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The Political Economy of Financial Development: A Review

  • Sumon Kumar Bhaumik
Chapter
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Part of the Advances in Theory and Practice of Emerging Markets book series (ATPEM)

Abstract

The importance of financial development for economic growth is well understood, and hence there is a demand for policies that facilitate financial development in emerging market economies and, more generally, in developing economies. This paper reviews the literature on the political economy of financial development which suggests that relevant policies are shaped, in large measure, by the interplay between the governments and interest groups that benefit from or lose rent on account of financial development. It draws some conclusions about formulation of financial policies and highlights possible ways in which the literature can be meaningfully extended.

Keywords

Financial Development Financial Policies Political Economy Emerging Market Economies Developing Economies 
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© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sheffield University Management School, University of SheffieldSheffieldUK
  2. 2.IZA – Institute of Labor EconomicsBonnGermany
  3. 3.Global Labor OrganizationGenevaSwitzerland

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