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Special Bridging Clauses

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Bridging Clauses in European Constitutional Law

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Abstract

This chapter deals with the special bridging clauses that are scattered throughout the Treaties, most notably the sector-specific passerelle clauses, the bridging clause for the area of enhanced cooperation as well as what we call “semi-passerelle clauses”. Of special interest is the relationship between the bridging clause found in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the general bridging clauses.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Langer, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Artikel 153 AEUV, para. 23.

  2. 2.

    European Court of Justice, Case C-36/98, Spain v. Council, decision of 30 January 2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:64, para 54.

  3. 3.

    Cf. Kahl, in Streinz (2012), Artikel 192 AEUV, para. 17; Krämer, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Vorbemerkung zu den Artikeln 191 bis 193 AEUV, para. 8 f.

  4. 4.

    Not exactly a predecessor, Article 67(2) of the EC Treaty contained a provision according to which, after a transitional period of five years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, in which the Council shall act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission or on the initiative of a Member State and after consulting the European Parliament, “the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament, shall take a decision with a view to providing for all or parts of the areas covered by this title to be governed by the [co-decision] procedure referred to in Article 251 and adapting the provisions relating to the powers of the Court of Justice”.

  5. 5.

    Kotzur, in Geiger et al. (2017), Artikel 81 AEUV, para. 15.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Leible, in Streinz (2012), Artikel 81 AEUV, para. 46; Hoppe, in Lenz and Borchardt (2012), Article 81 AEUV, para. 12; Rossi, in Calliess and Ruffert (2016), Artikel 81 AEUV, para. 35.

  7. 7.

    Waldhoff, in Calliess and Ruffert (2016), Artikel 312 AEUV, para. 8.

  8. 8.

    With the exception of Article 312(2) TFEU, according to which the European Council adopts the decision.

  9. 9.

    Not under Article 312(2) and Article 333 TFEU.

  10. 10.

    If anything, the European Parliament is only consulted.

  11. 11.

    A veto right exists only under Article 81(3)(2) TFEU.

  12. 12.

    Reimer (2016), para. 204 f.

  13. 13.

    In an earlier publication, one of the authors prematurely stated that the sector-specific bridging clauses are leges specialis to Article 48(7) TEU and thus suggested that they exclude the application of the general procedure. See Böttner (2017), p. 385.

  14. 14.

    On this, see Böttner (2016b), p. 539.

  15. 15.

    Böttner (2016b), p. 529 f.; Blanke, in Grabitz et al. (2016), Artikel 20 EUV, para. 57, Becker (1998), p. 53.

  16. 16.

    Cf. Böttner (2016b), p. 528.

  17. 17.

    Kuipers (2012), p. 216.

  18. 18.

    European Parliament legislative resolution of 16 June 2010 on the draft Council decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation [2010/0066(NLE)], point 2.

  19. 19.

    Admittedly, this is debated amongst European law scholars. While some authors reject the idea of an automatic transition into general Union law (see, for example, Zeitzmann (2015), p. 112), it seems that the majority tends towards an automatic transition (see, for example, Böttner (2016b), p. 537; Blanke, in Grabitz et al. (2016), Artikel 20 EUV, para 58; Lacchi (2013), p. 796).

  20. 20.

    See in more detail Böttner (2016a), p. 509 ff.

  21. 21.

    Blanke, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 1 TEU, para. 74.

  22. 22.

    Some authors argue without further reasoning that Article 31(3) TEU is lex specialis. See Wessels and Bopp (2008), p. 24; Peers (2012), p. 65; Herrnfeld, in Schwarze (2012), Artikel 48 EUV, para. 18; Meng, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Artikel 48 EUV, para. 24; Hummer, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Artikel 31 EUV, para. 10; Booß, in Lenz and Borchardt (2012), Artikel 48 EUV, para. 5. See also Wouters et al. (2008), p. 163.

  23. 23.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 and others, Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, headnote 2a.

  24. 24.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92, Treaty of Maastricht, judgment of 12 October 1993, BVerfGE 89, 155, p. 199, and 2 BvE 2/08 and others, Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, para. 312.

  25. 25.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 and others, Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, para. 317.

  26. 26.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 and others, Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, para. 318.

  27. 27.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 and others, Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, para. 319.

