Abstract
Bringing the insights of the previous chapters together, this chapter seeks to answer the book’s main question. I develop an interpretation of aesthetic and ethical life, and I show that we should understand the transition between both as qualitative. After criticizing Michelle Kosch’ and Anthony Rudd’s influential arguments for the rationality of the transition to ethical life for presupposing an externalist view on practical reasons, I develop my own argument. Contra MacIntyre’s charge of irrationality, I argue that there is reason for some but not for all aesthetes to embrace ethical life. I also reflect on the sort of communication that might be able to communicate to aesthetes that they have reason to embrace ethical life, showing that imagination is crucial here.
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Notes
- 1.
Kierkegaard probably knew this verse, written by Paul Pelisson (1624–1693), through the works of Lessing.
- 2.
In arguing this, I follow Wietzke (2013b) and Kemp (2015) who also argue that Kierkegaard’s thought should be understood along the lines of reasons internalism. Wietzke’s (2013b, 84–108) argument , which is developed in the context of an extensive discussion of important themes in Kierkegaard’s authorship, focuses on the notion ‘the single individual’ and Kierkegaard’s maieutic method. I deeply agree with his analysis on this point. However, Wietzke sometimes seems to interpret Kierkegaard’s thoughts too strongly in terms of the contemporary debate on practical reasons, suggesting that Kierkegaard actually thought in these terms and was interested in this kind of philosophy. Wietzke writes, for instance, that for Kierkegaard “achieving this goal [religious or spiritual awakening] means that we come to care deeply about a set of moral norms” (2013b, 85). Moreover, he writes that “the Purity of Heart discourse should be understood as an exercise towards internalizing reasons for action by establishing them within one’s internal set, which then validates them as motivating reasons ” (Wietzke 2013b, 92.) There is a similar tendency in Kemp’s argument. Kemp focuses on Judge William instead of Kierkegaard, and aims to show, through a sketch of the Hegelian background of Judge Williams’ views, that he holds an internalist understanding of practical reasons. Kemp writes that “the Judge hints that the transition from one stage to the other is just a matter of drawing out already present aspects of A’s motivational set. If A can finally come to see the situation as it is, he will be able to appreciate what he really desires is an ethical life” (2015, 9.) I agree with this analysis, but he too seems to suggest that Judge William (and Kierkegaard) themselves would phrase these matters in terms of (a theory of) practical reasons. For example, he writes that “Judge William follows his philosophical contemporaries in adopting an internalist account of reasons ” (Kemp 2015, 7) and he refers to “Kierkegaard’s account of practical reason ” (Kemp 2015, 7). While I believe, as I have pointed out, that it is completely justified to analyze Kierkegaard’s authorship in such terms, I do not believe that Kierkegaard himself understood his ideas this way, nor do I think that he was very interested in the type of philosophy that is now called ‘metaethics’.
- 3.
Compare MacIntyre’s remark: “Kierkegaard put moral philosophy permanently in his debt in a number of ways, among them by his account of the aesthetic. […] For I take it that the attitudes and way of life that Kierkegaard characterized as the aesthetic stage have a reality outside Kierkegaard’s writings […]” (2001, 347).
- 4.
- 5.
See also Rudd’s remark that on a Kierkegaardian view “the hard protective shell of the ego [needs] to be cracked, so that we can recognize consciously the more or less stifled longing for the Good that has been operating unconsciously all along” (2012, 239).
- 6.
This insight, as well as the aphorisms above, explain why I do not agree with Kemp’s conclusion that “A loves his depression ” (2015, 22). Although A uses his depression as a source of creativity, the diapsalmata make very clear that A suffers and, as we have seen, believes life is ‘dreadful’.
- 7.
- 8.
This is an allusion to Horace’s expression ‘de te fabula narratur’, ‘the story is (told) about you’. Given Kierkegaard’s maieutic aims, and his use of indirect communication, it is unsurprising that he is fond of this expression. He uses it a couple of times in the published works (cf. CA, 73/SKS 4, 377 and SLW, 478/SKS 6, 441). Apart from these explicit references I believe the pseudonymous works as such should be interpreted as springing from this principle.
- 9.
Compare Williams’ remark: “The justification he [the moral philosopher] is looking for is in fact designed for the people who are largely within the ethical world, and the aim of the discourse is not to deal with someone who probably will not listen to it, but to reassure, strengthen, and give insight to those who will” (1985, 26).
- 10.
Wietzke’s account is ambiguous, though. This passage suggests that he aims to show how any aesthete can be led to see that he or she has reason to embrace ethical life. However, while developing an argument for that conclusion, he refers to the “individual considering a transition to a new sphere of existence ” (Wietzke 2013b, 180) and the “individual who is seeking to undergo a qualitative transition ” (Wietzke 2013b, 186). Such individuals, of course, are already conflicted and motivated to change their lives, so he ends up demonstrating something that is significantly different from what he set out to demonstrate.
- 11.
That for some people (conscious) despair can come into existence only through unfortunate external circumstances is further suggested by a passage in which Anti-Climacus distinguishes such aesthetes from those who are more reflective, writing that for the latter “despair is not always occasioned by a blow, by something happening” (SUD, 54/SKS 11, 169. My italics).
- 12.
I also disagree with Kemp’s analysis at this point. He suggests that, for Kierkegaard, the imagination is able “to create reasons by giving rise to desires that did not exist prior to one’s encounter with them ” (Kemp 2015, 21). On the basis of the analysis above, it will be clear why I believe the imagination is not capable of creating completely new desires.
Bibliography
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Compaijen, R. (2018). Embracing Ethical Life. In: Kierkegaard, MacIntyre, Williams, and the Internal Point of View. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74552-7_5
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