by an adversary does depend on the defense budget deployed on it by the system defender. Based on this premise, this paper focuses on designing the defense budget strategy to protect state estimation process in ICSs against FDI attacks by applying a game-based framework. With resource-constraints for both the defender and the attacker side, the decision making process of how to deploy the defending budget for defenders and how to launch attacks on the meters for an attacker are investigated. A game-based framework is formulated and it has been proved that the Nash equilibrium is existed. For practical computation convenience, an on-line updating algorithm is proposed. What’s more, the simulation of the game-based framework described in this paper is demonstrated to verify its validity and efficiency. The experimental results have shown that the game-based framework could improve performance of the decision making and estimation process and mitigate the impact of the FDI attack. This may provide a novel and feasible perspective to protect the state estimation process and improve the intrusion tolerance in ICSs.

Keywords

Industrial Control System (ICS) Critical infrastructures False data injection (FDI) State estimation Intrusion tolerance Game theory Nash equilibrium 

Notes

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers for considerate and helpful comments. The work described in this paper is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (61379139) and the “Strategic Priority Research Program” of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Grant No. XDA06010701.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Cong Chen
    • 1
    • 2
  • Dongdai Lin
    • 1
  • Wei Zhang
    • 1
    • 2
  • Xiaojun Zhou
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information EngineeringChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  2. 2.School of Cyber SecurityUniversity of Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina

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