Abstract
This paper will analyse coalition politics in India over the period of coalition and/or minority governments from 1989 to the present, from the points of view of institutionalization, congruence and decentralization. India’s federal, bicameral parliamentary democracy, which uses a single-member, simple-plurality (SMSP) or first-past-the-post electoral system, has seen since 1989, a series of coalition and/or minority governments, mainly minority coalitions until the present surplus majority coalition since 2014. A large number of Indian states—in a federal system that has become increasingly decentralized since the mid-1990s—have also experienced coalition politics. Three questions naturally arise: (1) have coalitions become institutionalized at the federal and state levels, as least as far as the core formateur parties are concerned, or do they keep varying with changes of partners? This is the institutionalization question. The paper will argue that some practices have become institutionlised at the federal level and to a lesser extent at the state level. (2) What is the degree of congruence between coalitions at the federal level and those in various states, given the major role played by single-state regional parties in India’s system? This is the congruence question. The paper will argue that congruence is very limited and partial given the role of regional parties but that two broad coalitions are emerging, one led by the BJP, the other by the Congress. (3) How has coalition politics interacted with Indian federalism’s degree of decentralization? This is the decentralization question. The paper will argue that coalition politics has contributed to the further decentralization of power due to the fact that the two major national parties need regional parties as coalition partners to be able to form governments at the federal level and to pass legislation in both houses of parliament.
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Notes
- 1.
Jammu and Kashmir is only required to hold state assembly elections every 6 years.
- 2.
For all figures in this section except where specified otherwise the data are from:
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/religion.aspx
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Datza_2001/India_at_glance/scst.aspx
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement5.htm
accessed on July 5, 2011.
- 3.
For the estimate of upper castes, including dominant castes, see Government of India (1980, Vol. I, Part I, p. 56).
- 4.
- 5.
Planning Commission, Government of India (2010).
- 6.
- 7.
Brass (1997).
- 8.
A measure of the fragmentation of the opposition space represented by the percentage share of the largest non-Congress (in today’s terms, non-ruling party) vote in the total opposition vote. The higher the IOU the less fragmented the opposition space.
- 9.
Regional party is something of a misnomer as it implies a party strong in two or more states in a region. All the regional parties, however, are single state-based parties except the Janata Dal (United), strong in Bihar and Karnataka, and the CPI(M), strong in West Bengal, Tripura and Kerala, if one considers them regional parties. These sets of states do not constitute recognizable regions. The JD(U) and the CPI(M) are really national parties with a limited geographical spread, the former being a rump of the once much larger Janata Dal.
- 10.
Yadav (1996).
- 11.
For the BJP’s use of coalitions as a strategy to expand its base across states, see Sridharan (2005).
- 12.
For details of the alliances, pre- and post-election in 1998, see Arora (2000).
- 13.
For details of the argument and figures, see Sridharan (2004).
- 14.
- 15.
For a detailed overview of state-level coalition politics in India, see Sridharan (1999, , 2002, , 2003). For a detailed state-wise analysis of the BJP’s coalition strategies since 1989, Sridharan (2005). For a detailed analysis of the Congress’ coalition strategies and their criticality in the 2004 elections, see Sridharan (2004).
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Sridharan, E. (2018). Coalition Congruence in India’s Federal System. In: Albala, A., Reniu, J. (eds) Coalition Politics and Federalism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75100-9_5
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