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Ratio Legis pp 119–136Cite as

Nonconsequential Conception of Neutrality

Abstract

In the paper, I focus on the nonconsequential conception of state neutrality. I claim that we can distinguish three such conceptions: justificatory neutrality, intentional neutrality, and expressive neutrality. Each of them is based on a different understanding of the rationale of an action. The idea of justificatory neutrality provides a constraint on the types of reasons that may legitimately support political decisions. Intentional neutrality refers to considerations that move political decision makers. Expressive neutrality states that the most important aspect of a political action is an attitude that this action expresses. The aim of my research is twofold. I would like, first, to clarify the meaning and distinctiveness of each conception and, second, to propose the defensible variant of state neutrality principle drawing on this classification.

Keywords

  • State neutrality principle
  • Political perfectionism
  • Conceptions of the good
  • Legislative intent
  • Expressivism

The paper was supported by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education under the research grant no 0120/NPRH3/H21/82/2014, “The Neutrality Principle” (Zasada neutralności światopoglądowej).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Waldron (1989), p. 1102.

  2. 2.

    Wall (1998), p. 8.

  3. 3.

    Couto (2014), pp. 98–100.

  4. 4.

    Arneson (2000), p. 39.

  5. 5.

    Chan (2000), pp. 14–15.

  6. 6.

    Dworkin (1986), p. 191.

  7. 7.

    It should be clear that this is only one route of argumentation for political anti-perfectionism. For other arguments in favor of state neutrality, see: Caney (1991), pp. 457–477; Quong (2011), pp. 73–107.

  8. 8.

    Raz (1986), pp. 112–115; Patten (2014), pp. 113–114.

  9. 9.

    Raz (1986), pp. 112–115; Patten (2014), pp. 113–114.

  10. 10.

    Kramer (2017), p. 13.

  11. 11.

    Arneson (1990), p. 217.

  12. 12.

    Kramer (2017), pp. 13–14; Rawls (1993), p. 194.

  13. 13.

    Wall (1998), pp. 35–36.

  14. 14.

    Bird (1996), p. 71; Greenawalt (1995), pp. 46–49; Vallier (2011), p. 387.

  15. 15.

    Rawls (2000), p. 19.

  16. 16.

    Rawls (2000), pp. 18–19.

  17. 17.

    Quong (2011), p. 261; Freeman (2007), pp. 289–290.

  18. 18.

    McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

  19. 19.

    McGowan, p. 447.

  20. 20.

    McGowan, 444.

  21. 21.

    McGowan, 452.

  22. 22.

    Patten (2014), p. 113.

  23. 23.

    Patten (2014), p. 113.

  24. 24.

    Laegaard (2013), pp. 127–128.

  25. 25.

    Brighouse (1995), pp. 62–63.

  26. 26.

    Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

  27. 27.

    Lukumi Babalu, p. 529.

  28. 28.

    Lukumi Babalu, p. 526.

  29. 29.

    Lukumi Babalu, p. 541.

  30. 30.

    Lukumi Babalu, p. 534.

  31. 31.

    Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah, pp. 543–544.

  32. 32.

    Koppelman (2013), pp. 86–87.

  33. 33.

    Thomson (1993), p. 293.

  34. 34.

    Nussbaum (2008), pp. 225–227; Laborde (2013), pp. 83–85; Anderson and Pildes (2000), p. 1550.

  35. 35.

    Anderson and Pildes (2000), p. 1512.

  36. 36.

    Anderson and Pildes (2000), pp. 1512–1513.

  37. 37.

    Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S 668 (1984).

  38. 38.

    Lynch, pp. 688 and 692.

  39. 39.

    Lynch, p. 692.

  40. 40.

    Laegaard (2017), pp. 122–123.

  41. 41.

    Smith (2001), pp. 560–562; Laegaard (2017), pp. 125–127.

  42. 42.

    Eisgruber and Sager (2007), p. 134.

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Ciszewski, W. (2018). Nonconsequential Conception of Neutrality. In: Klappstein, V., Dybowski, M. (eds) Ratio Legis. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74271-7_6

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