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The Nature and Value of Privacy

  • Steven P. Lee
Chapter
Part of the AMINTAPHIL: The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice book series (AMIN, volume 8)

Abstract

Privacy is an important value in liberal societies. While the importance of privacy, in some form, is not in dispute, there is considerable disagreement about the scope of privacy and its relation to other values. Part of the reason for the controversy is lack of a common understanding about the precise nature and value of privacy. In this paper, I offer some thoughts on both issues.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I owe special thanks to Alistair Macleod, who provided me with a valuable commentary on an earlier version of this paper, and to the volume’s editors, Mark Navin and Ann Cudd, who helped me avoid some confusions. Thanks are due as well to participants in the discussion of the paper at the 2015 AMINTAPHIL meeting at Wake Forest University, and to Emily Perkins for help with the manuscript.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Hobart and William Smith CollegesGenevaUSA

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