Abstract
In this chapter, the problem of the failure of completeness of first-order predicate logic in an intuitionistic metamathematics is discussed and the philosophical significance of fallible models is analysed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsReferences
De Swart, H. (1976). Another intuitionistic completeness proof. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 41, 644–662.
Dummett, M. (1977). Elements of intuitionism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Heyting, A. (1956). Intuitionism: An introduction. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
McCarty, D. C. (1991). Incompleteness in intuitionistic metamathematics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 32, 323–358.
Troelstra, A., & Dalen, D. V. (1988). Constructivism in mathematics (Vol. II). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Veldman, W. (1976). An intuitionistic completeness theorem for intuitionistic predicate logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 41, 159–176.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Martino, E. (2018). The Intuitionistic Meaning of Logical Constants and Fallible Models. In: Intuitionistic Proof Versus Classical Truth. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 42. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74357-8_15
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74357-8_15
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-74356-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-74357-8
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)