Abstract
In this chapter, the connection between the notion of truth in a generalized Beth model and the intuitive notion of truth according to the intuitionistic meaning of logical constants is analysed.
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References
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Martino, E. (2018). Natural Intuitionistic Semantics and Generalized Beth Semantics. In: Intuitionistic Proof Versus Classical Truth. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 42. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74357-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74357-8_3
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Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-74356-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-74357-8
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