Abstract
Put most simply, economic changes and policy interventions generate political responses from those who see either threats to their interests or new opportunities to attain benefits (Acemoglu 2010). Because transportation mega-projects belong to that class of projects inciting intense changes, especially at the metropolitan and regional levels, it should not be surprising that they face various forms of opposition coming from multiple sources, ranging from vocal criticism to organized resistance. But mega-projects likewise benefit from vigorous support. In the USA, lobbying for earmarked projects was a common practice at the national (or federal) level until earmarking was prohibited by Congress in 2011. The proliferation of earmarked projects had persuaded advocacy groups to seek additional projects at the price of foregoing the benefits of more worthy projects. In addition, national advocacy organizations (or lobbyists) continue to try to persuade decision-makers by applying sometimes devious tactics but also their professional expertise.
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Notes
- 1.
US federal legislation, “Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a Legacy for Users”, (Public Law 109-59; SAFETEA-LU), passed in 2005, appropriated $244 billion over five years. It contained an unprecedented number of earmarks: 6373 separate projects amounting to nearly 10% of the total bill (Giuliano 2007).
- 2.
Once earmarks were eliminated, lobbyists had to devise new strategies. One critical result is the political gridlock, as legislators no longer have a way to pay for the crucial votes, accompanied by jobs and construction contracts.
- 3.
The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) and the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) are two such organizations. They are engaged in setting standards in addition to publishing the building specifications and guidelines used in highway design and construction throughout the USA. They represent air, rail, water and public transportation as well.
- 4.
Here I use the acronym SIGs to identify any organization engaged in economic and political activities with the aim of obtaining benefits for its members by influencing decisions favoring their interests. In our case, their success is measured in the form of mega-project revision, implementation or obstruction. For other definitions and the assumptions underlying their operation, see Knight (2004) and Grossman and Helpman (2001).
- 5.
For the role of opposition and advocacy groups in transportation policy-making, see Dunn (1998).
- 6.
An example is the Copenhagen Metro, a 22 km rapid transit system that faced ideology-based funding issues. It took 15 years to complete the project, with cost overruns of over 200%.
- 7.
In Chap. 6, I discussed the role of project history in establishing and sustaining the project’s idea, which serves as a rally point for support.
- 8.
Olson (1971) regards leadership or political entrepreneurs as a key determinant in solving collective action problems. Acemoglu and Jackson (2011) suggest a game-theoretic approach to modeling leadership. In their model, leaders are regarded as prominent agents, whose actions are more clearly observed by more agents.
- 9.
For example, the cross-Israel highway project (Highway 6) was originally considered in terms of highway versus rail options. Similar arguments were made before construction of the Canada Line, an above- and under-ground rail line in Vancouver, BC. For a more general discussion, see Dunn (1998).
- 10.
Leading textbooks in policy analysis focus mainly on technical issues rather than on political structure and players (e.g., see Weimer and Vining 2005).
More recent policy studies have underscored the importance of understanding the political contexts of decision-making (e.g., Weible 2006). More recently, Rodrik (2014) has emphasized the importance of ideas and the need for their systematic inclusion within a political-economic analysis. The interaction between ideas and institutions, with the latter often using the former to enhance their power, has still not received proper attention in the germane literature.
- 11.
See Grossman and Helpman (1994) for a model depicting how an SIG’s political contributions can influence trade policy.
- 12.
A commuter super-shuttle service linking Lower Manhattan and downtown Brooklyn to Long Island and the JFK AirTrain at an estimated cost of $2.4 Billion (2004 prices).
- 13.
A good example of a political champion of such interests is Manhattan borough President George McAneny who, in 1911, became the acknowledged main supporter of the New York City subway expansion scheme. According to public accounts, his leadership was indispensable in overcoming major development and construction interests, who had previously dithered in deciding how they would proceed (Derrick 2001).
- 14.
New York’s Second Avenue Subway, already mentioned here, is a classic case in point. ARC project, which will bring the Long Island Railroad to Grand Central Station in Manhattan, is another.
- 15.
Extension of Manhattan’s Number 7 subway line (a one-mile one-station project running from 42nd Street to 34th Street along 11th Avenue at a cost of $2.4 billion) was executed mainly due to the decisive advocacy of New York’s previous mayor, Michael Bloomberg.
- 16.
See Plotch (2015) on the Tappan Zee Bridge in upstate New York.
- 17.
See Berechman (2009) for the negative impacts of port expansion projects.
- 18.
One possible source of information on proponents’ activities is the documentation used for environmental impact analyses (Environmental Impact Statement—EIS), which by law must be published. Unfortunately, an EIS is often carried out years before a comprehensive CBA is completed, which itself can predate decision-making by several years.
- 19.
Given the limitations of the database (see Appendix, Chap. 4), we do not know how many mega-projects that faced opposition were ultimately not selected for implementation. However, we can safely conclude that 75% is a lower bound for the occurrence of some kind of opposition.
- 20.
To that end we used a statistical test known as the Granger causality test, which in our case means testing the hypothesis that opposition prolongs history as measured in years.
- 21.
In its binary form, the Logit model is expressed by the function \( {P}_1=\frac{1}{1+{e}^{-\left(\beta \cdot {v}_1\right)}} \), where P1 is the probability of the occurrence of the phenomenon studied (i.e., opposition) and v1 represents its explanatory variable (project history in this case). The null hypothesis, that history has no effect on opposition (the coefficient β = 0), states the alternative (β ≠ 0).
- 22.
The constant for this model is −1.263, at a significance level of 0.01%.
- 23.
See the 2013 case where New Jersey’s governor terminated the Cross Hudson Tunnel, known as “ARC”, a $9.8 billion project in the works for nearly 20 years.
- 24.
New York’s Second Avenue Subway, an inner city project, cost about $2.2 billion per km.
- 25.
This finding may not be applicable in the USA as a top-down project is more likely to run into local opposition than one locally initiated.
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Berechman, J. (2018). Interest Groups: Advocacy and Opposition. In: The Infrastructure We Ride On. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74606-7_7
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