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Scientific Research and Truth

  • Pierluigi Barrotta
Chapter
Part of the Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning book series (LARI, volume 16)

Abstract

After examining the scientific method in Peirce’s work and its connection with truth, I will deal with the relationship between pure science – the aim of which is only truth – and applied science – the aim of which is the implementation of practical applications. Here, I will distance myself from Dewey’s instrumentalism, which involves levelling pure science to applied science. In the last section, conclusions will be drawn and the meaning of ‘truth’ and, consequently, of ‘objectivity’ explained. We will begin to see why science and morality are two aspects of the same logic of inquiry, whose aim is the pursuit of truth.

Keywords

Belief Method (m. of tenacity, m. of authority, a priori m., m. of science) Doubt (‘irritation’ of d., fictitious d., Cartesian d.) Objectivity (moral values and o., different meanings of o.) Philosophical fallacy Propositions (as instruments of inquiry) Science (pure and applied) Scientific theories and laws (as material rules of inference, as true in relevant domains) Semantic realism Technology (t. different from ‘technics’ and ‘applied science’) Truth (morality and t., pragmatist theory of t., t. as correspondence, t. and convergence of opinions) 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierluigi Barrotta
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Civilizations and Forms of KnowledgeUniversity of PisaPisaItaly

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