  28. 28.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 and others, Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, para. 320 f.

  29. 29.

    Act on the Exercise by the Bundestag and by the Bundesrat of their Responsibility for Integration in Matters concerning the European Union (Responsibility for Integration Act) of 22 September 2009, as amended by Article 1 of the Act of 1 December 2009.l.

  30. 30.

    Ohler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Artikel 48 EUV, para. 54; Kaufmann-Bühler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Artikel 42 EUV, para. 74 and 77; Regelsberger and Kugelmann, Streinz (2012), Artikel 31 EUV, para 14.

  31. 31.

    Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2016), Artikel 31 EUV, para. 18, and Artikel 48 EUV, para. 16.

  32. 32.

    Orzan, in Curti Gialdino (2012), Articolo 31 TUE, p. 331 (333).

  33. 33.

    On unanimity voting in international organisations in general, see Böttner and Wessel, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 31 TEU, para. 7.

  34. 34.

    Terpan, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 24 TEU, para 16 ff.; Böttner and Wessel, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 31 TEU, para. 13–15.

  35. 35.

    See on this also Eeckhout (2012), p. 279 ff.

  36. 36.

    van Elsuwege (2011), p. 999. See also Kaufmann-Bühler and Meyer-Landrut, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Artikel 31 EUV, para 10.

  37. 37.

    Terpan, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 24 TEU, para. 20.

  38. 38.

    See in detail Böttner and Wessel, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 31 TEU, para. 32–35. Qualified majority voting is also possible in a limited number of other cases, e.g. the establishment and financing of a start-up fund for military and defence operations (Article 41(3)(3) TEU), the establishment of the European Defence Agency (Article 45(2) TEU) and some decisions in relation to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (Article 46 TEU) in the Common Security and Defence Policy. As a counter-weight to these exceptions, the Treaty maintained the ‘emergency brake’ (as a codification of the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise) for situations in which a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority voting (see Böttner and Wessel, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 31 TEU, para. 38–41).

  39. 39.

    Böttner and Wessel, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 31 TEU, para. 50–53.

  40. 40.

    See Böttner and Wessel, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 31 TEU, para. 16 ff.

  41. 41.

    Cf. Marquardt and Gaedtke, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Artikel 31 EUV, para. 2.

  42. 42.

    For an application of Article 48(7) TEU also Regelsberger (2008), p. 273; Marquardt and Gaedtke, in von der Groeben et al. (2015), Artikel 31 EUV, para. 12. Unclear Rathke, in von Arnauld and Hufeld (2010), IntVG, para. 81 (combination of the special bridging clauses and Article 48(7) TEU) and para. 97 (national parliaments have no veto under Article 31 TEU).

  43. 43.

    With the same view Schmalenbach, in Mayer and Stöger (2013), Artikel 31 EUV, para. 26; see also Lang, in Pocar and Baruffi (2014), Articolo 31 TUE, para. 4. Kaufmann-Bühler and Meyer-Landrut, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Artikel 31 EUV, para. 37, base the application of Article 48(7) TEU on the fact that Article 31(3) TEU does not give any further indications regarding the procedure for the use of the passerelle clause.

  44. 44.

    Kaufmann-Bühler and Meyer-Landrut, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Artikel 31 EUV, para. 37.

  45. 45.

    Terpan, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 24 TEU, para. 19–21.

  46. 46.

    Terpan, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 24 TEU, para. 22.

  47. 47.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. US 19/08, Treaty of Lisbon I, decision of 26 November 2008, ECLI:CZ:US:2008:Pl.US.19.08.1, para. 162 f.

  48. 48.

    Rathke, in von Arnauld and Hufeld (2010), IntVG, para. 92.

  49. 49.

    With this wording Vogel and Eisele, in Grabitz et al. (2015), Artikel 82 AEUV, para. 111.

    The German term “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” describes the power to decide on one’s own competences. The European Union does not dispose of this power, but instead is subject to the conferral of competences (Article 5(2) TEU).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. German University of Administrative Sciences, Speyer, Germany

    Robert Böttner

  2. Faculty of Law, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

    Jan Grinc

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Böttner, R., Grinc, J. (2018). Special Bridging Clauses. In: Bridging Clauses in European Constitutional Law. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73341-8_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73341-8_3

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