Political Economy of Corruption, Clientelism and Vote-Buying in Croatian Local Government

Part of the New Perspectives on South-East Europe book series (NPSE)


Local politics in Croatia is no different from any other local political environment throughout the transitional world. The system is riven with endemic corruption, serving simultaneously the interests of the politicians (the patrons) and either the rent-seeking private sector, politically connected voters, or any other vested interest (the clients). In such a system the best response function of each agent is to be connected and be part of the appropriate clique, the goal of which is to act upon common interests of all those included. This chapter will present a detailed overview of the political economy of corruption, clientelism, and vote-buying in Croatian municipalities, by examining how corruption helps mayors stay in power, how mayors build their small and powerful coalitions of interests with quasi-entrepreneurs that keep them in power, how they manipulate local public finances, and finally how they benefit from political connections with their national-level co-partisans.


Vote Buying Maya Built Endemic Corruption Croatian Voters Intergovernmental Grants 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Pembroke CollegeUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK

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